|
Commentator (in alphabetical
order)
*Dinesh Agrawal
Deputy General Manager (R&R)
National Thermal Power Corporation Ltd.
India 4 October 1999
*Mr.
Shahid Alam (Former Project Director, Resettlement, JMBP) Resettlement
Specialist, Jamuna Bridge Railway Link Project Dhaka, Bangladesh
*Richard E.
Bissell Executive Director, Policy Division National Academy of Sciences
Washington, D.C
Peter
Bosshard
Berne Declaration , 29
September
*Peter
Bosshard
Berne Declaration
Switzerland 23 September 1999
*Anna Dunets
John van Nostrand Associates
*T. Herbert
Prerana Resource Centre
* Jane Hill
President of the
American Anthropological
Association
*Ryan Hunter
Slovak National Coordinator
CEE Bankwatch Network
Center for Environmental Public Advocacy
Slovak Republic September 10, 1999
*Rohit Jain
Vice President
CADAM
Delhi, India 28 September 1999
*Manish Joshi
Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra
Dehradun, U.P., India September 15,
1999
*Monsieur
Jean Roger Mercier
Responsable environnementale pour l'Afrique.
Washington September 8, 1999
* Jim
Nations, Conservation International
*Dr. NDE
Executive President
Committee for the Coordination of Durable Development (CCDD)
Date of Creation: 1995
Statute: NGO Comment of 9 September
1999
* Alexandra
Page
Indian Law Resource Center
*Minar Pimple
Executive Director
Youth for Unity and Voluntary Action (YUVA)
Mumbai, India 17 September 1999
*Sam Rao, Senior Vice President
KCP Associates International Chicago/Manila/Nairobi
*B. Venkat Rao
Director
Ventre for Management and Social Research
Hyderabad, India 21 September 1999
*D. Narasimha Reddy
Executive Director
Centre for Resource Education,
Hyderabad, India September 14, 1999
*Ritsumeikan
University Research Group on Involuntary Resettlement
Chie GONDO, Takako HARUYAMA, Bunpei
HIROTA, Hirokatsu INOUE,
Hiroyuki IKUTA, Phil Hwa JO, Masao KAWAI, Nang Mya Kay
Khaing , Yuji OGAWA, Akinori SEKIDO, Hiroki SHIGENO, Shigehiro TAKAGI, Naoki
UEHATA, Makoto YAGUCHI
*Thayer
Scudder California Institute of Technology
* Pierre
Senecal
Conseiller Environment, Hydro-Quebec
Chair, EIA Technical Committee
Canadian Standards Association (CSA International)
IAIA Past-president 1996-97
Alex Wilks Coordinator, The Brenton Woods Project
*Achyut
Yagnik
Convenor
Forum 21
Ahmedabad, India 27 September 1999
Peter
Bosshard
Berne
Declaration
29 September
BD
Comments on the World Bank's Resettlement Policy Conversion
Introduction:
The
Berne Declaration appreciates the opportunity to comment on the proposed
conversion of the World Bank's resettlement and rehabilitation policy (OD
4.30/OP 4.12). The BD is a Swiss non-governmental organization with 16,000
members. It has advocated more equitable and environmentally sustainable
North-South relations since 1968.
The
BD has monitored World Bank projects such as the India NTPC Power Generation
project for many years. Like many other NGOs, has often been disturbed about
the failure of rehabilitation in resettlement projects. This failure has
created severe problems for 100,000s of people, and has triggered some of the
most important requests for investigation by the Inspection Panel. The
pending policy conversion must help to improve the performance of
resettlement projects. This is a test case for the World Bank's commitment to
the overarching goal of poverty reduction.
The
following comments focus on the issues of monitoring and supervision, of
land-for-land vs. cash compensation, and of restoration vs. improvement of
incomes. The Berne Declaration is concerned that rather than addressing the
critical loopholes of OD 4.30, the proposed new policy severely weakens a core
provision of the current policy. This weakening contradicts earlier claims
that the ongoing conversion process would not water down the earlier
operational directives.
Monitoring
and supervision:
In
paragraphs 5, 16 and 22, the proposed OP 4.12 attributes the responsibility
for monitoring to the borrowing government, and for supervision to the Bank.
This new distinction weakens the position of affected people and qualifies
the Bank's commitment to project implementation. Experience indicates that an
effective monitoring of resettlement projects is usually lacking, and that
governments are hardly ever committed to complying with Bank policies. OED's
June 1998 report on "Recent Experience with Involuntary
Resettlement" refers to "the governments' disinterest in the
M&E activity", which was "undisguised and tolerated by the
bank" (p. 5, para. 17). With such a poor record of the past, the Bank
should not disengage from its responsibility for project monitoring.
In
footnote 20, the proposed OP 4.12 suggests that borrowers create independent
advisory panels of resettlement specialists, a procedure which is now
followed for environmental assessments. This idea deserves support. The
proposed panels could be strengthened if they were established by the Bank and
not the borrowers. Their reports should be made available toproject-affected
people as a matter of principle.
Land-for-land
vs. cash compensation
According
to OD 4.30, "the Bank encourages 'land for land' approaches, providing
replacement land at least equivalent to the lost land". This is a core
provision of the current directive, which has encouraged similar provisions
in the R&R policies of many borrowing governments and agencies. It is
strongly qualified by the proposed new policy, which states in paragraph 9:
"If sufficient land is not available, non land-based options built
around opportunities for employment or self-employment should be provided in
addition to cash compensation for land and other assets lost."
This
change of policy is completely unacceptable. Contrary to the Bank's wishful
thinking, non land-based rehabilitation options - and especially the
much-touted self-employment schemes - have so far almost always failed, and
particularly in rural settings. While land is passed on from one generation
to the next, cash compensation is typically spent within a short period, and
training programs are usually not sufficient to turn farmers and peasants
into successful entrepreneurs in saturated markets. The failure of non
land-based rehabilitation is confirmed by OED's June 1998report (pp. 8 and
55), and by the reports of the Inspection Panel e.g. onthe NTPC project in
India. OED argues that this "only means the Bank has to put many more of
its best development planners onto the task" (p. 8). Yet it would be
cynical to weaken the policy before the best development planners have
demonstrated their ability to deliver non land-based rehabilitation. The
impact of this change will be borne by affected people, who typically belong
to the poorest members of society.
Some
observers might argue that since many Bank projects have not included
land-for-land rehabilitation in the past anyway, the proposed policy
conversion will not change much in actual practice. Yet so far, the official
preference for land-based rehabilitation has tended to discourage borrowers
and task managers from engaging in difficult resettlement operations.
Indirectly, the stated policy has helped to prevent the externalization of
social costs, and has contributed to a certain reduction(although not
minimization) of resettlement. The Berne Declaration is concerned that giving
up the preference for land-based rehabilitation might open the floodgates and
weaken the healthy scepticism among Bank staff and borrowers to engage in
resettlement projects.
Land-based
rehabilitation is often very difficult to achieve. Still, the Bank should not
qualify its preference for this option as long as it is not capable of
minimizing resettlement on the conceptual level, and as long as alternative options
such as self-employment schemes have not been demonstrated to work. The
Bank's new OP 4.12 should therefore stick to the preference for land-for-land
rehabilitation as expressed in OD 4.30.
Improving
vs. restoring income levels
A
central problem of the present policy and practice is that resettlement and
rehabilitation are usually not conceived as development projects, butas mere
compensation efforts. In paragraph 1, draft OP 4.12 continues to accept the
"restoration" of income levels which was stipulated by OD 4.30.In
his comments on 27 July, 1999, Prof. Thayer Scudder convincingly argues that
the restoration of pre-project income levels often means a reduction of the
standards of living. The Berne Declaration agrees with Prof. Scudder in that rehabilitation
should be conceived as development projects, that OP4.12 should stipulate an
improvement of the living standard of affected people, and that the reference
to income restoration should be deleted.
Thank
you for your consideration of these comments.
Peter
Bosshard
Berne
Declaration
Alex Wilks
Coordinator, The Brenton Woods Project
[The Bretton Woods Project works on World Bank and IMF
issues with a network of 27 UK
non-government organization]
30 September 1999
Resettlement policy conversion:
comments and suggestions
Dear Maninder Gill,
Thank you for your letter of 19 July asking the Bretton
Woods Project to prepare comments on the Bank's conversion of its Operational
Directive on Involuntary Resettlement. The Bank's decision to circulate the
proposed new documents in draft form for comments is very welcome and will I
am sure improve the final products.
In my current position, my previous work with The
Ecologist, I co-wrote Evicted!, the World Bank, British Aid and Forced
Resettlement, and my work over about 8 years in support of the Narmada
Bachao Andolan, India and the World Commission on Dams, I have come to
appreciate the importance of how resettlement policy is framed and
implemented. On the documents you sent, I have the following three main
comments.
1)Minimising displacement: what methodology?
It is clear to me, especially from reading the Morse
Report, the Bank's 1994 resettlement review, and my visits to some of the
disgraceful resettlement sites for people displaced by the Sardar
Sarovar/Narmada project, that the overriding aim of any resettlement policy
should be to ensure that displacement is minimised, as there are extremely
few cases where relocation and compensation of project affected people have
happened successfully.
Recognising this overarching aim, I would strongly
recommend that you clarify what the Bank means by "exploring all viable
alternative project designs" [BP, § 1, (a)]. Clarifying the Bank's
project appraisal methodology is also implicitly supported by Michael Cernea
in his recent book The Economics of Involuntary Resettlement (World Bank,
1999, p.21). He argues:
"The cost-benefit method can be easily
manipulated or influenced by a)
excluding costs caused by the project, b) by the way in which costs and
benefits are valued when direct market prices cannot be observed or are not
conclusive, and c) by the choice of the discount rate to estimate the present
value of a condemned asset. But the point I want to emphasize is that even at
its best, without distortions, the standard cost-benefit method is incapable
of answering the economic and ethical questions involved in forced
displacement" [emphasis in original].
Whilst I do not agree with all of the answers to
this problem that are proposed later in the book, I would urge the Bank to
recognise that the debate on project assessment methodologies is now far too
complex to be summarised by the word "viable". This whole issue
(including on multidimensional aspects of poverty and vulnerability, the
difficulties of commensuration of values, the problems with using discount
rates to produce net present value figures etc etc) is being explored in
detail in many fora at the moment. These include the work of the World
Commission on Dams and at a conference, "The Cost-Benefit Analysis
Dilemma: Strategies and Alternatives" to be held at Yale University,
8-10 October 1999. Both fora are discussing how you can take account of
different social groups' perspectives on valuation and viability, surely
essential in an era where the World
Bank is emphasising its intentions to be participatory, equitable and
holistic in its work.
RECOMMENDATION: that the Bank clarify in detail, with
reference to recent in-depth work such as that mentioned above, how
alternative project approaches and designs are to be assessed. The OP should
also clarify that alternatives assessment must include the no project
option.
2) Land for land compensation: a substantive weakening
The second most important shortcoming of the draft OP and
BP is the way that land for land compensation is treated. The approach
adopted in the draft BP text on land for land compensation is significantly
weaker than the relevant provisions of OD 4.30:
"If
sufficient land is not available, land is not the preferred option of the
displaced persons, or the provision of land would adversely affect the
sustainability of the park or protected area, non land-based options built
around opportunities for employment or self-employment should be provided in
addition to cash compensation for land and other assets lost." [draft
BP, §9]
This rewording gives ample opportunity for officials to
argue that they do not need to provide land for land. This constitutes a
substantive policy shift, contradicting the assurances given in a letter from
Myrna Alexander, then World Bank Director, Operations Policy Department, to
the Bretton Woods Project (4 February 1997): "It is important to reiterate that the conversion
process was never conceived as the opportunity to reformulate policy ....
Occasionally, we have used the conversion process to amend specific aspects
of established policies, but only in a very few cases in which that part of
the policy was clearly no longer applicable or when the Board has
specifically asked for a precise change" [emphasis in original].
My reading of the draft policy, and that of colleagues in
other NGOs, is that it has deliberately been drafted far more weakly than the
OD it is supposed to replace, w
the problems of
cash, rather than land, compensation were clearly recognised.
RECOMMENDATION: reinstate the language in OD 4.30
emphasising that 'cash compensation alone is normally inadequate' and reword
the second half of §9 to clarify that cash options will only be considered in
a very clearly defined and limited set of circumstances. Any changes from the
original policy on this vital matter should be discussed by the Board and
clear reasons given for the Bank's new approach.
3) The
Resettlement Dispute Committee
The new resettlement dispute committee proposed by BP 4.12
is expected to rule on questions of application and scope of the policy. The composition
of the Committee appears unsatisfactory as it may not include the Bank's best
resettlement specialists. It is unclear under what circumstances Task
Managers should ask for a committee ruling to proactively evaluate
compliance,. What is its relationship to the Bank's Operations Evaluation
Department and Quality Assurance Group, and to the project-specific advisory
panels of independent resettlement specialists advocated in footnote 20 on
page 6 of the draft OP?
RECOMMENDATION: the composition and function of the
committee should be reconsidered and clarified. The committee should include
one or more of the Bank's best resettlement specialists, and at least one
independent outside expert from academia or an NGO. The committee's
deliberations should be publicly available.
These are the most
important points which struck me on reviewing the draft OP and BP. Given the
absolute importance of the first point about taking all possible steps to
minimise displacement, and the fact that so much useful work is currently
being done in the context of the World Commission on Dams which itself
results from controversies over Bank-funded resettlement projects, I would
urge you to consider suspending the final publication of your new policy
until after the Commission has presented its conclusions next year.
Please keep me informed about progress on this vital
work.
Yours sincerely,
Alex Wilks Coordinator
cc.
Stephen Pickford/Myles Wickstead, UKDel, World
Bank
Ian Johnson, VP ESSD, World Bank The Clerk, International Development
Committee, House of Common, Achim Steiner, Secretariat, World Commission on
Dams, Interested NGOs
* Mr. Shahid Alam (Former Project Director, Resettlement, JMBP)
Resettlement Specialist, Jamuna Bridge Railway Link Project Dhaka, Bangladesh
Comments on OP
4.12 of the World Bank.
