|
Commentator (in alphabetical
order)
*Dinesh Agrawal
Deputy General Manager (R&R)
National Thermal Power Corporation Ltd.
India 4 October 1999
*Mr.
Shahid Alam (Former Project Director, Resettlement, JMBP) Resettlement
Specialist, Jamuna Bridge Railway Link Project Dhaka, Bangladesh
*Richard E.
Bissell Executive Director, Policy Division National Academy of Sciences
Washington, D.C
Peter
Bosshard
Berne Declaration , 29
September
*Peter
Bosshard
Berne Declaration
Switzerland 23 September 1999
*Anna Dunets
John van Nostrand Associates
*T. Herbert
Prerana Resource Centre
* Jane Hill
President of the
American Anthropological
Association
*Ryan Hunter
Slovak National Coordinator
CEE Bankwatch Network
Center for Environmental Public Advocacy
Slovak Republic September 10, 1999
*Rohit Jain
Vice President
CADAM
Delhi, India 28 September 1999
*Manish Joshi
Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra
Dehradun, U.P., India September 15,
1999
*Monsieur
Jean Roger Mercier
Responsable environnementale pour l'Afrique.
Washington September 8, 1999
* Jim
Nations, Conservation International
*Dr. NDE
Executive President
Committee for the Coordination of Durable Development (CCDD)
Date of Creation: 1995
Statute: NGO Comment of 9 September
1999
* Alexandra
Page
Indian Law Resource Center
*Minar Pimple
Executive Director
Youth for Unity and Voluntary Action (YUVA)
Mumbai, India 17 September 1999
*Sam Rao, Senior Vice President
KCP Associates International Chicago/Manila/Nairobi
*B. Venkat Rao
Director
Ventre for Management and Social Research
Hyderabad, India 21 September 1999
*D. Narasimha Reddy
Executive Director
Centre for Resource Education,
Hyderabad, India September 14, 1999
*Ritsumeikan
University Research Group on Involuntary Resettlement
Chie GONDO, Takako HARUYAMA, Bunpei
HIROTA, Hirokatsu INOUE,
Hiroyuki IKUTA, Phil Hwa JO, Masao KAWAI, Nang Mya Kay
Khaing , Yuji OGAWA, Akinori SEKIDO, Hiroki SHIGENO, Shigehiro TAKAGI, Naoki
UEHATA, Makoto YAGUCHI
*Thayer
Scudder California Institute of Technology
* Pierre
Senecal
Conseiller Environment, Hydro-Quebec
Chair, EIA Technical Committee
Canadian Standards Association (CSA International)
IAIA Past-president 1996-97
Alex Wilks Coordinator, The Brenton Woods Project
*Achyut
Yagnik
Convenor
Forum 21
Ahmedabad, India 27 September 1999
Peter
Bosshard
Berne
Declaration
29 September
BD
Comments on the World Bank's Resettlement Policy Conversion
Introduction:
The
Berne Declaration appreciates the opportunity to comment on the proposed
conversion of the World Bank's resettlement and rehabilitation policy (OD
4.30/OP 4.12). The BD is a Swiss non-governmental organization with 16,000
members. It has advocated more equitable and environmentally sustainable
North-South relations since 1968.
The
BD has monitored World Bank projects such as the India NTPC Power Generation
project for many years. Like many other NGOs, has often been disturbed about
the failure of rehabilitation in resettlement projects. This failure has
created severe problems for 100,000s of people, and has triggered some of the
most important requests for investigation by the Inspection Panel. The
pending policy conversion must help to improve the performance of
resettlement projects. This is a test case for the World Bank's commitment to
the overarching goal of poverty reduction.
The
following comments focus on the issues of monitoring and supervision, of
land-for-land vs. cash compensation, and of restoration vs. improvement of
incomes. The Berne Declaration is concerned that rather than addressing the
critical loopholes of OD 4.30, the proposed new policy severely weakens a core
provision of the current policy. This weakening contradicts earlier claims
that the ongoing conversion process would not water down the earlier
operational directives.
Monitoring
and supervision:
In
paragraphs 5, 16 and 22, the proposed OP 4.12 attributes the responsibility
for monitoring to the borrowing government, and for supervision to the Bank.
This new distinction weakens the position of affected people and qualifies
the Bank's commitment to project implementation. Experience indicates that an
effective monitoring of resettlement projects is usually lacking, and that
governments are hardly ever committed to complying with Bank policies. OED's
June 1998 report on "Recent Experience with Involuntary
Resettlement" refers to "the governments' disinterest in the
M&E activity", which was "undisguised and tolerated by the
bank" (p. 5, para. 17). With such a poor record of the past, the Bank
should not disengage from its responsibility for project monitoring.
In
footnote 20, the proposed OP 4.12 suggests that borrowers create independent
advisory panels of resettlement specialists, a procedure which is now
followed for environmental assessments. This idea deserves support. The
proposed panels could be strengthened if they were established by the Bank and
not the borrowers. Their reports should be made available toproject-affected
people as a matter of principle.
Land-for-land
vs. cash compensation
According
to OD 4.30, "the Bank encourages 'land for land' approaches, providing
replacement land at least equivalent to the lost land". This is a core
provision of the current directive, which has encouraged similar provisions
in the R&R policies of many borrowing governments and agencies. It is
strongly qualified by the proposed new policy, which states in paragraph 9:
"If sufficient land is not available, non land-based options built
around opportunities for employment or self-employment should be provided in
addition to cash compensation for land and other assets lost."
This
change of policy is completely unacceptable. Contrary to the Bank's wishful
thinking, non land-based rehabilitation options - and especially the
much-touted self-employment schemes - have so far almost always failed, and
particularly in rural settings. While land is passed on from one generation
to the next, cash compensation is typically spent within a short period, and
training programs are usually not sufficient to turn farmers and peasants
into successful entrepreneurs in saturated markets. The failure of non
land-based rehabilitation is confirmed by OED's June 1998report (pp. 8 and
55), and by the reports of the Inspection Panel e.g. onthe NTPC project in
India. OED argues that this "only means the Bank has to put many more of
its best development planners onto the task" (p. 8). Yet it would be
cynical to weaken the policy before the best development planners have
demonstrated their ability to deliver non land-based rehabilitation. The
impact of this change will be borne by affected people, who typically belong
to the poorest members of society.
Some
observers might argue that since many Bank projects have not included
land-for-land rehabilitation in the past anyway, the proposed policy
conversion will not change much in actual practice. Yet so far, the official
preference for land-based rehabilitation has tended to discourage borrowers
and task managers from engaging in difficult resettlement operations.
Indirectly, the stated policy has helped to prevent the externalization of
social costs, and has contributed to a certain reduction(although not
minimization) of resettlement. The Berne Declaration is concerned that giving
up the preference for land-based rehabilitation might open the floodgates and
weaken the healthy scepticism among Bank staff and borrowers to engage in
resettlement projects.