In Bangladesh, we are implementing one of the largest resettlement
projects of the world (Jamuna Multipurpose Bridge Project, JMBP) where about
100,000 people of different categories were affected. For resettlement and
economic rehabilitation of these affected people, we prepared a detail
program called 'Revised Resettlement Action Plan'. The program is under
implementation for the last six years. Although there are few important
issues yet to be addressed in this program, but so far this resettlement
program has been proved to be fairly successfully. This could be achieved
because of a total commitment and a flexible approach we took during
implementation of the program. At the beginning we developed a good database
generated from a comprehensive socioeconomic survey. For day to day
implementation we also have a CMIS. The resettlement program being implemented
by a Resettlement Unit, some government agencies and few renowned NGO.
OD 4.30 was the guiding principle for formulation and implementation
of the above resettlement program for JMBP. During implementation of the
resettlement program at field level it became necessary to prepare detail
implementation procedure or application modalities. As a unique project we
had to develop these detail procedures and modalities according to our need.
In fact these are the responsibility of individual borrowing countries and
may vary from project to project. For that, I do not consider it appropriate
to go for another policy documentation like OP 4.12. So far our experience is
concerned, we consider OD 4.30 as a complete document. For understanding the
Bank Policy on Involuntary resettlement OD 4.30 is considered as a most
precise, innovative and a document which is easy to follow. Although OP 4.12
has been termed as short and focused, but in actual term it has become
more elaborate and lengthy.
The OP/BP 4.12 para 3 says that 'this exercise does not involve a
revision of the current Bank policy on involuntary resettlement, but a
conversion to the new format. However the conversion does clarify certain
ambiguities, and takes into consideration -------.' I don't think there are
ambiguities in OD 4.30. Well any document of this kind can always be improved
and fine-tuned with events and experience.
In this regard the current exercise being undertaken to 'fine-tune' the
involuntary resettlement policy of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) is worth
mentioning. ADB in Nov. 1995 made a policy on 'involuntary resettlement'. The
same policy being implemented in many ADB funded projects of the region. Now
after 4 years, ADB wants to fine-tune its policy in the light of experience
gained in implementing this policy. For that they commissioned a TA and
conducted workshops on case studies in all seven countries namely PRC,
Pakistan, Viet Nam, Bangladesh, Nepal, Indonesia and Philippines. Now ADB is
organizing a workshop in Manila on Aug. 23-24, 1999 where experts from these
seven countries will firm-uptheir recommendations. The purpose is to
fine-tune the policy on involuntary resettlement of ADB. Similarly
'fine-tuning' the OD 4.30 in the light of experience gained by WB from all
over the world will be more appropriate.
Lastly I would like to say that, the world's most eminent
resettlement experts prepared a document like OD 4.30. I personally know many
of them. Also at later stages during implementation of JMBP, I met and
discussed with some of those personalities. In my opinion any major
modifications at this stage may not be helpful.
Thanks and regard.
*Thayer Scudder
California Institute of Technology
CRITIQUE OF
RESETTLEMENT DRAFT OP/BP 4.12: INVOLUNTARY RESETTLEMENT
Introduction
From a position
of pioneering leadership in resettlement guideline formulation the World
Bank's recent guideline revisions have ignored ongoing and recent research on
resettlement outcomes including research-based conclusions reported in two
recent Bank publications. These are the June 1998 Report No. 17538 of the
Operations Evaluation Department on Recent Experience With Involuntary
Resettlement and the Bank's March1999 The Economics of Involuntary
Resettlement: Questions and Challenges edited by Michael Cernea. While the
comments that follow draw on my own 40 years of research with
large-scale river basin development projects, I believe they are also
applicable to involuntary resettlement caused by other large-scale projects
such as coal-burning thermal stations and urban redevelopment.
The Major
Deficiency of the Current Draft Guidelines: Living Standard Restoration - A
Deficiency Which in Itself causes Impoverishment
A critical and
self-defeating weakness of the current policy is the often repeated statement
that "Displaced persons should be assisted in their efforts to improve
their livelihoods and standards of living or at least restore them"
(First page of the 1999 Draft and written in the 1990 OD 4.30as
"assisted in their efforts to improve their former living
standards, income earning capacity, and production levels, or at least to
restore them." ). While the first part of the 1999 sentence is
excellent, the subsequent acceptance of restoration undercuts the Bank's
emphasis on the resettlement component as a development project. For the
various reasons outlined in the next section, allowing restoration as opposed
to improvement tends to make a majority of those resettled worse off.
Research-based
Reasons why Restoration tends to Worsen Poverty among Resettled Households
and Communities
1. The Planning
Process: A first reason relates to the nature of the lengthy planning process
for major dams as well as for urban redevelopment projects. Though the
exception, that can go on for up to forty years as in the case of China’s
Three Gorges Project. However a 10 to 20 year planning horizon is not exceptional.
During that time, governments, private sector entrepreneurs, NGOs and project
affected people themselves are much less likely to make any investments
within the rural and urban areas concerned. Hence by the time a decision is
made to proceed with major feasibility studies including "base-line
studies" to determine pre-project living standards of future resettles,
those people's living standards will already be worse off than those of
neighbors living outside the project area.
2. The Nature of
the Resettlement Process: Another reason why mere restoration can be expected
to actually lower living standards relates tithe nature of the resettlement
process.
a. During the years or year immediately preceding
removal income and living standards tend to drop for a number of reasons.
Once people realize that relocation may be forthcoming, housing improvements
are less likely to be made while local innovators and entrepreneurs are less
likely to invest in new enterprises. Hence in the case of the Swaziland-South
African Maguga Dam on which construction has just begun this year, local
people who wanted to start cattle coops and other business ventures over ten
years ago were told by the authorities not to proceed. As for other impacts
adversely affecting living standards, labor migrants are apt to return home
to help their families hence those families losing access to remittances. Due
to uncertainty over removal dates rural people may also be less likely to
harvest good crops, having planted a smaller area or being told - as in some
cases - by the authorities not to plant at all because removal, subsequently
delayed, is imminent.
b. As for the period immediately following
removal, adjusting to new habitats, new neighbors (the hosts), and government
programs reduce time and energy for restoring whatever living standards those
displaced previously had. During that time period (which seldom lasts for
less than a year) living standards for the majority can be expected to drop.
For that reason, mere restoration requires improvement. As for that minority
who are able to obtain work during a project's construction phase, their
living standards also tend to drop once the construction phase ends because
longer-term development opportunities tend not to be available at the
appropriate time. Even where plans include a development component, a time
gap is common between people's physical removal and the implementation of
development plans, as is the case, for example, today with the World
Bank-assisted Lesotho Highlands Water Project.
Though dropped in
the Bank's latest draft (hence weakening it) even the World Bank/IFC January
1998 draft guidelines themselves state that living standards tend to drop
following removal, so that eventual restoration in fact would not compensate
for whatever downturn occurred before and after removal. Hence section
5a)(vi) states that those displaced should be” provided with development
assistance and measures for support during a transition period until
they have had a reasonable opportunity to establish their former production
levels, income-earning capacity, and living standards." So without
the project, living standards would most likely have been higher for the
majority during that period; indeed they might have even gone up in those
countries with a recent positive rate of development -as in China for
example.
3.
The Nature of Pre-Project Bench Mark Studies: Current guidelines are
based on the inaccurate assumption that pre-project bench mark (baseline in
the Bank's terminology) studies accurately reflect pre-project income and
living standards; hence constitute a basis against which restoration can be
measured. Yet even where pre-resettlement surveys are undertaken -- and
adequate ones are rare -- there is a general tendency to underestimate
people’s incomes at that time. For example, those involved can be expected to
under-report income due to forgetfulness (especially common in regard to
contributions of other family members) or fear of being taxed or because
sources of that income may be considered unflattering, quasi-legal or
illegal.
The World Bank's
own evaluations refer to the inadequacy of such studies as a baseline against
which to measure subsequent restoration. Thailand's PakMun Dam - one of the
World Commission on Dams' focal studies -- is a good example since the Bank
considers resettlement outcomes there as one of its most successful (in part,
in my opinion, because the project authority "was actually committed to
exceed the World Bank resettlement policy"[World Bank, 1998: 4]). Yet in
that case, "There is no true baseline study, only preliminary surveys in
1982 and 1983, too early to serve as a baseline"(page 19)
The Pak Mun
preliminary surveys considered only income, and that incompletely since
income from fishing was excluded; and they dealt only with households
requiring physical removal. Completed 7-8 years before construction began,
results were considered so inadequate that a second survey was carried out.
Though considered a baseline study by the project authorities that survey was
actually done four months after the dam had been completed and resettlers had
moved into their new houses. While it dealt with activities over the past 12
months, including eight months before reservoir inundation, surveys undertaken
during the year of removal can not be expected to provide a reliable record
for the reasons noted in the previous point dealing with the nature of the
resettlement process. Moreover, "the baseline data on fishing income was
inadequate" (page 6).
4.
Loss of Arable Land: Especially where farm land and access to common
property resources are lost or reduced, household expenses following
resettlement are apt to be greater than before. Increased costs are
especially a problem for resettlers who have to purchase food supplies that
previously they were able to produce, or where less fertile soils require the
purchase of such inputs as improved seed and fertilizers, or where new
production techniques require loans that lead to indebtedness. Another reason
why loss of arable land is apt to leave households worse off, is that such
land usually is passed on from generation to generation. The same is not the
case where cash compensation is provided or where first generation resettlers
obtain jobs.
5.
Cultural and Health Impacts: Draft OP 4.12 only covers direct economic
and social impacts (page 1). It does not cover the wide range of negative
cultural impacts reported in study after study that relate to loss of home,
burial grounds, religious sites, and ideological and political control over a
familiar habitat. Nor does it cover the public health implications of such
psychological impacts as "grieving for a lost home" and” anxiety
for the future" which are especially serious for indigenous people, and
for many ethnic minorities and peasant communities, with strong ties to the
land and limited mobility, as well as for low income urban communities.
There is no way
that social cost benefit analyses can accurately reflect the hardships
involved; hence the need for resettlement components to be planned and
implemented as development projects to offset such costs by helping
resettlers become project beneficiaries.
To sum up the
above five points, even restoration of living standards requires an emphasis
on improvement during the resettlement process. The failure of the World Bank
Guidelines to recognize the further impoverishing impacts of mere restoration
not only causes its own guidelines to be inadequate, but also encourages
borrower countries to emulate those guidelines. That is the case even in
countries with improved national policies for resettlement. China is a case
in point. According to Article 3of the January 25, 1991 regulation on 'Land
Acquisition and Resettlement Regulation for the Construction of Large and
Medium-Sized Water Conservancy Projects,' "The Government advocates and
supports resettlement with development." Yet the next article follows
the World Bank's guidelines when it states, "all resettlers shall be
assisted to improve or at least restore their former living standard in
steps." Note that the comment on” in steps" shows that the
authorities expect living standards to be worse off during the transition
period.
Mere restoration
of living standards gives a government a fallback positioning spite of
increasing evidence that implementation of that position further
impoverishes the majority. That is a conclusion, incidentally, that Chinese
researchers have also reached. Founded in 1992, the National Research
Centre for Resettlement at Hohai University has been studying dam-related
resettlement since the mid-1980s. Like myself, they have evolved a four stage
framework for describing the resettlement process. During their first stage
labeled 'Moving', they note that "the standard of living and production
of most displaced persons declines;" hence the need to improve living
standards merely to restore them.
The Current
Status of the Ongoing Restoration versus Improvement Controversy within the
World Bank
According to
ICOLD (International Commission on Large Dams)'s May 1997Position Paper on
Dams and the Environment "For the population involved, resettlement must
result in a clear improvement of their living standards, because the people
directly affected by a project should always be the first to benefit"
(pp. 11-13). In the World Bank's latest publication on resettlement issues
("The Economics of Involuntary Resettlement: Questions and
Challenges"), the editor and initiator of the Bank's 1980 Guidelines
states "The primary goal of any involuntary resettlement process is to
prevent impoverishment and to improve the livelihood of resettlers"
(Cernea,1999: 6). In the latest resettlement review by the Bank's Operations
Evaluation Department, the authors state "The emphasis should shift from
restoring income levels, which suggest stagnation at pre-dam lifestyles, to
improving income levels, which brings the displaces into the development
process along with the project's primary beneficiaries" (World Bank
1998: 7).
Granted such opinions
of the World Bank's resettlement experts, why is it that the current
redrafting of the Bank's resettlement guidelines continues to allow
restoration as the goal of its policy? The question is also perplexing
because the header at the top of the latest policy draft states” The World
Bank Group A World Free of Poverty." Yet the policy which
follows allows borrowers to replicate poverty. That is because almost
invariably people required to resettle are poor. Frequently as in the United
States, India and Brazil dam-resettlers, for example, are tribal people who
are the poorest of the poor. Yet where involving what are frequently the
largest development projects in a county's development plan, the Bank’s
resettlement policy allows such projects to merely replicate pre-existing
poverty among those who are the main losers and risk-takers.
Resettlement
experts within the World Bank's Social Development Department explain this
paradox in terms of strong resistance within the World Bank to revising the
guidelines to require improvement. In commenting on the OED belief that
"there is strong case for strengthening" the current OP
4.12resettlement draft (1998: 10), the Bank Management response to the
recommendation "to change the policy benchmark from restoration of
incomes of affected people to improvement" was that "Bank policies
already establish high standards for dealing with involuntary
resettlement" and "Management sees the implementation of existing
policy as the key priority" (1998: 16).
Two other reasons
are also mentioned for not altering the "restoration” stance. One is
that in shifting from the Bank’s Operational Directives to the new OP/BP
format, those involved are instructed to convert not revise the directives.
That argument is not convincing, at least with the resettlement guidelines,
since in fact they have been revised to include a wider range of resettlement
situations. They have also been weakened in that some previously mandated
requirements have now been weakened to the status of suggested "Best
Practice."
The second reason
relates to the wider range of resettlement situations that the Guidelines now
cover, including removal of people from new biosphere another reserves and
from national parks, or restriction of access to such reserves and parks.
If mere restoration is acceptable in some such cases, and I do not
accept that it is, then a single uniform policy for all types of involuntary
resettlement is no longer acceptable. Moreover, at a time when the World
Commission on Dams has the responsibility to develop guidelines and criteria,
it is inappropriate for the Bank to preempt the WCD process by not only
drafting new guidelines for one of the most controversial issues relating to
dams, but also to draft guidelines which allow the replication of poverty.
The main
argument, however, by opponents within the Bank to shifting from restoration
to improvement relates to the failure of the existing guidelines to even
achieve their goal of restoration. Why revise goals upward to
require improvement, they argue, when "The Bank has acknowledged that
the record on restoring - let alone improving - incomes has been
unsatisfactory"(World Bank, 1998:2).
I reject that
argument for two major reasons. The first, for the four reasons already
noted, is that a major reason for the failure of the Bank’s guidelines to
restore income and living standards is the emphasis in the guidelines on
compensation and restoration as opposed to development. Because of that
emphasis, potential development opportunities are not emphasized during the
planning process. Indeed, as the 1998 OED study notes,” the weakest part of
planning is on economic rehabilitation" (page 6). No wonder the Bank's
guidelines fail to achieve results since development planning and
implementation, as we have seen above, is necessary even for income and
living standard restoration.
The second reason
why I reject the argument that failure to restore in itself is reason enough
not to seek the goal of improvement is that, according to the Bank's own
studies, the most successful cases of dam-induced resettlement are cases
where the policy of the implementing agency or the national government is to
improve living standards. Two such cases recently analyzed by the Bank are
Thailand's Pak Mun Project and China’s Shuikou Project.
Benchmark
(Baseline) Studies and Monitoring and Evaluation.
Yet another
problem that the World Bank faces with the current guidelines is the
difficulty of determining when income and living standards have been
restored. Partly that is due to the inadequacy of the baseline studies
themselves and to the inadequacy of the subsequent monitoring process. Partly
it is due to the difficulty of determining the meaning of restoration granted
the less tangible public health and cultural costs of resettlement. Where the
goal is improvement, it becomes easier for monitors to decide whether or not
living standards are going up, staying the same or dropping. Through the use
of a range of indicators, Wimaladharma and I, for example, could make
such determinations within a matter of minutes during our long-term
monitoring of the same households in Sri Lanka's Accelerated Mahaweli
Project.
Other Issues
Merely omitting
the phrase "and restore" would go a long ways toward making the
Bank's resettlement guidelines State of the Art. My further comments relate
to changes that could embellish that result but that would still encourage
failure among burrowers whose policy remains a "restoration one."
Cash
Compensation. While Section 9 of OP 4.12 is an improvement over earlier
drafts, Section 10is still worrisome since loss of access to arable land and
communal natural resources can jeopardize resettlers during
national/international periods of economic downturn even where "markets
for land, housing and labor exist" and where "displaced persons use
such markets." Pak Mun, considered one of the Bank’s most successful
cases, is an example. There approximately two thirds of compensation offered
was cash. Though cash compensation for arable land was higher than replacement
value, many resettlers opted not to use that compensation for
purchasing replacement land, but rather for investing in savings, children's
welfare, housing and consumer goods. In OED's 1998 case study, the authors
explained this 1996 result in terms of the increasing importance of nonfarm
activities and employment, including employment in Bangkok. However, only
several years later such households no longer have the natural resource base
to fall back on after employment opportunities for wage laborers were
adversely affected by the Asian downturn. Those households are now hurting.
Loss of Land (and
Protection of Customary Land Tenure OD 4.30 emphasizes that "The
objective is to treat customary and formal rights as equally as possible in
devising compensation rules and procedures." Section 13 of OP 4.12
weakens that statement by referring to” customary and traditional rights
recognized under the laws of the country.” Where land is owned by the State,
that phrase puts communities with such rights at risk, especially in
countries like Mauritania and Somalia that have passed legislation favoring
individual rights at the expense of customary rights, and countries like
Zambia which have been considering similar legislation.
Section 31 on
land acquisition. While the World Bank family has always tried to avoid
financing land acquisition, OD 4.30 (1990) at least qualifies that stance by
stating that” normally" the Bank does not "disburse against land
acquisition." In this section OP 4.12 drops the word "normally,"
hence precluding any exceptions (such as providing loans for land purchase)
to a now rigid policy.
Footnote 20 of OP
4.12For contentious projects, an international advisory panel of experts
should be required not merely recommended as is the case here.
Section 11 of OP
4.12 Annex. Under resettlement measures the wording should be
"compensation and development measures" rather than
"compensation and other resettlement measures." One worrisome thing
about the Bank policy as well as the Overview of the June 1998 OED review of
involuntary dam resettlement is the ease with which the Bank, after
emphasizing that resettlement projects should be development projects,
thereafter emphasizes compensation and rehabilitation rather than
compensation and development. Compensation and rehabilitation are at best
mitigation measures that do not even restore living standards. Emphasis on
compensation and other mitigation methods, as opposed to improvement of
living standards, is apt to bias borrowers away from dealing with project
affected people as beneficiaries.
Section 21 on
Monitoring and Evaluation. This is inadequate since too much emphasis is
placed on the implementing agency doing its own monitoring. It is not
sufficient to merely state” supplemented by independent monitors as
appropriate." Who decides what is” appropriate?"
Sam Rao, Senior
Vice President KCP Associates International Chicago/Manila/Nairobi
Comments on Draft OP 4.12, Draft OP 4.12
Annex and Draft BP 4.12 are provided below:
The World Bank
should be commended for undertaking
to expand the 1990 operational policy (OP) on Involuntary Resettlement
(OP no. 4.30 of about 6pages) into OP 4.12 (about 10 pages), OP 4.12 Annex
describing the elements of a resettlement plan, an abbreviated resettlement
plan and a resettlement policy
framework (about 7 pages) and BP (Bank procedures) 4.12 (about 5
pages). We hope that the Source Book on Good Practices (GP 4.12) will also be
shared with civil society before finalization.
Draft OP 4.12:
Reaffirmation of Key Policy Points
It would be helpful to further delineate
the policy objectives under paragraph
1, as follows:
a) Involuntary
resettlement should be avoided, where
feasible, exploring all viable alternatives
b) Where involuntary
resettlement is unavoidable, it
should be minimized through appropriate adjustments in project design (for example, road
realignment, adjusting dam height,
etc.).
c) Resttlement activities
should be conceived and executed…..
d) Displaced persons ....
The Bank and its borrowers seemed to have
largely focused on technical design
aspects first and saw involuntary
resettlement as an unavoidable
consequence. It is necessary to shift the emphasis to avoidance of involuntary resettlement
in the first place by exploring all
viable options. Also, the examples of
road realignment and dam height
adjustment should stay in the text (and not lost in footnote) to
remind Bank Task Teams (TTs) and borrowers to explore project design avenues
to minimize involuntary resettlement.
Draft OP 4.12: Harmonizing Policy
Requirements with Bank Instruments
Under Section IV. Resettlement Instruments,
it is desirable to also cover
structural adjustment loans (SALs),
Sector Adjustment Loans (SECALs),
Adjustable Program Loans (APLs) and Learning and innovation Loans (LILs) which together
constitute more than half the Bank's
lending operations. In many cases,
the direct adverse economic and social
impacts of SALs, SECALs, etc. may be evident only during
implementation. Accordingly, a process approach analogous to that proposed to be adopted in projects involving restriction of access to
legally designated parks and
protected areas may be appropriate to mitigate them.
Draft OP 4.12 Annex
An outline of an action plan (mentioned in
para 15 of BP 4.12) with the
essential elements needs to be
prepared and included in this Annex to help borrowers, executing and implementing agencies, and Bank TTs
and TTLs. This should cover not only the involuntary restriction of access to
legally designated parks and protected areas, but also the adverse impacts of
SALs, SECALs, etc. It may be desirable to prepare separate action plan outlines
for each of the above lending instruments.
Draft BP 4.12: Avoidance of Involuntary
Resettlement
The draft is silent on avoidance of
involuntary resettlement. The first
step (Bank procedure) at the project
identification stage should be to explore alternatives to avoid involuntary resettlement. This would help address the very first policy
objective of avoidance of involuntary
resettlement.
Draft BP 4:12: Coverage of SALs, SECALs,
etc.
The Bank's
procedures to address the direct adverse
effects of SALs, SECALs, etc. during their identification, preparation, appraisal and implementation should be included in this
section to guide the borrowers and
Bank teams.
For consideration and action as
appropriate.
Sam
Rao, Senior
Vice President KCP Associates
International Chicago/Manila/Nairobi
Some
clarifications on the types of direct adverse impacts of SALs and SECALs that
may be suitable for coverage under this Policy:
(i) involuntary displacement of people,
(ii) loss or significant restriction of access to livelihood
opportunities, and
(iii) Reduction or loss of access to public services including food,
primary education and basic healthcare.
For your
consideration and use as appropriate.
* Richard E. Bissell Executive Director, Policy Division
National Academy of Sciences Washington, D.C
As a former
member of the Inspection Panel, I was provided the draft OP/BP by the
Executive Secretary at your suggestion for any comments I might have.
I have very few comments
to make substantively except to say that the reformatting has helped
considerably in clarifying some of the ambiguities of the current policy.
Without being an expert in resettlement, it was clear to me that many
of the Bank staff found the current policy to be unclear with regard to many
concrete situations on the ground, and this new approach has clearly moved in
the right direction.
My only concern relates to
the "Cover Note for Posting," where in paragraph 10you have stated
that the planned sourcebook for the GP 4.12 "will provide detailed
interpretation of various aspects of the policy." This may
create a problem for the Bank in the case of projects that become subject to
a request for inspection. The Inspection Panel bases its reviews of
projects only on OPs and BPs, by decision of the Executive Directors, and not
on GPs. GPs are supposed to provide only guidance to staff and because
they are not binding they are out of the purview of the Panel. If the
GP is providing not examples of application of policies but an authoritative
interpretation thereof, the GP would be binding for the staff and for the
Panel which would then have” jurisdiction" over it. In such a
case, the sourcebook would become more of a constraint instead of being a
helpful resource to staff.
Thank you for the
opportunity to comment.
September 8, 1999
Monsieur Jean Roger Mercier
Responsable environnementale pour l'Afrique.
Washington
Objet: Réponse à la lettre à propos du projet
OP/BP 4.12 sur les réinstallations involontaires
Faisant suite à votre lettre à propos de l'OP/BP 4.12, nous vous sommes
reconnaissant de solliciter notre avis sur une question aussi délicate
.toutefois nous nous excusons du retard qu'accuse notre réponse. Cet état de
chose est en partie dû au fait que la Directive Opérationnelle 4.30 sur les
réinstallations involontaires du 29 juin 1990 telle que revue et mise à jour
à l'issue de sa transformation en OP/BP/BE 4.12 sur les réinstallation
involontaires traite de la question avec beaucoup de clairvoyance, d'esprit
d'anticipation et de précision. Les seules suggestions que nous avons à faire
porte sur le volet supervision des réinstallations involontaires.
A l'effet nous pensons que sur ce point en plus du suivi étroit mené par le
vice président en cheville avec le Directeur - Pays concerné, la B.M:
a. Devrait faire mention de manière formelle et expresse d'un dispositif
coercitif à mettre en ouvre contre tout emprunteur défaillant.
b. Intégrer ce dispositif à tout contrat de mise à disposition du prêt et en
faire la condition d'octroi dudit prêt.
En espérant accrocher votre attention sur ce point
Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Responsable de l'évaluation environnementale
pour l'Afrique, l'expression de notre profond respect.
NAPI KAMAHA Julien Omer
September 9, 1999
Comments from:
Dr. NDE
Executive President
Committee for the Coordination of Durable Development (CCDD)
Date of Creation: 1995
Statute: NGO
CCDD BACKGROUND INFORMATION
MAIN OBJECTIVES:
- Promotion of sustainable management of natural resources
- Fight against poverty and misery
- Environment protection
- Community development
MAIN DOMAINS OF EXPERTISE :
- Environmental and social impact assessment
- Forestry and agro-forestry
- Numerized cartography and GIS (Geographical Information System)
- Follow-up and evaluation
REMARKS ON THE DRAFT OP/BP 4.12 ON INVOLUNTARY RESETTLEMENT
Introduction:
CCDD is a Cameroon environmental NGO. We are member of GCA/Group for
Concentration and Action, a Cameroon NGO network which has been fighting for
three years for the mitigation of negative environmental and social impacts
in the framework of the Chad - Cameroon Oil and Pipeline Project. Last July
1999, I was invited and took part in a training seminar on the Safeguard
Policies of the Word Bank organized in Yaounde by the Cameroon Residence
Mission. That seminar was very successful, as it helped the participants have
a broader view and more detail of the Work Bank environmental safeguard
policies, the Work Bank spirit and philosophy, and other aspects of that
institution.
All that puts us on a better position to comment on the Draft OP /BP 4.12 on
involuntary resettlements.
GENERAL REMARKS
Unlike certain complex Work Bank documents, this draft version looks simple,
clear and straight to the point . The main document is divided into seven
sections, and the annex into three, and the sections are further more divided
into paragraphs. The advantage of that presentation is that it makes it
easier for the Borrower's experts to understand and comply with.
As far as the content of the Directive is concerned, we appreciate the effort
of the Word Bank aimed at reducing the sufferings and losses of the
population affected by a project. But we believe that those sufferings and
losses can only be reduced, "mitigated", but never cancelled, for,,
truly speaking, nothing can replace your home or your homeland. Displacement
has two types of impacts: material and visible impact, and moral and
invisible impact. The former can be mitigated and even completely corrected,
but the latter is impossible to really mitigate and correct, as it damages
the intricate life web that ties a man to his home, his family, his land, the
surrounding hills , streams, mountains, rivers, villages, etc, to his youth,
his past, his history and that of his family, of his ancestors, his tribe...
Can you pay for all that? It is unevaluable . Can you resettle all that? Is
untransferable...
Thus I believe that the true objective of the Directive is, let's say, to
console the affected population for their loss by trying at least to mitigate
the material and physical impacts. Yet to me it is a very positive attitude,
I mean to solve the problems that can be solved, to mitigate what can be
mitigated, to make the affected population feel that their situation is being
seriously taken into consideration.
Basing on all those considerations, CCDD agrees with the form and content of
this Directive. Nevertheless I have a few remarks concerning the document.
The methodology I will apply is to follow the plan of the Draft and go point
by point.