Land-based
rehabilitation is often very difficult to achieve. Still, the Bank should not
qualify its preference for this option as long as it is not capable of
minimizing resettlement on the conceptual level, and as long as alternative options
such as self-employment schemes have not been demonstrated to work. The
Bank's new OP 4.12 should therefore stick to the preference for land-for-land
rehabilitation as expressed in OD 4.30.
Improving
vs. restoring income levels
A
central problem of the present policy and practice is that resettlement and
rehabilitation are usually not conceived as development projects, butas mere
compensation efforts. In paragraph 1, draft OP 4.12 continues to accept the
"restoration" of income levels which was stipulated by OD 4.30.In
his comments on 27 July, 1999, Prof. Thayer Scudder convincingly argues that
the restoration of pre-project income levels often means a reduction of the
standards of living. The Berne Declaration agrees with Prof. Scudder in that rehabilitation
should be conceived as development projects, that OP4.12 should stipulate an
improvement of the living standard of affected people, and that the reference
to income restoration should be deleted.
Thank
you for your consideration of these comments.
Peter
Bosshard
Berne
Declaration
Alex Wilks
Coordinator, The Brenton Woods Project
[The Bretton Woods Project works on World Bank and IMF
issues with a network of 27 UK
non-government organization]
30 September 1999
Resettlement policy conversion:
comments and suggestions
Dear Maninder Gill,
Thank you for your letter of 19 July asking the Bretton
Woods Project to prepare comments on the Bank's conversion of its Operational
Directive on Involuntary Resettlement. The Bank's decision to circulate the
proposed new documents in draft form for comments is very welcome and will I
am sure improve the final products.
In my current position, my previous work with The
Ecologist, I co-wrote Evicted!, the World Bank, British Aid and Forced
Resettlement, and my work over about 8 years in support of the Narmada
Bachao Andolan, India and the World Commission on Dams, I have come to
appreciate the importance of how resettlement policy is framed and
implemented. On the documents you sent, I have the following three main
comments.
1)Minimising displacement: what methodology?
It is clear to me, especially from reading the Morse
Report, the Bank's 1994 resettlement review, and my visits to some of the
disgraceful resettlement sites for people displaced by the Sardar
Sarovar/Narmada project, that the overriding aim of any resettlement policy
should be to ensure that displacement is minimised, as there are extremely
few cases where relocation and compensation of project affected people have
happened successfully.
Recognising this overarching aim, I would strongly
recommend that you clarify what the Bank means by "exploring all viable
alternative project designs" [BP, § 1, (a)]. Clarifying the Bank's
project appraisal methodology is also implicitly supported by Michael Cernea
in his recent book The Economics of Involuntary Resettlement (World Bank,
1999, p.21). He argues:
"The cost-benefit method can be easily
manipulated or influenced by a)
excluding costs caused by the project, b) by the way in which costs and
benefits are valued when direct market prices cannot be observed or are not
conclusive, and c) by the choice of the discount rate to estimate the present
value of a condemned asset. But the point I want to emphasize is that even at
its best, without distortions, the standard cost-benefit method is incapable
of answering the economic and ethical questions involved in forced
displacement" [emphasis in original].
Whilst I do not agree with all of the answers to
this problem that are proposed later in the book, I would urge the Bank to
recognise that the debate on project assessment methodologies is now far too
complex to be summarised by the word "viable". This whole issue
(including on multidimensional aspects of poverty and vulnerability, the
difficulties of commensuration of values, the problems with using discount
rates to produce net present value figures etc etc) is being explored in
detail in many fora at the moment. These include the work of the World
Commission on Dams and at a conference, "The Cost-Benefit Analysis
Dilemma: Strategies and Alternatives" to be held at Yale University,
8-10 October 1999. Both fora are discussing how you can take account of
different social groups' perspectives on valuation and viability, surely
essential in an era where the World
Bank is emphasising its intentions to be participatory, equitable and
holistic in its work.
RECOMMENDATION: that the Bank clarify in detail, with
reference to recent in-depth work such as that mentioned above, how
alternative project approaches and designs are to be assessed. The OP should
also clarify that alternatives assessment must include the no project
option.
2) Land for land compensation: a substantive weakening
The second most important shortcoming of the draft OP and
BP is the way that land for land compensation is treated. The approach
adopted in the draft BP text on land for land compensation is significantly
weaker than the relevant provisions of OD 4.30:
"If
sufficient land is not available, land is not the preferred option of the
displaced persons, or the provision of land would adversely affect the
sustainability of the park or protected area, non land-based options built
around opportunities for employment or self-employment should be provided in
addition to cash compensation for land and other assets lost." [draft
BP, §9]
This rewording gives ample opportunity for officials to
argue that they do not need to provide land for land. This constitutes a
substantive policy shift, contradicting the assurances given in a letter from
Myrna Alexander, then World Bank Director, Operations Policy Department, to
the Bretton Woods Project (4 February 1997): "It is important to reiterate that the conversion
process was never conceived as the opportunity to reformulate policy ....
Occasionally, we have used the conversion process to amend specific aspects
of established policies, but only in a very few cases in which that part of
the policy was clearly no longer applicable or when the Board has
specifically asked for a precise change" [emphasis in original].
My reading of the draft policy, and that of colleagues in
other NGOs, is that it has deliberately been drafted far more weakly than the
OD it is supposed to replace, w
the problems of
cash, rather than land, compensation were clearly recognised.
RECOMMENDATION: reinstate the language in OD 4.30
emphasising that 'cash compensation alone is normally inadequate' and reword
the second half of §9 to clarify that cash options will only be considered in
a very clearly defined and limited set of circumstances. Any changes from the
original policy on this vital matter should be discussed by the Board and
clear reasons given for the Bank's new approach.
3) The
Resettlement Dispute Committee
The new resettlement dispute committee proposed by BP 4.12
is expected to rule on questions of application and scope of the policy. The composition
of the Committee appears unsatisfactory as it may not include the Bank's best
resettlement specialists. It is unclear under what circumstances Task
Managers should ask for a committee ruling to proactively evaluate
compliance,. What is its relationship to the Bank's Operations Evaluation
Department and Quality Assurance Group, and to the project-specific advisory
panels of independent resettlement specialists advocated in footnote 20 on
page 6 of the draft OP?
RECOMMENDATION: the composition and function of the
committee should be reconsidered and clarified. The committee should include
one or more of the Bank's best resettlement specialists, and at least one
independent outside expert from academia or an NGO. The committee's
deliberations should be publicly available.
These are the most
important points which struck me on reviewing the draft OP and BP. Given the
absolute importance of the first point about taking all possible steps to
minimise displacement, and the fact that so much useful work is currently
being done in the context of the World Commission on Dams which itself
results from controversies over Bank-funded resettlement projects, I would
urge you to consider suspending the final publication of your new policy
until after the Commission has presented its conclusions next year.