SPECIFIC REMARKS
1. Title: "involuntary resettlements"
Starting with the title, I would have preferred compulsory or obligatory to
involuntary, in order to stress the compulsory or obligatory nature of the
displacement and resettlement: Indeed, people are obliged, are forced to
leave their land and resettle somewhere else. The problem with involuntary is
that it means much more
unintentional... So, compulsory displacement, obligatory displacement,
compulsory resettlement, obligatory resettlement are more accurate and
appropriate phrases in the context of the affected population.
2. §(1a ). This sub-paragraph looks incomplete in the French version I got.
The second and last sentence ends with a comma..., so I do not know what
comes next.
3. §(1 c ). The foot note (5) at the end of this sub-paragraph seems to have
been put at a wrong place. Since it relates to 2(b), its best place is
normally just after this 2(b), where it would become 2(c) instead of the foot
note position.
4. §(1d) (to be added ). I have the sad impression that the Word Bank is not
insisting enough on training and capacity building. It is as if the Bank
wants farmers to remain farmers from generation to generation. Yet the Bank
speaks all the time of "improving the living conditions of the affected
people". Is that not a kind of contradiction?
I think that right in the first paragraph, just after (1c ) the Bank should
add a fourth point on training. Thus I suggest:
(d) "In the framework of the efforts aimed at improving their living
conditions, the displaced should have the possibility to learn a profession
of their choice, so that they can practise it where they are or in the new
resettlement site or elsewhere".
5. §(2a iii). This point is very important; as like in many places in the
document, it stresses clearly that even if the concerned people are not
physically displaced and resettled, they will still be eligible for
resettlement advantages.
6. § (5c). Concerning the notion of "replacement cost", I would
like to draw your attention on something that you may have overlooked. Lost
properties include houses, plants and so on. But there two types of plants:
annual plants (maize, rice, cassava, ground-nuts etc.), and everlasting
plants (fruit trees, coffee trees, cacao trees, palm trees, etc.). When an
adult everlasting plant is destroyed the farmer loses not only the plant
itself but also the revenue of that year and the coming years. If he is paid
just the replacement cost, he will plant new seeds, but will have to wait for
several years (two to five, if not more) before they grow adult and start
full production. So if that transition period is not taken into account and
added to the "replacement cost", the farmer will surely get poorer
than before the resettlement. That is why, basing on that point that we have
been defending for two years in CCDD as well as in GCA, I suggest the
following:
·
At the level of (5c) you should add "...for the
loss of properties and revenues"
·
At the level of foot note (12), immediately after
"transaction costs", you should add: "as well as annual
revenues lost during the transition period, i.e. while waiting for the new
plants to grow adult and start full production".
·
Just after ( c ), you should add a new sub-paragraph
stating: "In case of the creation of a replacement plantation - even if
there no physical resettlement - in addition to replacement cost, annual lost
revenues must be taken into account, so as to cover the whole transition
period".
7. § ( 9). I am very happy with this paragraph, especially as it mentions the
"non-land options ". But please, add "training" as one of
those options.
Thus the last section of the last sentence should read"... non-land
options such as training, employment and self-employment
opportunities..."
What makes me also happy is the "en plus" in the French version on
which I am working. If the displaced, especially the young ones, could
undergo some training, or even attend school "en plus de la
compensation", it would not be a passing but a lasting profit.
8. §(12). Concerning eligibility, I would like to point out that there are
actually two categories of displacements and resettlements:
1° Displacement and resettlement for material reasons: That is when the
farmer has lost his properties (houses, farms, etc.) and is therefore obliged
to leave the place and resettle somewhere else.
2° Displacement and resettlement for moral and social reasons: When almost
the whole family is displaced or almost the whole tribal group, the farmer is
also obliged to leave the place and join the others. This category of farmers
should also be eligible, because they also are affected by the project in the
sense that they have decided to go because of the project that has caused the
displacement of their family or tribal group.
9. §(14). We must not forget that in Third World countries, most rural people
have not attended school and are therefore ignorant of law provisions. That
is why I suggest that this foot note be added at the level of the phrase
"national legislation":
"Provided information on that legislation has been broadly disseminated
in the region and local population warned of a possible displacement action
in a delay acceptable to the Work Bank."
10. Footnote (19). The information should not be widely spread only in the
demarcated area, but also in surrounding zone, where people may come from and
invade the demarcated area. So that also should be added to the note.
11. Annex, §10. The foot note to this paragraph provides an interesting
methodology as to the evaluation of replacement costs for lands, houses and
others.
But I think a second foot note should be added on agricultural products , and
even a third one on natural plants (forest products). Working on the
Chad-Cameroon Oil and Pipeline Project, GCA experts have elaborated a
pertinent methodology on how best to evaluate those two types of products. I
will send you a copy of our document if you ask for.
12. Annex, § 21. I suggest that you add local NGOs as one of the follow-up
and evaluation institutions.
13. Annex, § 22. The Bank seems not to pay enough attention to that category
of projects. Yet some of them can have serious and large scale impacts on a
large population. Let's consider for instance the Chad-Cameroon Oil and
Pipeline Project: The pipeline corridor will be 1050 km long and 30 to 60 m
bride! There will be no physical displacement and resettlement - as it is
said - but because of the length of the of the pipe, many social groups will
be affected.
So I think that the five aspects mentioned are not enough, even though they
are said to be the "minimum" aspects.
I suggest you add Paragraphs 7, 8, 10, 11, 17, 18 and 21 of the Annex.
Comments from:
Ryan Hunter
Slovak National Coordinator
CEE Bankwatch Network
Center for Environmental Public Advocacy
Slovak Republic September 10, 1999
RESPONSE TO
RESETTLEMENT DRAFT OP/BP 4.12: INVOLUNTARY RESETTLEMENT
The Center for Environmental Public Advocacy strongly recommends that the
World Bank Group not implement or plan any resettlement projects until the
report from the World Commission on Dams (WCD) (due out Summer 2000) is
published and fully reviewed by the Bank.
Furthermore, we propose the following five points, which were submitted for
the WCD report, as fundamental for the preparation of any resettlement
policy.
·
To elaborate a thorough evaluation of the social impacts of projects
involving resettlement implemented to date at national and international
levels, inclusive of the proposal for recommendations of a substantive and
procedural nature for the future decision-making and planning of such
projects. Such evaluations must be elaborated independently of organizations
profiting from such projects, and also must ensure the effective
participation of relocated inhabitants and civil organizations dealing with
this matter. All relevant information necessary for comprehensive analysis of
the social effects of such projects, must be made accessible to the entity
elaborating the evaluation. Evaluations must be made public to the full
extent, with recommendations forming the basis for revision of policies
regulating project funding, the mechanism, at both national and international
levels.
·
To ensure effective participation of the affected public in the
decision-making process of any further project involving resettlement at both
the national and international levels, inclusive of the timely access to all
significant economic, social and environmental information. Governments must
ensure reform of such processes that so far have been implemented in
contradiction to the law. Governments and international institutions must
ensure a fully independent evaluation of the preparation of any new projects
involving resettlement, as well as the progressive monitoring and auditing of
its implementation. This is to be carried out by persons independent of such
institutions and organizations that have a vested interest in the preparation
and implementation of the evaluated project.
·
To set up funds for the compensation of damages and loss of property
for those affected by the projects who have not yet been justly identified
for such. These funds must be administrated independently of the investor and
organizations that partook in the projects. Furthermore, their transparency
must be ensured and reports on the activities and use of funds regularly made
public. The funds must provide assistance to all those who were subjected to
property damage or loss due to the projects, in the preparation of their
claims for reparation.
·
Governments and international institutions must provide a guarantee
that in the future they shall not finance any project for which it was not
made clear sufficiently in advance of the decision to proceed with the
project, that the investor shall provide equitable compensation for all those
to be displaced or otherwise affected. Likewise, the investor shall ensure
prompt and complete information for them, together with effective
participation of citizens in the whole decision-making process. This also
applies to projects where affected persons do not express their qualified
consent prior to the realization of such projects. International financial
institutions must guarantee that they shall not finance any projects
whatsoever that presupposes involuntary relocation, in such countries where
legislation does not cater for the aforementioned conditions.
·
International financial institutions must cancel debts from loans for
such projects in so called developing and post-communist countries, for which
economic, environmental and social costs outweigh real benefits.
Finally, we express our full support for the recommendations submitted to the
World Bank Group both by Mr. Thayer Scudder of the California Institute of
Technology (July 27) as well as the Bank Information Center.
Sincerely,
Ryan Hunter
---
D. Narasimha Reddy
Executive Director
Centre for Resource Education,
Hyderabad, India 14 September 1999
This is with reference to the letter by Mr. Mohammad Hasan, social
Development Specialist, the World Bank, India, dated 22nd July, 1999, seeking
review and comments on draft Operational Policy 4.12 & Bank Procedures
4.12.
The policy and procedures look comprehensive, on paper at least. however, as
with any policy, it tries to juggle between the vocabulary. the intention of
helping the people, to be resettled or to be affected by resettlement does
not come out clearly. policy objectives which constitute the heart of the
matter falls far short of the expectations, though it is more than what we
have been monitoring.
Firstly, policy objectives do not highlight the purpose of resettlement, which
has been the most basic contention. This is important considering questions
like these:
·
is resettlement necessary?
·
is it in common/national interests? what is the definition of
national interest, at least in the context of the project?
·
what is public purpose? who defines this?
OP 4.12 should have a objective of accepting resettlement only
a. when there are public projects, no to private sector projects
b. when public purpose is defined/explained in the project proposal
c. the borrower/project proposer/applicant (whether it is a national
government, or
Ministry, or department) has a resettlement policy complete with the
definition and
explanation of the purpose and necessary legal framework, or
should develop a policy as such by the time the project is taken up for
implementation
Policy objective does not mention the disruption of social networking and
social supportive systems in resettlement projects. in fact, apart from the
loss of assets, means of livelihood and other physical properties, the trauma
of losing these social links is at the core of the resettlement issue. this
is especially true for women, children, destitute, poor, old and crippled.
efforts should be more on rebuilding these links.
Resettlement policies, plans, projects or programmes should be tailored to
the political and economic contexts, and should be dynamic enough to adjust
to the changes therein.
OP 4.12 Criteria for Eligibility page 5 of 8
These criteria exclude the people who are using the land or other assets, or surviving
on the land and other assets, without legal rights. for instance, this
includes:
1. agricultural labour
2. tribals dependent on forest resources/minor forest produce
3. leasehold farmers, or farmers who survive on `rented' land
4. poor people living in slums/squatter settlements in urban areas
OP 4.12 should include a provision to insist on the development of
Resettlement Fund, possibly at different levels, national to project-level,
to be financed from taxes/levies from project beneficiaries, and project
implementing agencies (public or private). this is important because most
resettlement projects have to be implemented beyond the main project period.
This is also necessary as safeguard against fund diversions, for whatever
reasons.
OP 4.12 should insist that the Resettlement Plan/project should specify the
quantum of assistance in monetary terms, and this assistance should be made
accessible to the people affected by resettlement, through necessary legal
and institutional framework. This will be one form of check against
diversions by higher-level administration, and corruption.
These are some of my initial reactions. I hope to come up with more, after
detailed review.
D. Narasimha Reddy
Comments from:
Manish Joshi
Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra
Dehradun, U.P., India 15 September 1999
With reference to your letter dated 30 August, 1999 from the World Bank, New
Delhi Office, India, I am enclosing my Comments on the revised resettlement
policy of the World Bank as were desired by you.
Comments on the revised resettlement policy of the World Bank
The Operational manual of the resettlement policy drafted by the World bank
seems to be quite adequate and it covers all the necessary measures required
for the Involuntary Resettlement because of the developmental projects. The
policy draft has considered all the aspects required for the same. The draft
also looks into all the aspects related to the impacts which may occur
because of the Involuntary Resettlement i.e. from socio-economic,
socio-cultural, socio-political to the environmental aspects.
The planning for Involuntary Resettlement seems to be good and interesting.
It is a good part on its behalf that the bank ensures all the pros and cons
of the project and resettlement before funding is granted. The bank's
procedures are quite extensive and in my opinion should be quite effective
and the rehabilitated community would not feel the pain of resettlement. The
idea of a Task Team for the monitoring and evaluation of the rehabilitation
is excellent, as this will ensure safe and excepted rehabilitation.
Although the development projects in the developing countries like India has
already displaced 50% tribals out of the total population of 68 million, but
they have not been rehabilitated properly. As in the case of the Narmada
River Valley project where nearly 2,97,000 people in the three districts are
involuntarily being displaced without adequate rehabilitation. Not only this
but the declaration of many India's Protected Areas have also displaced
millions of people, belonging to the poor and marginalised community, as is
being done in the proposed Raja ji N.P., in the Dehradun district, in the
State of Uttar Pradesh, India. Here the indigenous Van gujjar tribe is being
forced to leave the forest areas and settle in an unfriendly environment.
So, it is my personal opinion that instead of going for very big development
projects small projects should be initiated this will not debar the poor from
their basic human rights and thus will ensure the development in the real
sense. As far as the case for conserving the natural resources is concerned
the local inhabitants should be involved in its conservation and management.
This will ensure effective management, as these people have been the
inseparable part of that ecology.
In an encouraging news published in an Indian daily 'The Hindustan Times',
where the bank struck down 56 cr eco-development project from the Ministry of
Environment and Forest, Government of India at the Rajiv Gandhi N.P. in
Nagarhole, India, for not ensuring the proper rehabilitation of the 6000
tribals. This kind of initiations taken by the bank will surely help in
proper functioning of the drafts framed by the World Bank.
Manish Joshi
Comments from :
Minar Pimple
Executive Director
Youth for Unity and Voluntary Action (YUVA)
Mumbai, India 17 September 1999
Comments on the Draft Operational Policy 4.12
Overall comments :
·
The definition of the project needs to clearly
outline, the affected and the beneficiaries and the cost benefit analysis -
human, environmental, social, cultural - of such projects where the
beneficiaries and the affected are not the same needs to be looked at
critically, e.g. the Sardar Sarovar project, India, where the project
affected are completely different from those expected at the very outset to
benefit from the project.
·
Resettlement and rehabilitation (R&R) is part of
the development continuum and treated as such. It should not be seen as an
add on to a project/investment. While the policy document talks about
resettlement, and takes initiatives of proposing rehabilitation measures,
rehabilitation of displaced persons, has to be a stated objective of the Bank
Policy and an inviolable part of the project. It is necessary then to review
the definition of the "project".
·
The impact of the project should not be seen in the
narrow definition of the immediate impact. The primary, secondary and
tertiary impacts need to be considered in assessing the complete and true
impact of the project.
·
By treating resettlement and rehabilitation as
different from the project, there is an inherent subsidy provided to the
project (as defined in the OP) and the borrower. What is considered the
"hard costs" of the project are typically financed at IBRD rates of
interest, whereas what is seen as the "soft" components are financed
through IDA. The interest differential is a substantial hidden subsidy.
Specific comments :
The same format as that followed in OP 4.12 is adopted.
I. Objectives
The viability of all projects should be assessed on the basis of costs which
include the costs of all social, economic and environmental risks, the costs
of dismantling of production systems, loss of assets and income sources.
It is assumed that the guidelines for costing these are laid out in Bank
policies OP 4.01, 4.12, , 4.04, 4.11 and 4.20 and any other policies as may
be relevant.
The market values associated with the risks caused by the primary, secondary
and tertiary impacts of the project, R&R and replacement need to be
factored in while appraising the returns on the project.
Para 1 (b) Displaced person should have opportunities -
The policy should lay down clear institutional mechanisms whereby the
"opportunity" is converted into planning and implementation
methodologies, which are completely participatory, transparent and
accountable.
II. Impacts covered :
Ø Para 2 :
This policy covers direct economic and social impacts - Project create
primary, secondary and tertiary impacts. This leads to the primary, secondary
and tertiary project affected. In this comment, it is assumed that the
"direct" impact referred to deals only with the primary project
affected.
It is not sufficient to identify, resettle and rehabilitate only those
"directly" affected by the project. The indirectly affected are
most often as badly in need of rehabilitation as the directly affected. Loss
of livelihood of those servicing the settlement in the pre-displacement
phase, also needs to be considered an impact of the project.
For example -the pollution impact of chemical factories is well over the prescribed
perimeter of operation, and there is an erosion in the air quality over a
larger area. This may affect the health of future generations. Specific
guidelines for these cases needs to be worked at.
Ø Footnote 6 :
It should not just be deemed good practice to undertake a social assessment,
but should be made decreed in this policy as mandatory.
Ø Para 3.
Needs to be commended.
III. Required Measures :
Ø Definition of replacement cost :
The contribution of the displaced to the development of the project site
particularly in urban scenarios needs to be acknowledged and valued. Dharavi,
Mumbai, India, is a prime example of a settlement, which has sprung up on
marshy, land. The entire settlement has been reclaimed by the material, human
and financial resources of the settlers. Projects that displace and resettle
people from this often totally ignore this.
The material, financial and human investment in building the settlement, that
are lost in the resettlement process, should be costed at inflation factored
market values and this should decide the basis of the replacement cost.
Ø Institutional arrangements :
Stress needs to be laid on formal and legal institutional arrangements and
mechanisms that are created to:
·
ensure information about their rights and options
·
ensure participation in decision making and arriving
at feasible alternatives
·
lay down the charter of relocation as agreeable to
the displaced persons as well as the implementing agency.
·
ensure grievance redressal systems
The institutional mechanisms so created, need to be representative of all
stakeholders involved in the project, particularly, the displaced persons -
local governance structures, CBOs, NGOs, implementing agency etc.
Ø Identification and preparation of resettlement site :
The policy document identifies this as one of the pre-requisites for the take
over of land and other assets. While this works in theory, in practice this
has often been neglected.
The appraisal procedure must include the identification, the title search and
the process of take over/conveyance of ownership of the site by the borrower.
Investment /project/sub project or component lending should be tied to the
satisfactory resettlement site identification and preparation.
Ø Granting of tenurial rights to resettled property :
The policy document needs to incorporate the granting of appropriate tenurial
rights, either in the form of leaseholding or ownership to be granted to the
resettled persons regardless of the status of ownership/legal
right/leaseholding prior to the displacement in the same context of declaring
eligibility to be resettled.
Ø Loss of livelihood :
One of the largest casualties of displacement is livelihood - particularly
where the livelihood is linked to the land. In urban scenarios, the place of
stay is closely linked to the livelihood of the person.
Loss of skills :
Skills lost in the process of resettlement need to be costed onto the
project; particularly where the skill lost is linked to traditional or
cultural occupation.
There is a need for reconciliation of skills required and skills lost in the
process of re-employment. Skills required for employability can be enhanced
or built through training, which has been identified in the policy document
but the skills lost need to be costed.
Indirect impact
Loss of livelihood may also accrue due to secondary impacts of the project.
for example, the movement of markets due to resettlement, may cause a loss of
livelihood to those who were servicing those markets in the pre-project
period. These persons will not fall under the category of the "project
affected". The definition of project affected needs to be broadened and
rehabilitation measures made applicable to them.
Ø Designated parks and restricted areas :
The approach followed here should be similar to that followed in the joint
forest management of forests by the indigenous populations.
For the enhanced protection of the restricted and protected areas, joint
protected area management should be undertaken with very clear resource
planning for the protection and conservation of the wildlife and natural
resources within the protected areas.
IV. Eligibility for benefits :
Ø Identifying the project affected :
Para 13 of the policy identifies 3 frames of reference for setting the
criteria for eligibility. Most marginalised groups who are the most adversely
affected by the projects, do not fall under the narrow definition of project
affected adopted by most projects. At the very outset, the primary, secondary
and tertiary project affected need to be detailed and identified.
Ø Methodology for setting criteria, identification :
The nature of the methodology has to be inherently participatory, transparent
and accountable to all the stakeholders in the project. This is again
reflected in the legal, procedural and process mechanisms instated for the
planning, monitoring and implementation of the project.
Ø Dealing with those deemed ineligible :
Clear provisions need to be laid out in the resettlement plan for those deemed
ineligible in meeting the criteria set for the resettlement. Measures to
ensure that this is done in a humane and participatory manner need to be
ensured.
V. Resettlement Planning, Monitoring and implementation
Ø Para 17 - Resettlement Planning -
Once again, we wish to stress the importance of multi stakeholder
institutional arrangements for arriving at the scope and level of detail of
the resettlement instruments - arrangements that ensure the democratic
representation of those affected by the project.
Ø Para 18 - The full costs of the project :
The policy document includes the full cost of resettlement activities to be
treated as a charge against the economic benefits of the project.
It is also imperative that the social, cultural and environmental and human
opportunity costs be charged against the economic benefits of the project,
just as the net benefits are to be charged to the benefits stream of the
project. While, it is not clear whether this is covered under other
operational policy manuals/ documents we wish to stress that the true
viability of a project can only be ascertained when all of the above are
included in the project economic streams and at commercial rates of
borrowing.
This would entail a policy change in appraising a project; but with far
reaching consequences for development and growth with equity.
Ø Para - 22 - The borrower is responsible for adequate monitoring and
evaluation
In projects and investments where involuntary resettlement is an issue, it is
typically seen as a by-product of the main investment or project and is most
time not given adequate attention.
The setting up of an independent multi stakeholder monitoring and evaluation
mechanism which works with the borrower but with some level of accountability
to the affected population with organisations representing them, the
appropriate government and the bank is imperative.
Resettlement Policy Framework
Ø Para 27 - Multiple subprojects
Whereas the resettlement policy framework is submitted at the time of
appraisal, certain tranches of disbursement for sub project financing should
be linked to the submission of the detailed resettlement plan for the
displaced within the sub project. This will ensure that the borrower is held
to the commitments laid down in the policy frame work.
VII. Assistance to the Borrower :
This has been covered under general comment no. 4.
It is essential that difference between financing the "soft" and
"hard" costs and therefore the interest differential be negated.
The resettlement and rehabilitation (R&R) be treated as and financed as a
"hard" component of the project. The viability of the project then
needs to be appraised on this commercial basis.
B. Venkat Rao,
Director
Ventre for Management and Social Research
Hyderabad, India 21 September 1999
Review of Draft Operational Policy 4.12 and Bank Procedures 4.12
The Bank's attempt to revise the OD 4.30 is contextual and positive move
towards attaining effective R&R results in a period with demand for more
and more development projects which may result in displacement and consequent
adverse socio economic impacts. The following are the comments on the OP
4.12:
General
·
The change in the title from Operational Directive to
Operational Policy reflects the current thinking in various government and
non-governmental agencies.
·
The script needs to be attended on page setting. In
almost all the pages the text continues beyond the footnote in the same page
resulting in confusion in reading.
Specific
·
Even though the issue of income restoration has
adequately been identified, it needs some more dealing. The text mostly
covers the issues of resettlement and its handling. All the three parts of
Annex contains the issues related to only resettlement. In the same way what
has to be done in case of severe income losses and what the RAP and Policy
should contain on income restoration, should also be dealt in Annex. Probably
a paragraph on income restoration in all three parts of Annex would be
appropriate.
·
The definition of displaced person includes 2(a) and
2(b), which refers to both, displaced and affected but not necessarily
displaced. In this case why not it be called 'Directly Affected Persons'
which includes both displaced and undispalced and conveys the meaning
directly, instead Displaced Persons which mainly represents displaced only.
·
The principle of compensation at replacement cost is
just and appropriate. As per the definition it is the cost at market value
and so on... Our experience shows the assessment of real market value is
cumbersome and difficult to arrive at because the affected person invariably
tries to project at higher side and the project authorities at lower side.
Appointment of any independent valuation experts generally does not
materialise for reasons of low / no interest on the part of implementing
agencies. The element of injustice will be higher if we leave it open to be
defined by the concerned. For all practical purposes the following can be a
midway:
A range of incremental percentage could be proposed over
and above the registered value of land depending upon the place (state,
country). Suppose in case of country X it can be 10 to 30% or 200% above the
government registered value because of low government registered rates. In
case of country Y it can be 0% because market price is always equivalent to
registered price. This should be left to the local staff who will fix the
range of percentage from time to time depending upon the local conditions.
·
Paragraph 2 (b) and its explanation in point 11 of
footnote is not clear. Why it is being confined to just legally designated
parks and protected areas. It is something moving from general to specific.
Needs some more clarity.
·
Paragraph 3 can be sub titled as 'Coverage' for
giving more clarity.
·
In section VI Resettlement Instruments, Resettlement
Policy Framework (b) can be preceded by Resettlement Plan (a) for the reasons
of order.
·
Paragraph 24 (a) ...... 'Annex cannot be prepared by
project appraisal;' is some thing not clear. May be it is.... 'can be
prepared'.
·
Paragraph 24(e), in this at the end of the sentence
the following may be added ...'and the proposed entitlements'
Peter Bosshard
Berne Declaration
Switzerland 23 September 1999
BD Comments on the World Bank's Resettlement Policy Conversion
Introduction:
The Berne Declaration appreciates the opportunity to comment on the proposed
conversion of the World Bank's resettlement and rehabilitation policy (OD
4.30/OP 4.12). The BD is a Swiss non-governmental organization with 16,000 members.
It has advocated more equitable and environmentally sustainable North-South
relations since 1968.
The BD has monitored World Bank projects such as the India NTPC Power
Generation project for many years. Like many other NGOs, has often been
disturbed about the failure of rehabilitation in resettlement projects. This
failure has created severe problems for 100,000s of people, and has triggered
some of the most important requests for investigation by the Inspection
Panel. The pending policy conversion must help to improve the performance of
resettlement projects. This is a test case for the World Bank's commitment to
the overarching goal of poverty reduction.
The following comments focus on the issues of monitoring and supervision, of
land-for-land vs. cash compensation, and of restoration vs. improvement of
incomes. The Berne Declaration is concerned that rather than addressing the
critical loopholes of OD 4.30, the proposed new policy severely weakens a
core provision of the current policy. This weakening contradicts earlier
claims that the ongoing conversion process would not water down the earlier
operational directives.
Monitoring and supervision:
In paragraphs 5, 16 and 22, the proposed OP 4.12 attributes the
responsibility for monitoring to the borrowing government, and for
supervision to the Bank. This new distinction weakens the position of
affected people and qualifies the Bank's commitment to project
implementation. Experience indicates that an effective monitoring of
resettlement projects is usually lacking, and that governments are hardly
ever committed to complying with Bank policies. OED's June 1998 report on
"Recent Experience with Involuntary Resettlement" refers to
"the governments' disinterest in the M&E activity", which was
"undisguised and tolerated by the bank" (p. 5, para. 17). With such
a poor record of the past, the Bank should not disengage from its
responsibility for project monitoring.
In footnote 20, the proposed OP 4.12 suggests that borrowers create
independent advisory panels of resettlement specialists, a procedure which is
now followed for environmental assessments. This idea deserves support. The
proposed panels could be strengthened if they were established by the Bank
and not the borrowers. Their reports should be made available to
project-affected people as a matter of principle.
Land-for-land vs. cash compensation
According to OD 4.30, "the Bank encourages 'land for land' approaches,
providing replacement land at least equivalent to the lost land". This
is a core provision of the current directive, which has encouraged similar
provisions in the R&R policies of many borrowing governments and
agencies. It is strongly qualified by the proposed new policy, which states
in paragraph 9: "If sufficient land is not available, non land-based
options built around opportunities for employment or self-employment should
be provided in addition to cash compensation for land and other assets
lost."
This change of policy is completely unacceptable. Contrary to the Bank's
wishful thinking, non land-based rehabilitation options - and especially the
much-touted self-employment schemes - have so far almost always failed, and
particularly in rural settings. While land is passed on from one generation
to the next, cash compensation is typically spent within a short period, and
training programs are usually not sufficient to turn farmers and peasants
into successful entrepreneurs in saturated markets. The failure of non
land-based rehabilitation is confirmed by OED's June 1998 report (pp. 8 and
55), and by the reports of the Inspection Panel e.g. on the NTPC project in
India. OED argues that this "only means the Bank has to put many more of
its best development planners onto the task" (p. 8). Yet it would be
cynical to weaken the policy before the best development planners have
demonstrated their ability to deliver non land-based rehabilitation. The
impact of this change will be borne by affected people, who typically belong
to the poorest members of society.