Please keep me informed about progress on this vital
work.
Yours sincerely,
Alex Wilks Coordinator
cc.
Stephen Pickford/Myles Wickstead, UKDel, World
Bank
Ian Johnson, VP ESSD, World Bank The Clerk, International Development
Committee, House of Common, Achim Steiner, Secretariat, World Commission on
Dams, Interested NGOs
* Mr. Shahid Alam (Former Project Director, Resettlement, JMBP)
Resettlement Specialist, Jamuna Bridge Railway Link Project Dhaka, Bangladesh
Comments on OP
4.12 of the World Bank.
In Bangladesh, we are implementing one of the largest resettlement
projects of the world (Jamuna Multipurpose Bridge Project, JMBP) where about
100,000 people of different categories were affected. For resettlement and
economic rehabilitation of these affected people, we prepared a detail
program called 'Revised Resettlement Action Plan'. The program is under
implementation for the last six years. Although there are few important
issues yet to be addressed in this program, but so far this resettlement
program has been proved to be fairly successfully. This could be achieved
because of a total commitment and a flexible approach we took during
implementation of the program. At the beginning we developed a good database
generated from a comprehensive socioeconomic survey. For day to day
implementation we also have a CMIS. The resettlement program being implemented
by a Resettlement Unit, some government agencies and few renowned NGO.
OD 4.30 was the guiding principle for formulation and implementation
of the above resettlement program for JMBP. During implementation of the
resettlement program at field level it became necessary to prepare detail
implementation procedure or application modalities. As a unique project we
had to develop these detail procedures and modalities according to our need.
In fact these are the responsibility of individual borrowing countries and
may vary from project to project. For that, I do not consider it appropriate
to go for another policy documentation like OP 4.12. So far our experience is
concerned, we consider OD 4.30 as a complete document. For understanding the
Bank Policy on Involuntary resettlement OD 4.30 is considered as a most
precise, innovative and a document which is easy to follow. Although OP 4.12
has been termed as short and focused, but in actual term it has become
more elaborate and lengthy.
The OP/BP 4.12 para 3 says that 'this exercise does not involve a
revision of the current Bank policy on involuntary resettlement, but a
conversion to the new format. However the conversion does clarify certain
ambiguities, and takes into consideration -------.' I don't think there are
ambiguities in OD 4.30. Well any document of this kind can always be improved
and fine-tuned with events and experience.
In this regard the current exercise being undertaken to 'fine-tune' the
involuntary resettlement policy of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) is worth
mentioning. ADB in Nov. 1995 made a policy on 'involuntary resettlement'. The
same policy being implemented in many ADB funded projects of the region. Now
after 4 years, ADB wants to fine-tune its policy in the light of experience
gained in implementing this policy. For that they commissioned a TA and
conducted workshops on case studies in all seven countries namely PRC,
Pakistan, Viet Nam, Bangladesh, Nepal, Indonesia and Philippines. Now ADB is
organizing a workshop in Manila on Aug. 23-24, 1999 where experts from these
seven countries will firm-uptheir recommendations. The purpose is to
fine-tune the policy on involuntary resettlement of ADB. Similarly
'fine-tuning' the OD 4.30 in the light of experience gained by WB from all
over the world will be more appropriate.
Lastly I would like to say that, the world's most eminent
resettlement experts prepared a document like OD 4.30. I personally know many
of them. Also at later stages during implementation of JMBP, I met and
discussed with some of those personalities. In my opinion any major
modifications at this stage may not be helpful.
Thanks and regard.
*Thayer Scudder
California Institute of Technology
CRITIQUE OF
RESETTLEMENT DRAFT OP/BP 4.12: INVOLUNTARY RESETTLEMENT
Introduction
From a position
of pioneering leadership in resettlement guideline formulation the World
Bank's recent guideline revisions have ignored ongoing and recent research on
resettlement outcomes including research-based conclusions reported in two
recent Bank publications. These are the June 1998 Report No. 17538 of the
Operations Evaluation Department on Recent Experience With Involuntary
Resettlement and the Bank's March1999 The Economics of Involuntary
Resettlement: Questions and Challenges edited by Michael Cernea. While the
comments that follow draw on my own 40 years of research with
large-scale river basin development projects, I believe they are also
applicable to involuntary resettlement caused by other large-scale projects
such as coal-burning thermal stations and urban redevelopment.
The Major
Deficiency of the Current Draft Guidelines: Living Standard Restoration - A
Deficiency Which in Itself causes Impoverishment
A critical and
self-defeating weakness of the current policy is the often repeated statement
that "Displaced persons should be assisted in their efforts to improve
their livelihoods and standards of living or at least restore them"
(First page of the 1999 Draft and written in the 1990 OD 4.30as
"assisted in their efforts to improve their former living
standards, income earning capacity, and production levels, or at least to
restore them." ). While the first part of the 1999 sentence is
excellent, the subsequent acceptance of restoration undercuts the Bank's
emphasis on the resettlement component as a development project. For the
various reasons outlined in the next section, allowing restoration as opposed
to improvement tends to make a majority of those resettled worse off.
Research-based
Reasons why Restoration tends to Worsen Poverty among Resettled Households
and Communities
1. The Planning
Process: A first reason relates to the nature of the lengthy planning process
for major dams as well as for urban redevelopment projects. Though the
exception, that can go on for up to forty years as in the case of China’s
Three Gorges Project. However a 10 to 20 year planning horizon is not exceptional.
During that time, governments, private sector entrepreneurs, NGOs and project
affected people themselves are much less likely to make any investments
within the rural and urban areas concerned. Hence by the time a decision is
made to proceed with major feasibility studies including "base-line
studies" to determine pre-project living standards of future resettles,
those people's living standards will already be worse off than those of
neighbors living outside the project area.
2. The Nature of
the Resettlement Process: Another reason why mere restoration can be expected
to actually lower living standards relates tithe nature of the resettlement
process.
a. During the years or year immediately preceding
removal income and living standards tend to drop for a number of reasons.
Once people realize that relocation may be forthcoming, housing improvements
are less likely to be made while local innovators and entrepreneurs are less
likely to invest in new enterprises. Hence in the case of the Swaziland-South
African Maguga Dam on which construction has just begun this year, local
people who wanted to start cattle coops and other business ventures over ten
years ago were told by the authorities not to proceed. As for other impacts
adversely affecting living standards, labor migrants are apt to return home
to help their families hence those families losing access to remittances. Due
to uncertainty over removal dates rural people may also be less likely to
harvest good crops, having planted a smaller area or being told - as in some
cases - by the authorities not to plant at all because removal, subsequently
delayed, is imminent.
b. As for the period immediately following
removal, adjusting to new habitats, new neighbors (the hosts), and government
programs reduce time and energy for restoring whatever living standards those
displaced previously had. During that time period (which seldom lasts for
less than a year) living standards for the majority can be expected to drop.