Some observers might argue that since many Bank projects have not included
land-for-land rehabilitation in the past anyway, the proposed policy
conversion will not change much in actual practice. Yet so far, the official
preference for land-based rehabilitation has tended to discourage borrowers
and task managers from engaging in difficult resettlement operations.
Indirectly, the stated policy has helped to prevent the externalization of
social costs, and has contributed to a certain reduction (although not
minimization) of resettlement. The Berne Declaration is concerned that giving
up the preference for land-based rehabilitation might open the floodgates and
weaken the healthy skepticism among Bank staff and borrowers to engage in
resettlement projects.
Land-based rehabilitation is often very difficult to achieve. Still, the Bank
should not qualify its preference for this option as long as it is not
capable of minimizing resettlement on the conceptual level, and as long as
alternative options such as self-employment schemes have not been
demonstrated to work. The Bank's new OP 4.12 should therefore stick to the
preference for land-for-land rehabilitation as expressed in OD 4.30.
Improving vs. restoring income levels
A central problem of the present policy and practice is that resettlement and
rehabilitation are usually not conceived as development projects, but as mere
compensation efforts. In paragraph 1, draft OP 4.12 continues to accept the
"restoration" of income levels which was stipulated by OD 4.30. In
his comments on 27 July, 1999, Prof. Thayer Scudder convincingly argues that
the restoration of pre-project income levels often means a reduction of the
standards of living. The Berne Declaration agrees with Prof. Scudder in that
rehabilitation should be conceived as development projects, that OP 4.12
should stipulate an improvement of the living standard of affected people,
and that the reference to income restoration should be deleted.
Thank you for your consideration of these comments.
Peter Bosshard
Berne Declaration
Achyut Yagnik
Convenor
Forum 21
Ahmedabad, India 27 September 1999
CRITIQUE OF DRAFT OP/BP 4.12: INVOLUNTARY RESETTLEMENT
Preface
Draft OP 4.12 has been drafted in a way that does not place sufficient
emphasis on the entire debate around "development paradigms",
whether the Bank and borrower can negate local community consent in the
design and implementation of a project is a moot question. Till now, most of
the States who have borrowed from the Bank have assumed ultimate power to
decide development plans and programmes and the Bank has directly or
indirectly strengthened this tendency.
It appears that in the drafting of OP 4.12, the Bank has virtually ignored debates
centering on the doctrine of Public Trust wherein the State is Trustee of all
the basic resources and not the owner. At this stage it is noteworthy that
the United States Courts as well as the Supreme Court of India have
emphasized the doctrine of Public Trust in recent times. Keeping in mind our
collective commitment to sustainable development, it has become imperative
not only to uphold but to expand the scope of the doctrine of Public Trust.
The tone and tenor of the Draft 4.12 indicates that the Bank is further
strengthening the "eminent domain" of the State in favour of the
established sections of society.
Detailed Comments
At the outset, we would like to emphasise that the phrase "involuntary
resettlement" is nothing but a euphemism for "resettlement of
forced evictees". Such forced eviction is contrary to the spirit of the
United Nation Declaration of Human Rights.
1b) Where voluntary resettlement...
Projects themselves should be conceived and executed as sustainable
development programmes. For this to happen, local communities should have the
opportunities to participate in the planning and implementation of the
project itself and not just the resettlement programmes. This participation
should not be just in the form of consultations but must include their
informed consent for the project.
We agree with Mr Sam Rao's comments of August 13 where he observes that it is
necessary to shift the emphasis to avoidance of involuntary resettlement in
the first place.
Instead of the term "Displaced persons" we suggest the term
"Project Affected Persons (PAPs)" be used. This is a wider term
encompassing persons:
1. Displaced due to taking over of land and house
2. Partially displaced due to loss of either land and house
3. Persons affected due to loss of work and wages, loss of income from the
collection of non-woo forest produce and loss of place of work by local
traders, hawkers and artisans in the acquired area.
4. Persons of neighbouring communities who are adversely affected sometimes
during the course of the project or as a consequence of the project.
1c) Displaced persons should be assisted in their efforts....
The restoration of livelihoods to pre displacement level is a retrograde
step. The standard of living after displacement must be much higher than
pre-displacement levels. Our experience shows that displaced people are
languishing even after many years of displacement and they are nowhere near
the standards of living they enjoyed prior to displacement. Mr Thayer Scudder
has rightly pointed this out in his critique of July 27.
2b) involuntary restriction of access to legally designated parks and
protected areas...
This Policy directly contradicts the Ecodevelopment Project funded by the
World Bank in India. The Staff Appraisal report of this project (World Bank
Document: Report No 14914-IN), in its Chapter on Project Impacts and
Justification (C 5.8) clearly states:
"Planning would take place in the context of options that would not
involve relocation. .. The forest department would not cause or carry out
involuntary relocation in the project areas."
We would also like to point out that all over the world, there is a move
towards the concept of Joint Forest Management and Joint Protected Areas
Management, where forest ecosystems are protected in a sustainable manner
with the active participation of people. Central to this concept is the
recognition of the fact that human are also part of the forest ecosystem.
5a) informed about their options...
The USA has the Right to Information as a basic right but in many countries
of the Third World, like India, the Right to Information is not granted as a
basic right by the Constitution. Instead the colonial legacy of the Official
Secrets Act has percolated through the rank and file of the bureaucracy. As a
result, PAPs rarely receive complete information about projects or their
rights as oustees. Our comments on I1b where we insisted on a participatory
process in project formulation must be viewed in this context as well.
5b) Consulted on, offered choices among and provided technically and
economically feasible resettlement alternatives
Resettlement packages must be technically and economically feasible to the
PAPs and not only to the Bank and borrowers. Resettlement packages must also
be socially and culturally acceptable to the PAPs. In this context we would
like to cite the example of the Gir Sanctuary experience in Gujarat, India
where pastoral communities were given good land based resettlement packages.
Yet, PAPs were not able to make the transition from pastoralism to
agriculture and were forced to abandon the land. Therefore, it is of utmost
importance that resettlement packages are social and cultural acceptable.
5c) provided prompt and effective compensation at full replacement cost...
The definition of replacement costs provided in footnote 13 related to this
clause cannot be implemented. We believe that people's habitats, forests, the
cultural practices associated with them can never be replaced and certainly
not monetarily.
5f) after displacement, offered support... for a reasonable transition
period, as appropriate...
Who is to decide what is reasonable and appropriate? We believe that all such
decisions must be taken with the participation and informed consent of the
PAPs.
9) Land-based resettlement options should be offered to displaced persons
whose livelihoods are land based.
Here we would like to emphasise that in addition to the qualities mentioned
in the clause, land thus offered must be irrigated. Without a reliable water
supply, compensation with good quality of land is worthless.
13) Criteria for Eligibility...
This clause has homogenised the categories of PAPs, without any recognition
of the socio-cultural plurality among them. This results in resettlement
packages which do not take into account the specific needs of communities,
reducing them into categories of "those with formal legal rights to
land" and "those without formal legal rights to land".
We suggest that Draft OP/BP 4.12 make it mandatory that the findings of socio-economic
studies recommended therein must be reflected in the design of resettlement
options and be translated into action.
16) The borrower is responsible for preparing, implementing and monitoring...
With this clause, it seems that the Bank wants to distance itself from taking
any responsibility for any aspect or process related to resettlement. There
is no indication of what is to happen in the case of non-compliance on the
part of the borrower. Yet phrases in the present Draft such as "to the
extent possible", "technically and economically feasible" are
essentially escape clauses which help the borrower rationalise
non-compliance. Thus, it would be an exaggeration to say that the Bank
prefers to be a mute spectator to violations of the basic human right to life
and livelihood with dignity.
Terms such as "acceptable to the Bank" (Clause 6 relating to access
to parks and protected areas, Clause 14 relating to establishing "cut
off" date) and "satisfactory to the Bank" (Clause 12 relating
to procedures for establishing criteria for eligibility for compensation)
occur throughout the Draft. We suggest that the acceptance and satisfaction
of the people, particularly PAPs must be paramount. This acceptance and
satisfaction must be not merely recommendatory but mandatory.
Conclusion
Draft OP/BP 4.12: Involuntary Resettlement only relates to displacement of
people due to projects directly funded by the Bank. We think that the larger
question pertains to displacement as a result of Structural Adjustment throughout
the Third World in which the Bank is playing pivotal role. The entire process
of globalisation, liberalisation and privatisation set in motion by SAP,
directly and indirectly, uproots a number of vulnerable communities who
become silent sufferers, struggling for their very survival.
It is paradoxical that the process of globalisation undermines the
"eminent" status of the State. Yet, at the local level the same
State, for liberalisation and privatisation, acquires natural resources like
land, forest and water under the doctrine of "eminent domain". We
feel that the Bank plays a cardinal role in facilitating both these
processes.
As a forum devoted to the protection of the lives and livelihood of
vulnerable communities, we wonder how the Bank proposes to address these
issues.
Achyut Yagnik
Rohit Jain
Vice President
CADAM
Delhi, India 28 September 1999
Critique of the Draft World Bank Policy on
Involuntary Resettlement (Draft Operational Policy 4.12 and
Bank Procedures 4.12)
PREFACE
Involuntary displacement in India has registered an increase in the last 50
years and more so in the last 10-15 years with the onset of the Structural
Adjustment Policies and the New Economic Policies by the Indian State. In an
effort to revive the Indian Economy at the behest of many International
Donors like the World Bank and the IDB, the Indian State has followed a path
of deregulating the economy from the clutches of the State, privatising the
social sector and its services and washing its hands off the welfare of the
poor and the vulnerable. As part of the above policies, to give a boost to
the industrial sector, land laws are being changed and need for land has
increased manifold. The Indian State, in collusion with the private sector
has been acquiring land from the people using antiquated dictatorial laws to
further the interest of the private companies\multinational companies at the
expense of the poor and the vulnerable. The impact of these processes are now
visible as people have started opposing their planned dispossession by the
State and other vested interests largely aided by funds and loans from
International donors like the World Bank.
Till date no satisfactory resettlement of the displaced people have taken
place. The oustees of the large dams like the Hirakud, Bhakra Nangal, Damodar
Valley Corporation built in the 50's and the 60's are still languishing. In
the case of the the Sardar Sarovar Dam, which was funded by the World Bank
and had one of the best resettlement packages, the oustees face innumerous
difficulties and slow death. The World Bank had to pull out of this project
as the respective state governments refused to comply with the various agreements
on resettlement. But pulling out did not stop the eviction and the extensive
damage which had been inflicted on the people, their lands and livelihood by
the Indian States aided by the World Bank. Inspite of having a reasonable
good rehabilitation and resettlement package on paper, the impoverisation and
pauperisation of the displaced people could not be prevented.
Thus by having model policy guidelines, like OP 4.12, for the borrowers there
is no guarantee and assurance that the displaced people will be better off.
OP 4.12 will be just another instrument in the hands of the government and
borrowers to involuntarily and ruthlessly displace people especially
vulnerable and ethnic communities from their habitat, in the name of
development. By showing the carrot of model resettlement guidelines etc, the
respective governments and the borrowers only take people for a ride and try
to deflect the debate on whether the project is really needed and whose
interests the project will eventually serve. The World Bank to expand its
operation and lend more money in the name of developing the third world
countries, can demand good practices and implementation of resettlement
policies by the borrowers, but not necessarily get them implemented properly
and adequately. Even if the World Bank withdraws, it has already initiated
irreversible processes of destruction and dispossession of the vulnerable and
ethnic communities.
The World Bank funds\loans to borrowers, to a large extent goes to finance
huge infrastructures of the borrowers, fat pay packages and remuneration to
the bureaucrats\employees\consultants, at the expense of the nation and its
people who have to repay the loans. The common man is already saddled with
the huge burden of repayment of international loans and if not repaid, the
nations will slip into a debt trap. Thus loans now tied with OP 4.12 will
increase this debt. OP 4.12 is only a license for the borrowers to further
displace people. In the final analysis it is the borrowers and the bank which
benefit for they have nothing to lose.
Comments on the Policy
1. Who decides Involuntary displacement?
In the Policy Objectives of OP 4.12, clause 1b of I, it is stated that the
displaced persons should have opportunities to participate in planning &
implementing resettlement programs. But before this stage is reached, why the
'Public Purpose' of the particular project to be executed, resulting in
involuntary displacement is not debated in public. Is the 'Public Purpose'
really public? The current draconian land acquisition law in India does not
provide any space to question and challenge the 'public purpose' of the
project for which the land is to be acquired. The 'Public Purpose' is decided
by a nexus of a few individuals-politicians-bureaucrats-specialists-industrialists-contractors,
who do not even consider that it is their duty and responsibility to share
the information with the people. OP 4.12 only further strengthens the eminent
domain of the 'State' in favour of the private companies & multinational
companies, in forcefully and involuntarily acquiring and using the private
& common\community resources of a particular nation.
The principle of 'Eminent Domain of the 'State' is now slowly giving way to
the trusteeship principle where the 'State' is a custodian on behalf of the
people and not the owner of common\community resources. The American law has
defined this in many cases and the Supreme Court of India has given path
breaking judgements on the 'trusteeship' principle. Thus the 'State' cannot act
in contradiction to this basic principle. The 'Trusteeship' principle is thus
equally applicable in deciding the public purpose of a particular project.
Until and unless this basic principle is not followed in deciding the 'Public
Purpose' of a project, simply ensuring participation of the displaced people
in planning their own resettlement is a farce and goes against the principle
of natural justice. It is just like asking the displaced people to write
their own epitaph. The Bank should not be funding any project in which the
people have no right to decide the necessity of the project. Otherwise it
will only increase the existing inequity and dispossession, in the name of
development. Clear cut guidelines on deciding the 'public purpose' of any
project for which land is required and decision making by the people are
needed. Only this can ensure whether displacement is necessary or not.
2. Restoration of livelihoods to pre-displacement levels not acceptable.
Under clause 1c of I of OP 4.12, restoration of livelihoods to
pre-displacement levels is a retrograde step. The standard of living after
displacement has to be much higher than pre-displacements level. By providing
the clause of restoration, the bank has provided an escape mechanism for the
borrowers. Our experiences show that displaced people are languishing even
after many years of displacement and they are no where near the standards of
living, which they had prior to displacement. Thayer Scudder has rightly
pointed out this in his critique to the Draft OP/BP 4.12. The restoration
concept should be scrapped.