For that reason, mere restoration requires improvement. As for that minority
who are able to obtain work during a project's construction phase, their
living standards also tend to drop once the construction phase ends because
longer-term development opportunities tend not to be available at the
appropriate time. Even where plans include a development component, a time
gap is common between people's physical removal and the implementation of
development plans, as is the case, for example, today with the World
Bank-assisted Lesotho Highlands Water Project.
Though dropped in
the Bank's latest draft (hence weakening it) even the World Bank/IFC January
1998 draft guidelines themselves state that living standards tend to drop
following removal, so that eventual restoration in fact would not compensate
for whatever downturn occurred before and after removal. Hence section
5a)(vi) states that those displaced should be” provided with development
assistance and measures for support during a transition period until
they have had a reasonable opportunity to establish their former production
levels, income-earning capacity, and living standards." So without
the project, living standards would most likely have been higher for the
majority during that period; indeed they might have even gone up in those
countries with a recent positive rate of development -as in China for
example.
3.
The Nature of Pre-Project Bench Mark Studies: Current guidelines are
based on the inaccurate assumption that pre-project bench mark (baseline in
the Bank's terminology) studies accurately reflect pre-project income and
living standards; hence constitute a basis against which restoration can be
measured. Yet even where pre-resettlement surveys are undertaken -- and
adequate ones are rare -- there is a general tendency to underestimate
people’s incomes at that time. For example, those involved can be expected to
under-report income due to forgetfulness (especially common in regard to
contributions of other family members) or fear of being taxed or because
sources of that income may be considered unflattering, quasi-legal or
illegal.
The World Bank's
own evaluations refer to the inadequacy of such studies as a baseline against
which to measure subsequent restoration. Thailand's PakMun Dam - one of the
World Commission on Dams' focal studies -- is a good example since the Bank
considers resettlement outcomes there as one of its most successful (in part,
in my opinion, because the project authority "was actually committed to
exceed the World Bank resettlement policy"[World Bank, 1998: 4]). Yet in
that case, "There is no true baseline study, only preliminary surveys in
1982 and 1983, too early to serve as a baseline"(page 19)
The Pak Mun
preliminary surveys considered only income, and that incompletely since
income from fishing was excluded; and they dealt only with households
requiring physical removal. Completed 7-8 years before construction began,
results were considered so inadequate that a second survey was carried out.
Though considered a baseline study by the project authorities that survey was
actually done four months after the dam had been completed and resettlers had
moved into their new houses. While it dealt with activities over the past 12
months, including eight months before reservoir inundation, surveys undertaken
during the year of removal can not be expected to provide a reliable record
for the reasons noted in the previous point dealing with the nature of the
resettlement process. Moreover, "the baseline data on fishing income was
inadequate" (page 6).
4.
Loss of Arable Land: Especially where farm land and access to common
property resources are lost or reduced, household expenses following
resettlement are apt to be greater than before. Increased costs are
especially a problem for resettlers who have to purchase food supplies that
previously they were able to produce, or where less fertile soils require the
purchase of such inputs as improved seed and fertilizers, or where new
production techniques require loans that lead to indebtedness. Another reason
why loss of arable land is apt to leave households worse off, is that such
land usually is passed on from generation to generation. The same is not the
case where cash compensation is provided or where first generation resettlers
obtain jobs.
5.
Cultural and Health Impacts: Draft OP 4.12 only covers direct economic
and social impacts (page 1). It does not cover the wide range of negative
cultural impacts reported in study after study that relate to loss of home,
burial grounds, religious sites, and ideological and political control over a
familiar habitat. Nor does it cover the public health implications of such
psychological impacts as "grieving for a lost home" and” anxiety
for the future" which are especially serious for indigenous people, and
for many ethnic minorities and peasant communities, with strong ties to the
land and limited mobility, as well as for low income urban communities.
There is no way
that social cost benefit analyses can accurately reflect the hardships
involved; hence the need for resettlement components to be planned and
implemented as development projects to offset such costs by helping
resettlers become project beneficiaries.
To sum up the
above five points, even restoration of living standards requires an emphasis
on improvement during the resettlement process. The failure of the World Bank
Guidelines to recognize the further impoverishing impacts of mere restoration
not only causes its own guidelines to be inadequate, but also encourages
borrower countries to emulate those guidelines. That is the case even in
countries with improved national policies for resettlement. China is a case
in point. According to Article 3of the January 25, 1991 regulation on 'Land
Acquisition and Resettlement Regulation for the Construction of Large and
Medium-Sized Water Conservancy Projects,' "The Government advocates and
supports resettlement with development." Yet the next article follows
the World Bank's guidelines when it states, "all resettlers shall be
assisted to improve or at least restore their former living standard in
steps." Note that the comment on” in steps" shows that the
authorities expect living standards to be worse off during the transition
period.
Mere restoration
of living standards gives a government a fallback positioning spite of
increasing evidence that implementation of that position further
impoverishes the majority. That is a conclusion, incidentally, that Chinese
researchers have also reached. Founded in 1992, the National Research
Centre for Resettlement at Hohai University has been studying dam-related
resettlement since the mid-1980s. Like myself, they have evolved a four stage
framework for describing the resettlement process. During their first stage
labeled 'Moving', they note that "the standard of living and production
of most displaced persons declines;" hence the need to improve living
standards merely to restore them.
The Current
Status of the Ongoing Restoration versus Improvement Controversy within the
World Bank
According to
ICOLD (International Commission on Large Dams)'s May 1997Position Paper on
Dams and the Environment "For the population involved, resettlement must
result in a clear improvement of their living standards, because the people
directly affected by a project should always be the first to benefit"
(pp. 11-13). In the World Bank's latest publication on resettlement issues
("The Economics of Involuntary Resettlement: Questions and
Challenges"), the editor and initiator of the Bank's 1980 Guidelines
states "The primary goal of any involuntary resettlement process is to
prevent impoverishment and to improve the livelihood of resettlers"
(Cernea,1999: 6). In the latest resettlement review by the Bank's Operations
Evaluation Department, the authors state "The emphasis should shift from
restoring income levels, which suggest stagnation at pre-dam lifestyles, to
improving income levels, which brings the displaces into the development
process along with the project's primary beneficiaries" (World Bank
1998: 7).
Granted such opinions
of the World Bank's resettlement experts, why is it that the current
redrafting of the Bank's resettlement guidelines continues to allow
restoration as the goal of its policy? The question is also perplexing
because the header at the top of the latest policy draft states” The World
Bank Group A World Free of Poverty." Yet the policy which
follows allows borrowers to replicate poverty. That is because almost
invariably people required to resettle are poor. Frequently as in the United
States, India and Brazil dam-resettlers, for example, are tribal people who
are the poorest of the poor. Yet where involving what are frequently the
largest development projects in a county's development plan, the Bank’s
resettlement policy allows such projects to merely replicate pre-existing
poverty among those who are the main losers and risk-takers.
Resettlement
experts within the World Bank's Social Development Department explain this
paradox in terms of strong resistance within the World Bank to revising the
guidelines to require improvement. In commenting on the OED belief that
"there is strong case for strengthening" the current OP
4.12resettlement draft (1998: 10), the Bank Management response to the
recommendation "to change the policy benchmark from restoration of
incomes of affected people to improvement" was that "Bank policies
already establish high standards for dealing with involuntary
resettlement" and "Management sees the implementation of existing
policy as the key priority" (1998: 16).
Two other reasons
are also mentioned for not altering the "restoration” stance. One is
that in shifting from the Bank’s Operational Directives to the new OP/BP
format, those involved are instructed to convert not revise the directives.
That argument is not convincing, at least with the resettlement guidelines,
since in fact they have been revised to include a wider range of resettlement
situations. They have also been weakened in that some previously mandated
requirements have now been weakened to the status of suggested "Best
Practice."
The second reason
relates to the wider range of resettlement situations that the Guidelines now
cover, including removal of people from new biosphere another reserves and
from national parks, or restriction of access to such reserves and parks.
If mere restoration is acceptable in some such cases, and I do not
accept that it is, then a single uniform policy for all types of involuntary
resettlement is no longer acceptable. Moreover, at a time when the World
Commission on Dams has the responsibility to develop guidelines and criteria,
it is inappropriate for the Bank to preempt the WCD process by not only
drafting new guidelines for one of the most controversial issues relating to
dams, but also to draft guidelines which allow the replication of poverty.
The main
argument, however, by opponents within the Bank to shifting from restoration
to improvement relates to the failure of the existing guidelines to even
achieve their goal of restoration. Why revise goals upward to
require improvement, they argue, when "The Bank has acknowledged that
the record on restoring - let alone improving - incomes has been
unsatisfactory"(World Bank, 1998:2).
I reject that
argument for two major reasons. The first, for the four reasons already
noted, is that a major reason for the failure of the Bank’s guidelines to
restore income and living standards is the emphasis in the guidelines on
compensation and restoration as opposed to development. Because of that
emphasis, potential development opportunities are not emphasized during the
planning process. Indeed, as the 1998 OED study notes,” the weakest part of
planning is on economic rehabilitation" (page 6). No wonder the Bank's
guidelines fail to achieve results since development planning and
implementation, as we have seen above, is necessary even for income and
living standard restoration.
The second reason
why I reject the argument that failure to restore in itself is reason enough
not to seek the goal of improvement is that, according to the Bank's own
studies, the most successful cases of dam-induced resettlement are cases
where the policy of the implementing agency or the national government is to
improve living standards. Two such cases recently analyzed by the Bank are
Thailand's Pak Mun Project and China’s Shuikou Project.
Benchmark
(Baseline) Studies and Monitoring and Evaluation.
Yet another
problem that the World Bank faces with the current guidelines is the
difficulty of determining when income and living standards have been
restored. Partly that is due to the inadequacy of the baseline studies
themselves and to the inadequacy of the subsequent monitoring process. Partly
it is due to the difficulty of determining the meaning of restoration granted
the less tangible public health and cultural costs of resettlement. Where the
goal is improvement, it becomes easier for monitors to decide whether or not
living standards are going up, staying the same or dropping. Through the use
of a range of indicators, Wimaladharma and I, for example, could make
such determinations within a matter of minutes during our long-term
monitoring of the same households in Sri Lanka's Accelerated Mahaweli
Project.
Other Issues
Merely omitting
the phrase "and restore" would go a long ways toward making the
Bank's resettlement guidelines State of the Art. My further comments relate
to changes that could embellish that result but that would still encourage
failure among burrowers whose policy remains a "restoration one."
Cash
Compensation. While Section 9 of OP 4.12 is an improvement over earlier
drafts, Section 10is still worrisome since loss of access to arable land and
communal natural resources can jeopardize resettlers during
national/international periods of economic downturn even where "markets
for land, housing and labor exist" and where "displaced persons use
such markets." Pak Mun, considered one of the Bank’s most successful
cases, is an example. There approximately two thirds of compensation offered
was cash. Though cash compensation for arable land was higher than replacement
value, many resettlers opted not to use that compensation for
purchasing replacement land, but rather for investing in savings, children's
welfare, housing and consumer goods. In OED's 1998 case study, the authors
explained this 1996 result in terms of the increasing importance of nonfarm
activities and employment, including employment in Bangkok. However, only
several years later such households no longer have the natural resource base
to fall back on after employment opportunities for wage laborers were
adversely affected by the Asian downturn. Those households are now hurting.
Loss of Land (and
Protection of Customary Land Tenure OD 4.30 emphasizes that "The
objective is to treat customary and formal rights as equally as possible in
devising compensation rules and procedures." Section 13 of OP 4.12
weakens that statement by referring to” customary and traditional rights
recognized under the laws of the country.” Where land is owned by the State,
that phrase puts communities with such rights at risk, especially in
countries like Mauritania and Somalia that have passed legislation favoring
individual rights at the expense of customary rights, and countries like
Zambia which have been considering similar legislation.
Section 31 on
land acquisition. While the World Bank family has always tried to avoid
financing land acquisition, OD 4.30 (1990) at least qualifies that stance by
stating that” normally" the Bank does not "disburse against land
acquisition." In this section OP 4.12 drops the word "normally,"
hence precluding any exceptions (such as providing loans for land purchase)
to a now rigid policy.
Footnote 20 of OP
4.12For contentious projects, an international advisory panel of experts
should be required not merely recommended as is the case here.
Section 11 of OP
4.12 Annex. Under resettlement measures the wording should be
"compensation and development measures" rather than
"compensation and other resettlement measures." One worrisome thing
about the Bank policy as well as the Overview of the June 1998 OED review of
involuntary dam resettlement is the ease with which the Bank, after
emphasizing that resettlement projects should be development projects,
thereafter emphasizes compensation and rehabilitation rather than
compensation and development. Compensation and rehabilitation are at best
mitigation measures that do not even restore living standards. Emphasis on
compensation and other mitigation methods, as opposed to improvement of
living standards, is apt to bias borrowers away from dealing with project
affected people as beneficiaries.
Section 21 on
Monitoring and Evaluation. This is inadequate since too much emphasis is
placed on the implementing agency doing its own monitoring. It is not
sufficient to merely state” supplemented by independent monitors as
appropriate." Who decides what is” appropriate?"