3. Involuntary displacement from Sanctuaries & Parks.
Under clause 2 (a) & (b) of II of the policy it is stated very clearly
that this policy does not apply to restrictions of access to natural resources.
This is a dual policy of the Bank. Under the Eco-development project funded
by the World Bank in India, it is very clearly stated that there will be no
involuntary displacement and restrictions on the people residing in
sanctuaries and parks. Then how is it that the Bank is not applying this
policy to sanctuaries and parks? In other words the World Bank is promoting
involuntary displacement by giving the government officials an escape clause.
Also the process of declaring certain area of the forests as sanctuaries and
parks and restricting access to the natural resources is itself anti-people
and does not fulfill the clause of 'public purpose'.
4. Elements of 'Replacement costs' non implementable.
The definition of replacement costs provided in footnotes of clause 5c of III
of the policy is non implementable. It only sounds good on paper but how does
one put it to practice. Can people habitats be replaced? Can forests be
replaced? Can people's culture and environment be replaced? And there are many
more elements, which just cannot be replaced. The definition is mere words
and deflects the issue of compensation. One cannot compensate for destruction
of habitats & livelihood, however one may try. Thus involuntary
resettlement can never replace people's livelihood and habitat. Therefore
funding any development (displacement) project will bring about misery and
destruction to the displaced.
5. Land for Land a must
Under section III of the policy, Land for Land does not find any mention. In
fact the Bank offers much less in terms of resettlement package than what the
Narmada Package offered to the displaced people or even some resettlement law
offers. It is a known fact that other measures than land for land are not
long lasting and are of short duration. For the landless, many resettlement
packages offer land as compensation. The Bank policy does not find any
mention on this. Land for Land is a must in any resettlement package. The
ownership of the replaced means of production should remain with the affected
individual/population/communities. Past experiences have shown that the Land
Acquisition and displacement has only accelerated the transfer of peoples
sources of livelihood and their means of production into fewer hands, thus
increasing the inequality within society and increased dependence of poor
people for employment on the unstable market forces and privately controlled
industrial units. To do away with it, basically means diluting the complete
resettlement package.
6. Homogenisation of categories of displaced people not acceptable
Under clause 13 of IV, the policy has homogenised the categories of the
displaced people thus conveniently doing away with the heterogeneity among
the displaced people. As heterogeneous groups like tribals, fisherfolk,
pastoralists, etc are increasingly threatened by displacement, the
resettlement packages will need to take care of their traditional occupations
in replacing their livelihoods. Numerous examples bear testimony to this fact
that by simply giving lands to pastoralists or fisherfolk, would not
necessarily replace their livelihood. Any resettlement efforts have to be
specific to the communities being threatened by involuntary displacement.
Infact involuntary displacement destroys the social and economic fabric of
the vulnerable communities ushering a social, economic and an environmental
crisis. No resettlement package can mitigate this crisis.
7. Monitoring and evaluation by the borrower not acceptable
The provision of monitoring and evaluation by the borrowers themselves, goes
against the principle of natural justice. The borrowers are interested in
early completion of the project. The resettlement process becomes secondary
and is seen to be delaying the project. The borrowers use the provisions of
resettlement to get loans\funds and social acceptance for the project, but
are not interested in the actual implementation. The World Bank, beyond
threatening to withhold further instalments or withdraw, also cannot do much.
8. Involuntary resettlement due to non irrigation projects on the increase
and resettlement extremely difficult.
Involuntary displacement due to non irrigation projects is on the increase in
India. The concept of sharing benefits from the project is a far cry. In
India, large tracts of land are being acquired by the State for developing
Industrial Estates. After developing the plots, they are then offered to
different groups to set up industries. The gestation period between
acquisition of land and setting up of the industry is very large going up to
10-15 years. Thus any benefit from this project to the displaced people is
out of the question. It is also not binding on the industries coming up to
recruit labour from the displaced people and even if they do it is mostly as
temporary labour who do not have any security of employment. In fact the
condition of such displaced people is worse than what they were before
displacement. Direct employment cannot replace the permanent nature of
livelihood provided by land, forest and water.
The Bank should really take a serious review of this policy. Under the cover
of this policy the Bank is pushing the Structural Adjustment Programme in
many developing nations, which is directly responsible for involuntary
displacement. Instead of creating a 'World free of Poverty' the World Bank is
creating a 'World full of Poverty'.
Rohit Jain
Dinesh Agrawal
Deputy General Manager (R&R)
National Thermal Power Corporation Ltd.
India 4 October1999
The comments expressed below are the personal views of Dinesh Agrawal and do
not reflect the views of his organisation.
I. Background
1. The resettlement policy of the World Bank is in vogue since 1980 and has
been applicable to many projects all over the world during the last 20 years.
I have often put up one question to a large number of the Bank staff i.e.
tell me a project where resettlement has been found satisfactory to the Bank
according to it's own policy. Surprisingly, I never got a straight forward
answer. While the objective of such a policy is unexceptionable, the process
of application gives a blurred vision. What has gone wrong?
2. The policy (OP 4.12) and the operational guidelines (GP 4.12) are mutually
inseparable. The GP will be basis to assure operationalisation of OP, based
on which, there may be need for changes in drafting OP. This is not being
followed.
3. Extensive consultations have been held within the Bank (the staff who also
consider about their comfort level in dealing with resettlement issues) and
the NGOs (whose role, like opposition in the government, is to oppose
whatever is being done), but little with the borrower who have the prime
responsibility of operationalising this policy.
4. The role and responsibilities of the Bank, the NGOs and the DPs is not
covered at all. Giving the rights without responsibilities is always fraught
with unforeseen complications.
5. The web site of the World Bank reflects the comments of only three
persons, one of which is a borrower. What does it indicate? Why NGOs are shy
of commenting on this draft policy? I expected many more comments
particularly in view of the increased awareness of the public and experience
of borrower. This point is worth pondering. The draft policy need to be
intensely debated particularly with the borrower to make it practical and
operationable.
6. The Anthropologist and people working in the field of social development
have cited that it often take months to understand the social behaviour of
one community and to bring in change may take years. Notwithstanding the
above, the approach of the Bank is very sterile and mechanical, always
expecting a quick fix solution.
7. The comments given below are primarily based on the feed back provided by
the R&R staff, DPs and NGOs at site. It may be agreed that many of the
comments are too specific and cannot be covered under a policy. But, if the
policy is unable to address these issues, then it becomes an impractical and
non-operational entity as has often been experienced during the last 20
years.
II. General Comments
8. It is generally believed that the raison-de-etre for bank loans is the
overall development of the country which is why Bank is keen to invest in
infrastructural sector. However, in actual practice, the sector and project
specific loans lose the overall focus and tend to concentrate on the DPs
alone rather than on the entire community, thus missing the woods for the
trees. The policy has thus a reductionistic approach having a telescopic view
towards DPs.
9. One of the reason is that it ignores the situational analysis of the
prevailing socio-cultural behaviour and need of the country. The less
developed countries (LDCs) do face a plethora of socio-economic problems
including lack of education, health, economic security etc. This raises two
basic issues which do not find even a mention in the policy.
(a) Is it just, equitable and plausible to raise the standard of living of
certain under-priviledged/marginalised classes overnight, without adequate
enabling mechanism, thus creating and perpetuating dependency syndrome?
(b) Can these under-privileged/marginalised people have adequate capability
and understanding to ensure adequate and transparent consultation and
participation or such provisions are incorporated only with the intention to
provide livelihood to national and international activist NGOs who have their
own agenda.
10. The process of transition from that of exploitation to that of
participation has to be smooth and cordial lest it deteriorates into what is
commonly known as 'reverse exploitation'. The spectre of such 'reverse
exploitation' will continue to loom large over the big industries unless the
policy has adequate inbuilt safeguards to prevent the occurrence of such a
phenomenon. The present approach gives a perception of threat to all direct
stakeholder rather than that of an opportunity for sustainable development
and building of nation.
11. According to the World Bank Guidelines, all involuntary resettlement
should be conceived and executed as development programmes. 'Development' in
real sense is about quality of lives of people. When we talk of developments,
it goes beyond any relief or welfare measure and means improvement and
enrichment of peoples' quality of lives. In this context, restoring the
previous standard of living has little relevance. The thrust then becomes a
sort of relief measure of restoring their previous lifestyle, whatever it was
and not making efforts to improve it.
12. Though any change has its own resistance, some change is inevitable and
positive change is conducive to development. It must be believed and followed
as a principle that every individual is capable of change, wants change to
improve his life and should change to contribute to country's development.
However, change requires learning and unlearning. Here the change is about
the entire lifestyle of people which must be followed by change in people's
attitudes. Thus when we talk of a broader term like 'development' - the effort
should be to mobilize people to adjust to their new life styles.
13. Though PAP's right to be rehabilitated cannot be questioned but the fact
remains that responsibility can never be totally transferred. It has to be
'shared'. It is people's responsibility as well to develop themselves.
Development imposed from outside is neither sustaining nor sustainable. That
is the reason, a dependency syndrome develops and people shirk from their
responsibility of making adequate efforts for their own rehabilitation
develop dependency syndrome and put the whole burden on the borrower.
III. Specific Comments on Draft OP 4.12
14. Para. 3 - The policy states that it applies to all displaced persons
regardless of the severity of impact. The policy is silent on the issue
whether each person is to be given the same benefit or the benefit is to be
based on severity. In practice, the DPs aspire to achieve the standard of
living comparable to employees of borrower without making adequate efforts,
rendering the concept of attaining previous standard of living as null and
void. The Bank staff also pamper such demands of DPs rather than assessing
whether previous standard of living has been restored or not. In the
developing country, where many people live in abysmal poverty without any
access to basic human need like water, electricity, medical and educational
facility, the concept of restoring previous standard of living become
meaningless.
15. Para. 5(a) - Refers to information to displaced persons about their
options and rights pertaining to resettlement. This, however, raises some
questions which need to be addressed. Do the displaced person have the right
to negotiate these options and such rights? Who will decide the options and
rights?
16. Para. 5(e) - It is not clear from the policy whether the residential
housing or housing sites and/or agricultural sites that are to be provided,
are to be free i.e. in addition to compensation or in lieu of earlier assets
i.e. by adjusting the cost from compensation.
17. Para. 5(f) - The concept of reasonable transition period is vague and
limitless. Further, it not clear who will decide about the reasonability of
fixing a transition period.
18. Para. 5(g) - Like (f) the provision of development assistance is vague
and limitless both in terms of time and monetary resources. While the full
responsibility of giving such assistance lies with the borrower, it does not
impose a corresponding duty on the DPs for making efforts to improve or at
least restore their livelihood and standards of living. Such provisions are
conducive for creating dependency syndrome. Another unaddressed issue remains
as to who will certify whether the livelihood and standard of living has been
restored or improved? This issue gains criticality particularly in view of
notion that the past is always rosy than present.
19. Para. 7- The identification of displaced persons is normally based on the
land records wherein all family members particularly women and children may
not be categorised as displaced person whereas this para includes all women
and children. Does it mean that each displaced persons irrespective of
records or the loss of livelihood has to be treated as separate entity and
entitled for R&R benefit? Does it also mean that minors or for that
matter even infants are entitled for R&R benefit?
20. Para. 8 - The provision of measures for resettlement is a dynamic process
and should not be made a pre condition for relocation. There have been
numerous instances when the DP did not shift to a well developed resettlement
site or avoided receiving full compensation in order to pressurise the
borrower to yield to their additional demands. The responsibility of the Bank
or DPs is such situation is not stated.
21. Para. 9 - The implementation of land based option has a conceptual flaw.
The compensation for the land acquired is to be paid at the first instance as
per the law of many countries and also as per the policy of the bank. This
compensation amount is often said to have been spent by the DP before the
borrower could start the implementation of "Land for Land". As a
result, the DP shows its inability to return the compensation for
implementing "Land for Land", thus putting the borrower in a
dilemma. It is also not made clear, whether a DP will be considered rehabilitated
if he buys land on his own or has enough of remaining land to sustain his
family.
22. Further, it s not clear whether such options are to be provided only to
land owners or also to other categories of DPs as well. Also, since land
holdings are still on a family basis whether land based resettlement options
are to be provided on a family basis or an individual basis. What about
wives, infants etc. who though not necessarily may be having a share but
might be dependent on the land ? Have they to be treated separately for land
based options.
23. Opportunities for employment so as to meet the objectives of restoring
their original standard of living may restrict the option available only for
the richer and influential lot, since they are bigger land owner and,
therefore, bigger land loser as compared to marginal land owner/landless DPs.
Is it justifiable? Shouldn't the criterion be based on impoverishment risk
rather than that of loss of incomes?
24. Para. 10 - The statement that "the land taken for the project is a
small fraction of the affected asset and the residual is economically
viable" is left open for interpretation and need to be specific both in
terms of percentage loss or in terms of absolute value. The fraction
specified as 20% in the notes at 16 need to be incorporated in the main
document and not in post script, particularly when the proposition of 20% had
already been provided in other documents earlier, but not accepted by the
Bank staff in most of the cases. In the absence of such specifics, people buy
or fragment the land into decimals of a hectare of land to claim R&R
benefits.
25. Para. 11 - (a) It is not clear why the "Host" communities are
to be consulted on resettlement option and in planning, implementation and
monitoring of resettlement. Will it not raise their expectation and further
complicate the process of implementation?
26. Para 11 - (b) The policy is silent on the issue of maintenance of such
infrastructure and public services, in the absence of which the borrower
often remains at receiving end and forced to maintain such infrastructure and
public services. Should DPs not have explicit responsibility to maintain such
infrastructure and public services?
27. Para. 12 - When the draft policy is so explicit on the eligibility criteria
of DP for extension of resettlement assistance, it is not clear, why in this
para., the responsibility for establishing the criteria is left to borrower.
This concept is self contradictory.
28. The process of conducting the socio-economic and the census survey is
also left open in the absence of any specific qualifying criteria for the
institute/agency who has to conduct the same or it's accreditation by the
World Bank or other agencies. The land records are often not updated.