Sam Rao, Senior
Vice President KCP Associates International Chicago/Manila/Nairobi
Comments on Draft OP 4.12, Draft OP 4.12
Annex and Draft BP 4.12 are provided below:
The World Bank
should be commended for undertaking
to expand the 1990 operational policy (OP) on Involuntary Resettlement
(OP no. 4.30 of about 6pages) into OP 4.12 (about 10 pages), OP 4.12 Annex
describing the elements of a resettlement plan, an abbreviated resettlement
plan and a resettlement policy
framework (about 7 pages) and BP (Bank procedures) 4.12 (about 5
pages). We hope that the Source Book on Good Practices (GP 4.12) will also be
shared with civil society before finalization.
Draft OP 4.12:
Reaffirmation of Key Policy Points
It would be helpful to further delineate
the policy objectives under paragraph
1, as follows:
a) Involuntary
resettlement should be avoided, where
feasible, exploring all viable alternatives
b) Where involuntary
resettlement is unavoidable, it
should be minimized through appropriate adjustments in project design (for example, road
realignment, adjusting dam height,
etc.).
c) Resttlement activities
should be conceived and executed…..
d) Displaced persons ....
The Bank and its borrowers seemed to have
largely focused on technical design
aspects first and saw involuntary
resettlement as an unavoidable
consequence. It is necessary to shift the emphasis to avoidance of involuntary resettlement
in the first place by exploring all
viable options. Also, the examples of
road realignment and dam height
adjustment should stay in the text (and not lost in footnote) to
remind Bank Task Teams (TTs) and borrowers to explore project design avenues
to minimize involuntary resettlement.
Draft OP 4.12: Harmonizing Policy
Requirements with Bank Instruments
Under Section IV. Resettlement Instruments,
it is desirable to also cover
structural adjustment loans (SALs),
Sector Adjustment Loans (SECALs),
Adjustable Program Loans (APLs) and Learning and innovation Loans (LILs) which together
constitute more than half the Bank's
lending operations. In many cases,
the direct adverse economic and social
impacts of SALs, SECALs, etc. may be evident only during
implementation. Accordingly, a process approach analogous to that proposed to be adopted in projects involving restriction of access to
legally designated parks and
protected areas may be appropriate to mitigate them.
Draft OP 4.12 Annex
An outline of an action plan (mentioned in
para 15 of BP 4.12) with the
essential elements needs to be
prepared and included in this Annex to help borrowers, executing and implementing agencies, and Bank TTs
and TTLs. This should cover not only the involuntary restriction of access to
legally designated parks and protected areas, but also the adverse impacts of
SALs, SECALs, etc. It may be desirable to prepare separate action plan outlines
for each of the above lending instruments.
Draft BP 4.12: Avoidance of Involuntary
Resettlement
The draft is silent on avoidance of
involuntary resettlement. The first
step (Bank procedure) at the project
identification stage should be to explore alternatives to avoid involuntary resettlement. This would help address the very first policy
objective of avoidance of involuntary
resettlement.
Draft BP 4:12: Coverage of SALs, SECALs,
etc.
The Bank's
procedures to address the direct adverse
effects of SALs, SECALs, etc. during their identification, preparation, appraisal and implementation should be included in this
section to guide the borrowers and
Bank teams.
For consideration and action as
appropriate.
Sam
Rao, Senior
Vice President KCP Associates
International Chicago/Manila/Nairobi
Some
clarifications on the types of direct adverse impacts of SALs and SECALs that
may be suitable for coverage under this Policy:
(i) involuntary displacement of people,
(ii) loss or significant restriction of access to livelihood
opportunities, and
(iii) Reduction or loss of access to public services including food,
primary education and basic healthcare.
For your
consideration and use as appropriate.
* Richard E. Bissell Executive Director, Policy Division
National Academy of Sciences Washington, D.C
As a former
member of the Inspection Panel, I was provided the draft OP/BP by the
Executive Secretary at your suggestion for any comments I might have.
I have very few comments
to make substantively except to say that the reformatting has helped
considerably in clarifying some of the ambiguities of the current policy.
Without being an expert in resettlement, it was clear to me that many
of the Bank staff found the current policy to be unclear with regard to many
concrete situations on the ground, and this new approach has clearly moved in
the right direction.
My only concern relates to
the "Cover Note for Posting," where in paragraph 10you have stated
that the planned sourcebook for the GP 4.12 "will provide detailed
interpretation of various aspects of the policy." This may
create a problem for the Bank in the case of projects that become subject to
a request for inspection. The Inspection Panel bases its reviews of
projects only on OPs and BPs, by decision of the Executive Directors, and not
on GPs. GPs are supposed to provide only guidance to staff and because
they are not binding they are out of the purview of the Panel. If the
GP is providing not examples of application of policies but an authoritative
interpretation thereof, the GP would be binding for the staff and for the
Panel which would then have” jurisdiction" over it. In such a
case, the sourcebook would become more of a constraint instead of being a
helpful resource to staff.
Thank you for the
opportunity to comment.
September 8, 1999
Monsieur Jean Roger Mercier
Responsable environnementale pour l'Afrique.
Washington
Objet: Réponse à la lettre à propos du projet
OP/BP 4.12 sur les réinstallations involontaires
Faisant suite à votre lettre à propos de l'OP/BP 4.12, nous vous sommes
reconnaissant de solliciter notre avis sur une question aussi délicate
.toutefois nous nous excusons du retard qu'accuse notre réponse. Cet état de
chose est en partie dû au fait que la Directive Opérationnelle 4.30 sur les
réinstallations involontaires du 29 juin 1990 telle que revue et mise à jour
à l'issue de sa transformation en OP/BP/BE 4.12 sur les réinstallation
involontaires traite de la question avec beaucoup de clairvoyance, d'esprit
d'anticipation et de précision. Les seules suggestions que nous avons à faire
porte sur le volet supervision des réinstallations involontaires.
A l'effet nous pensons que sur ce point en plus du suivi étroit mené par le
vice président en cheville avec le Directeur - Pays concerné, la B.M:
a. Devrait faire mention de manière formelle et expresse d'un dispositif
coercitif à mettre en ouvre contre tout emprunteur défaillant.
b. Intégrer ce dispositif à tout contrat de mise à disposition du prêt et en
faire la condition d'octroi dudit prêt.
En espérant accrocher votre attention sur ce point
Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Responsable de l'évaluation environnementale
pour l'Afrique, l'expression de notre profond respect.
NAPI KAMAHA Julien Omer
September 9, 1999
Comments from:
Dr. NDE
Executive President
Committee for the Coordination of Durable Development (CCDD)
Date of Creation: 1995
Statute: NGO
CCDD BACKGROUND INFORMATION
MAIN OBJECTIVES:
- Promotion of sustainable management of natural resources
- Fight against poverty and misery
- Environment protection
- Community development
MAIN DOMAINS OF EXPERTISE :
- Environmental and social impact assessment
- Forestry and agro-forestry
- Numerized cartography and GIS (Geographical Information System)
- Follow-up and evaluation
REMARKS ON THE DRAFT OP/BP 4.12 ON INVOLUNTARY RESETTLEMENT
Introduction:
CCDD is a Cameroon environmental NGO. We are member of GCA/Group for
Concentration and Action, a Cameroon NGO network which has been fighting for
three years for the mitigation of negative environmental and social impacts
in the framework of the Chad - Cameroon Oil and Pipeline Project. Last July
1999, I was invited and took part in a training seminar on the Safeguard
Policies of the Word Bank organized in Yaounde by the Cameroon Residence
Mission. That seminar was very successful, as it helped the participants have
a broader view and more detail of the Work Bank environmental safeguard
policies, the Work Bank spirit and philosophy, and other aspects of that
institution.
All that puts us on a better position to comment on the Draft OP /BP 4.12 on
involuntary resettlements.
GENERAL REMARKS
Unlike certain complex Work Bank documents, this draft version looks simple,
clear and straight to the point . The main document is divided into seven
sections, and the annex into three, and the sections are further more divided
into paragraphs. The advantage of that presentation is that it makes it
easier for the Borrower's experts to understand and comply with.
As far as the content of the Directive is concerned, we appreciate the effort
of the Word Bank aimed at reducing the sufferings and losses of the
population affected by a project. But we believe that those sufferings and
losses can only be reduced, "mitigated", but never cancelled, for,,
truly speaking, nothing can replace your home or your homeland. Displacement
has two types of impacts: material and visible impact, and moral and
invisible impact. The former can be mitigated and even completely corrected,
but the latter is impossible to really mitigate and correct, as it damages
the intricate life web that ties a man to his home, his family, his land, the
surrounding hills , streams, mountains, rivers, villages, etc, to his youth,
his past, his history and that of his family, of his ancestors, his tribe...
Can you pay for all that? It is unevaluable . Can you resettle all that? Is
untransferable...
Thus I believe that the true objective of the Directive is, let's say, to
console the affected population for their loss by trying at least to mitigate
the material and physical impacts. Yet to me it is a very positive attitude,
I mean to solve the problems that can be solved, to mitigate what can be
mitigated, to make the affected population feel that their situation is being
seriously taken into consideration.
Basing on all those considerations, CCDD agrees with the form and content of
this Directive. Nevertheless I have a few remarks concerning the document.
The methodology I will apply is to follow the plan of the Draft and go point
by point.
SPECIFIC REMARKS
1. Title: "involuntary resettlements"
Starting with the title, I would have preferred compulsory or obligatory to
involuntary, in order to stress the compulsory or obligatory nature of the
displacement and resettlement: Indeed, people are obliged, are forced to
leave their land and resettle somewhere else. The problem with involuntary is
that it means much more
unintentional... So, compulsory displacement, obligatory displacement,
compulsory resettlement, obligatory resettlement are more accurate and
appropriate phrases in the context of the affected population.
2. §(1a ). This sub-paragraph looks incomplete in the French version I got.
The second and last sentence ends with a comma..., so I do not know what
comes next.
3. §(1 c ). The foot note (5) at the end of this sub-paragraph seems to have
been put at a wrong place. Since it relates to 2(b), its best place is
normally just after this 2(b), where it would become 2(c) instead of the foot
note position.
4. §(1d) (to be added ). I have the sad impression that the Word Bank is not
insisting enough on training and capacity building. It is as if the Bank
wants farmers to remain farmers from generation to generation. Yet the Bank
speaks all the time of "improving the living conditions of the affected
people". Is that not a kind of contradiction?
I think that right in the first paragraph, just after (1c ) the Bank should
add a fourth point on training. Thus I suggest:
(d) "In the framework of the efforts aimed at improving their living
conditions, the displaced should have the possibility to learn a profession
of their choice, so that they can practise it where they are or in the new
resettlement site or elsewhere".
5. §(2a iii). This point is very important; as like in many places in the
document, it stresses clearly that even if the concerned people are not
physically displaced and resettled, they will still be eligible for
resettlement advantages.
6. § (5c). Concerning the notion of "replacement cost", I would
like to draw your attention on something that you may have overlooked. Lost
properties include houses, plants and so on. But there two types of plants:
annual plants (maize, rice, cassava, ground-nuts etc.), and everlasting
plants (fruit trees, coffee trees, cacao trees, palm trees, etc.). When an
adult everlasting plant is destroyed the farmer loses not only the plant
itself but also the revenue of that year and the coming years. If he is paid
just the replacement cost, he will plant new seeds, but will have to wait for
several years (two to five, if not more) before they grow adult and start
full production. So if that transition period is not taken into account and
added to the "replacement cost", the farmer will surely get poorer
than before the resettlement. That is why, basing on that point that we have
been defending for two years in CCDD as well as in GCA, I suggest the
following:
·
At the level of (5c) you should add "...for the
loss of properties and revenues"
·
At the level of foot note (12), immediately after
"transaction costs", you should add: "as well as annual
revenues lost during the transition period, i.e. while waiting for the new
plants to grow adult and start full production".
·
Just after ( c ), you should add a new sub-paragraph
stating: "In case of the creation of a replacement plantation - even if
there no physical resettlement - in addition to replacement cost, annual lost
revenues must be taken into account, so as to cover the whole transition
period".
7. § ( 9). I am very happy with this paragraph, especially as it mentions the
"non-land options ". But please, add "training" as one of
those options.
Thus the last section of the last sentence should read"... non-land
options such as training, employment and self-employment
opportunities..."
What makes me also happy is the "en plus" in the French version on
which I am working. If the displaced, especially the young ones, could
undergo some training, or even attend school "en plus de la
compensation", it would not be a passing but a lasting profit.
8. §(12). Concerning eligibility, I would like to point out that there are
actually two categories of displacements and resettlements:
1° Displacement and resettlement for material reasons: That is when the
farmer has lost his properties (houses, farms, etc.) and is therefore obliged
to leave the place and resettle somewhere else.
2° Displacement and resettlement for moral and social reasons: When almost
the whole family is displaced or almost the whole tribal group, the farmer is
also obliged to leave the place and join the others. This category of farmers
should also be eligible, because they also are affected by the project in the
sense that they have decided to go because of the project that has caused the
displacement of their family or tribal group.
9. §(14). We must not forget that in Third World countries, most rural people
have not attended school and are therefore ignorant of law provisions. That
is why I suggest that this foot note be added at the level of the phrase
"national legislation":
"Provided information on that legislation has been broadly disseminated
in the region and local population warned of a possible displacement action
in a delay acceptable to the Work Bank."
10. Footnote (19). The information should not be widely spread only in the
demarcated area, but also in surrounding zone, where people may come from and
invade the demarcated area. So that also should be added to the note.
11. Annex, §10. The foot note to this paragraph provides an interesting
methodology as to the evaluation of replacement costs for lands, houses and
others.
But I think a second foot note should be added on agricultural products , and
even a third one on natural plants (forest products). Working on the
Chad-Cameroon Oil and Pipeline Project, GCA experts have elaborated a
pertinent methodology on how best to evaluate those two types of products. I
will send you a copy of our document if you ask for.
12. Annex, § 21. I suggest that you add local NGOs as one of the follow-up
and evaluation institutions.
13. Annex, § 22. The Bank seems not to pay enough attention to that category
of projects. Yet some of them can have serious and large scale impacts on a
large population. Let's consider for instance the Chad-Cameroon Oil and
Pipeline Project: The pipeline corridor will be 1050 km long and 30 to 60 m
bride! There will be no physical displacement and resettlement - as it is
said - but because of the length of the of the pipe, many social groups will
be affected.
So I think that the five aspects mentioned are not enough, even though they
are said to be the "minimum" aspects.
I suggest you add Paragraphs 7, 8, 10, 11, 17, 18 and 21 of the Annex.
Comments from:
Ryan Hunter
Slovak National Coordinator
CEE Bankwatch Network
Center for Environmental Public Advocacy
Slovak Republic September 10, 1999
RESPONSE TO
RESETTLEMENT DRAFT OP/BP 4.12: INVOLUNTARY RESETTLEMENT
The Center for Environmental Public Advocacy strongly recommends that the
World Bank Group not implement or plan any resettlement projects until the
report from the World Commission on Dams (WCD) (due out Summer 2000) is
published and fully reviewed by the Bank.
Furthermore, we propose the following five points, which were submitted for
the WCD report, as fundamental for the preparation of any resettlement
policy.
·
To elaborate a thorough evaluation of the social impacts of projects
involving resettlement implemented to date at national and international
levels, inclusive of the proposal for recommendations of a substantive and
procedural nature for the future decision-making and planning of such
projects. Such evaluations must be elaborated independently of organizations
profiting from such projects, and also must ensure the effective
participation of relocated inhabitants and civil organizations dealing with
this matter. All relevant information necessary for comprehensive analysis of
the social effects of such projects, must be made accessible to the entity
elaborating the evaluation. Evaluations must be made public to the full
extent, with recommendations forming the basis for revision of policies
regulating project funding, the mechanism, at both national and international
levels.
·
To ensure effective participation of the affected public in the
decision-making process of any further project involving resettlement at both
the national and international levels, inclusive of the timely access to all
significant economic, social and environmental information. Governments must
ensure reform of such processes that so far have been implemented in
contradiction to the law. Governments and international institutions must
ensure a fully independent evaluation of the preparation of any new projects
involving resettlement, as well as the progressive monitoring and auditing of
its implementation. This is to be carried out by persons independent of such
institutions and organizations that have a vested interest in the preparation
and implementation of the evaluated project.
·
To set up funds for the compensation of damages and loss of property
for those affected by the projects who have not yet been justly identified
for such. These funds must be administrated independently of the investor and
organizations that partook in the projects. Furthermore, their transparency
must be ensured and reports on the activities and use of funds regularly made
public. The funds must provide assistance to all those who were subjected to
property damage or loss due to the projects, in the preparation of their
claims for reparation.
·
Governments and international institutions must provide a guarantee
that in the future they shall not finance any project for which it was not
made clear sufficiently in advance of the decision to proceed with the
project, that the investor shall provide equitable compensation for all those
to be displaced or otherwise affected. Likewise, the investor shall ensure
prompt and complete information for them, together with effective
participation of citizens in the whole decision-making process. This also
applies to projects where affected persons do not express their qualified
consent prior to the realization of such projects. International financial
institutions must guarantee that they shall not finance any projects
whatsoever that presupposes involuntary relocation, in such countries where
legislation does not cater for the aforementioned conditions.
·
International financial institutions must cancel debts from loans for
such projects in so called developing and post-communist countries, for which
economic, environmental and social costs outweigh real benefits.
Finally, we express our full support for the recommendations submitted to the
World Bank Group both by Mr. Thayer Scudder of the California Institute of
Technology (July 27) as well as the Bank Information Center.
Sincerely,
Ryan Hunter
---
D. Narasimha Reddy
Executive Director
Centre for Resource Education,
Hyderabad, India 14 September 1999
This is with reference to the letter by Mr. Mohammad Hasan, social
Development Specialist, the World Bank, India, dated 22nd July, 1999, seeking
review and comments on draft Operational Policy 4.12 & Bank Procedures
4.12.
The policy and procedures look comprehensive, on paper at least. however, as
with any policy, it tries to juggle between the vocabulary. the intention of
helping the people, to be resettled or to be affected by resettlement does
not come out clearly. policy objectives which constitute the heart of the
matter falls far short of the expectations, though it is more than what we
have been monitoring.
Firstly, policy objectives do not highlight the purpose of resettlement, which
has been the most basic contention. This is important considering questions
like these:
·
is resettlement necessary?
·
is it in common/national interests? what is the definition of
national interest, at least in the context of the project?
·
what is public purpose? who defines this?
OP 4.12 should have a objective of accepting resettlement only
a. when there are public projects, no to private sector projects
b. when public purpose is defined/explained in the project proposal
c. the borrower/project proposer/applicant (whether it is a national
government, or
Ministry, or department) has a resettlement policy complete with the
definition and
explanation of the purpose and necessary legal framework, or
should develop a policy as such by the time the project is taken up for
implementation
Policy objective does not mention the disruption of social networking and
social supportive systems in resettlement projects. in fact, apart from the
loss of assets, means of livelihood and other physical properties, the trauma
of losing these social links is at the core of the resettlement issue. this
is especially true for women, children, destitute, poor, old and crippled.
efforts should be more on rebuilding these links.
Resettlement policies, plans, projects or programmes should be tailored to
the political and economic contexts, and should be dynamic enough to adjust
to the changes therein.
OP 4.12 Criteria for Eligibility page 5 of 8
These criteria exclude the people who are using the land or other assets, or surviving
on the land and other assets, without legal rights. for instance, this
includes:
1. agricultural labour
2. tribals dependent on forest resources/minor forest produce
3. leasehold farmers, or farmers who survive on `rented' land
4. poor people living in slums/squatter settlements in urban areas
OP 4.12 should include a provision to insist on the development of
Resettlement Fund, possibly at different levels, national to project-level,
to be financed from taxes/levies from project beneficiaries, and project
implementing agencies (public or private). this is important because most
resettlement projects have to be implemented beyond the main project period.
This is also necessary as safeguard against fund diversions, for whatever
reasons.
OP 4.12 should insist that the Resettlement Plan/project should specify the
quantum of assistance in monetary terms, and this assistance should be made
accessible to the people affected by resettlement, through necessary legal
and institutional framework. This will be one form of check against
diversions by higher-level administration, and corruption.
These are some of my initial reactions. I hope to come up
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