Depending on the outcome of such survey and the reaction of the interested
parties, or vested interests the report could be termed as unacceptable by
the concerned staff of the World Bank. In certain cases, a particular survey
report while accepted and praised by one staff is dubbed as rubbish by
another staff. It is essential that adequate provisions are incorporated in
the draft policy to avoid the personal interpretation by the Bank staff.
29. The socio-economic survey normally highlights the severity of economic
impact without considering the capacity and capability of the DP towards self
rehabilitation and resettlement. As a result the knowledgeable, educated and
resourceful DPs corner the available opportunities. It would therefore be
worth considering the concept of "Impoverishment Risk Analysis" in
place of traditional socio-economic and census survey to enable the most
vulnerable and impoverished DP getting the priority for R&R benefits.
This is more important in developing countries where feudalistic system is
still prevalent in many interior parts of the country.
30. Para. 13(b) - The policy does not specify the process by which such DPs
will be identified and certified. The absence of such provisions will open
the flood gate to demands for R&R benefits by one and all.
31. Para. 14 - This para. is apparently wrongly worded and structured,
particularly the third line "However, they are entitled to resettlement
assistance in lieu of compensation for land". This gives the impression
that where the compensation for land is given, no R&R assistance is to be
provided, thus negating the basic concept of this policy. The most important
question on which policy is silent is as to who will authenticate such list.
32. Para. 17 - The policy is silent about the process of giving information
about the resettlement aspect of the project to DPs and taking their view
into account. Who will certify that information has been given. What is to be
done, if a small group or even one DP claims about lack of information. In
highly risky and contentions projects involving significant and complex
resettlement activities, too much consultations may back fire by raising the
expectations of the DPs which is further fuelled by certain vested interests.
33. Para. 22 - The performance indicator for assessing the R&R component
should be specific and part of this policy rather than leaving it open to the
perception of individual staff of Bank.
34. Para. 28 - The ex-post review by the Bank will serve little purpose to
the suffering of DPs already caused and hence the Bank can not abdicate it's
responsibility by leaving the review to any other agency.
35. Para. 30 - The assistance envisaged in the policy should rather be
mandatory instead of optional to enable the concerned staff of borrower to
understand and adopt the Bank policy.
36. Para. 32 - In addition to what is written in this para., the Bank also
does not take any responsibility during the implementation of the R&R
component of a project, like the agreement to the survey reports or the
census data or the list of eligible DPs. Even when, the R&R options and
benefits are finalised and agreed by the Bank, in case of a claim by a person
for R&R benefit, Bank conveniently takes the borrower to task. The Bank
also interfere too much on other issues which though are the prevalent social
issues in a specific country or area but certainly are not covered under this
policy. Rather than stating what the Bank does not do, the responsibility of
Bank should also be clearly delineated in the policy. This will avoid the
personal and often contradictory stand and perception of different staff of
the Bank who work on a project over different time periods.
IV. Specific comments on Draft OP 4.12 Annex
37. Para. 6 0 - The annex. does not mention about the qualifying requirement
or accreditation of the agencies who can carry out the census and
socio-economic survey and establish the income level, loss of income and the
standard of living of all individual DPs. The experience shows that these
survey are primarily based on the response of DPs rather than the evaluation
of the surveyor. It is also observed that often the acceptance of these
reports by the Bank staff is based on the reactions of the interested
parties, which is sometimes rejected after a long time gap, thus
necessitating fresh surveys. The experience shows that there is a direct
co-relation in the number of studies and complexity of the issues. The Bank
staff find it convenient to institute fresh studies each time they are under
pressure. The objectivity becomes the victim under such circumstances. It is,
therefore, necessary that the Bank should be involved and should own up the
responsibility (since they have the requisite experience and expertise) in
selection of consultants and also the results of these studies.
38. Para. 12(b) - It is also a known fact that during the planning of a
project, the unscrupulous rich, knowledgeable outsiders and also creamy layer
of DPs buy small fragments of land or fragment their land among the family
members/outsiders to become eligible DPs and usurp the limited available
opportunities quickly. While, this para. provides theoretical ideology, the
practical aspects are ignored and remain unaddressed.
39. Para. 16(d) - This para. reflects the reductionistic approach of Bank. In
the developing countries, where many people living in abysmal poverty without
any access to basic human need like water, electricity, medical and
educational facilities, the thrust has to be on certain minimum level of
amenities rather than providing 'at least comparable to services available to
resettlers".
V. Specific comments on Draft B.P. 4.12
40. Para. 16 - It is wrong to put the whole burden of achieving the objective
on the borrower alone even though it has fully implemented the agreed measures.
If the Bank is so particular on achieving the objective, then it also has a
moral obligation to accept it's failure and extend the free grant (not loan)
for implementing future course of action.
End of comments
Dinesh Agrawal
October 26, 1999
James D. Nations
Vice President
Mexico and Central American Programs
Conservation International
Washington, DC
USA
World Bank Resettlement Policy
Draft OP 4.12
We appreciate the opportunity to
comment on the Draft OP/BP 4.12 concerning the World Bank's resettlement
policy. Our interest in this issue results from Conservation International's
direct experience with the resettlement issue in a protected area in Central
America.
On November 25, 1997, Conservation
International-Guatemala submitted a project concept paper to the World Bank
for a GEF Medium-Sized Grant for the management and protection of the Laguna
del Tigre National Park and Biotope (LTNP). Located in the 1.6 million ha.
Maya Biosphere Reserve in the northern Petén region of Guatemala, Laguna del
Tigre National Park (292,575 ha.) and Laguna del Tigre Biotope (45,427 ha.)
occupy about 20% of the Reserve. The park and reserve together are larger
than Yosemite National Park in California and form the largest protected area
core zone in Central America. This area includes Mesoamerica's largest
freshwater wetland and is recognized as a wetland of global importance under
the Ramsar Treaty.
Because of the many issues
surrounding the protection of LTNP--squatter communities and oil operations
in the park among them--the time and effort to obtain approval for this grant
from the Guatemalan government were considerable. Nonetheless, after
exhaustive consultation with relevant stakeholders and numerous meetings with
government officials, we obtained final approval from the Guatemalan
Government on May 19, 1999, 18 months after the original concept paper was
submitted to World Bank/GEF. Upon receiving government approval, CI-Guatemala
submitted the Project Brief to the World Bank for review. Because we had
worked closely with the Bank's contact personnel in putting the Brief
together, we anticipated no major obstacles in obtaining final approval from
the Bank. Indeed, by mid-June, the World Bank Secretariat had approved the
Brief, leaving approval from the Legal Department as the final step for the
agreement to be signed.
At this point, however, varying
interpretations of the Draft OP/BP 4.12 within the Bank made final approval
of the Project Brief uncertain. Specifically, some members of the Legal
Department were concerned about the possibility of future involuntary
resettlement of illegal colonists from the LTNP. This concern came despite
the fact that no resettlement project of any kind was planned as part of the
CI-Guatemala Project Brief, and the Guatemalan Government had only a
voluntary resettlement plan in place. The Government has pledged not to use
involuntary resettlement of current residents as a means to protect LTNP.
Despite this situation, members of
the Legal Department asked that final approval of the Project Brief be
contingent upon CI-Guatemala obtaining written guarantees from relevant
government agencies indicating that they would not carry out forced
resettlements. CI-Guatemala pointed out that the sometimes complex
bureaucracy of the Guatemalan Government and possible resistance to attempts
by foreign entities to dictate official behavior would delay implementation
of the Project Brief for at least another six months and possibly halt the
project altogether.
During July, 1999, considerable
consultation took place with and within the World Bank. Ultimately, the Legal
Department noted that its request might hinder CI-Guatemala's ability to
effectively implement the GEF project in a timely manner. By August 25, 1999,
with some revisions made to the wording of the Brief's text, the Legal
Department gave final approval for the Project Brief. On September 21, 1999,
CI-Guatemala Director Carlos Soza and World Bank Central America Department
Director Donna Dowsett-Coirolo signed the final agreement for the GEF
Medium-Size Project.
Among the key elements of this brief
history are the fact that the project was carefully designed to include a
range of sustainable development activities aimed at incorporating occupying
farm families into park management decisions and improving their livelihoods.
Also, although the Government of Guatemala had implemented a voluntary
resettlement plan for the LTNP, there were, and are, no plans for involuntary
resettlement.
Conservation International is
strongly supportive of the most stringent social guidelines at the World Bank
and other international financial institutions, but we would caution that the
World Bank's resettlement policy should not be interpreted in a way that
would invalidate conservation and sustainable development activities. In the
case of Guatemala's Laguna del Tigre National Park, preventing the approval
of a project that seeks to improve environmental and social conditions for
families within Laguna del Tigre National Park because of hypothetical future
violations of World Bank policies would have had a perverse and unnecessary
effect.
On a more general topic, we strongly
support the World Bank's work to protect human rights. We also know that one
of the ultimate human rights is a nation's natural resource base, providing
clean air, water, and healthy, renewable biological resources to all of a
nation's citizens. One of the obligations of the state is to protect these
resources for the benefit of all citizens, not for a select few. We also know
that it is the intention of the World Bank to protect this natural resource
base within the countries where the Bank operates.
Any global policy carries the risk
of creating unintended effects. We trust that in revising Draft OP/BP 4.12,
World Bank staff will be careful to word the document to prevent the
possibility of supporting speculative land grabs by a few citizens within
legal protected areas as a way to obtain land of equal or better value in a
non-protected area.
James D. Nations
Vice President
Mexico and Central America Programs
October 29, 1999
Anna Dunets
John van Nostrand Associates
Planners/Human Settlements/Community Development
Toronto, Ontario
Canada
Comments on Draft
Operational Policy 4.12
a) Baseline Studies and
Replacement Costs
Section iv, Socioeconomic
Studies of the Resettlement Plan (Draft OP 4.12, Annex) states that a census
survey is required to: identify current occupants; to provide an inventory of
assets; and to provide a mechanism to update this information so that the
latest information is available at the time of their displacement. Section
viii, Valuation and Compensation for Losses, states that replacement cost for
houses and other structures is the market cost of the materials to build a
replacement structure and for urban land it is the pre-displacement market
value [as opposed to pre-project market value] of land of equal size and use.
This task is only briefly
referred to in Section v (a), Legal Framework. The wording of Sections iv and
viii seem to imply that valuation and compensation are assessed on the day
before displacement. This is impractical because the number of affected
persons and the value of their assets will increase from the day that any
compensation opportunity is made public knowledge. The OD 4.30 did include
under Resettlement Planning, Section vi (d), Valuation of and Compensation
for Lost Assets, a statement requiring "mechanisms to prevent illegal
encroachers and squatters, including an influx of nonresidents entering to
take advantage of such benefits, from participating in the compensation arrangements,
by an early recording of the numbers and names of the affected populations
entitled to compensation/rehabilitation." This seems to have been
omitted from the Draft OP 4.12.
The identification of the
affected persons and their assets and the valuation of their assets, is a
critical event in the resettlement process. It has to be clearly decided when
this is done and it has to be part of, and preferably the first order of
business of, the consultation/negotiation process with the affected persons.
The methodology for identification and valuation has to be established. This
involves considerable work by the Proponent.
This comment ties in with the
one made by Thayer Scudder of the CIT, to the effect that once the prospect
of relocation is broached, people change their plans. He states that people
stop increasing their assets, possibly because of laws and enforcement
requiring them to do so, and thus become worse off than they would have been.
In our experience in Ghana, perhaps because the framework for establishing
the date of valuation was not well worked out, or because the enforcement for
the same was not in place, people increased their assets, at least initially,
by building or planting new crops. Either way, the point is that the
methodology and the timing of the concept of identification and valuation for
compensation, is critical and complex and can sideline the whole process
and/or leave the resettled persons in a worse position than before, and is
not sufficiently emphasized in the OP 4.12.
b) Community Consultation
Section xiii, Community
Participation, requires a description of (amongst other things) the strategy
for consultation and participation of resettlers and hosts, and the
identification of procedures for grievance mechanisms.
The emphasis should be not just
on information, participation and consultation, but on the recognition that
communities are part of a negotiation for resettlement between the Proponent
and the community; that is, what may start as an involuntary resettlement
process, should, after successful negotiations, be seen as a voluntary
resettlement process. The alternative to failed negotiations should be that
no resettlement takes place (or another attempt is made with new personnel).
The establishment of a negotiating forum and the membership of this forum is
central to the Resettlement Plan. Community negotiation implies a much more
active and central role for communities than what appears to be put forward
in the OP 4.12.
October 30, 1999
T. Herbert
Prerana Resource Centre
Hazaribag, Bihar
India
Comments on Draft OP 4.12 dt.
June 22 1999.
In this submission, by "OD
4.30" we mean the former Operation Directive, by "Draft" the
triple Draft OP/BP/GP as released over a year ago, by "Present
Text" the draft Operational Policy/Annex/Bank Procedures of June 22 1999
which is before us now.
We highlight a few points:
1. INCOME RESTORATION:
TEXT: OD 4.30 no 18 dealt with
alternative income strategies. Also, the Draft Text OP 6 "strategy for
improving or at least restoring the incomes and living standards..." and
Draft BP 6 "plans for restoration of incomes..." and Draft Annex 2
K "alternative employment strategies and training..." also deal
with it.
In the Present Text, its need is
mentioned in policy objectives 1 c, in Required Measures 5 g, but here it
becomes the more general "livelihood" and "development
assistance".
Most strangely these points have
been dropped from the Annex.
Also most noticeable is the change
of "(for vulnerable groups) to include acceptable alternative
income-earning strategies to protect the livelihood of these people" (OD
4.30 No.16) to "information on vulnerable groups".
COMMENT
a) These are changes pointing to a
change of policy.
b) Income Restoration must be
explicated as the most crucial issue in the Policy. THIS CANNOT BE STRESSED
STRONGLY ENOUGH. In the rehabilitation of displacees, economic rehabilitation
(income restoration) is the touch stone which divides those resettlers whose
living standard is raised, and those who are thrown into a downward spiral of
poverty. To destroy the whole economic base of a village, of whole areas of
villages, and not to have clear norms and strategies for economic
rehabilitation is not acceptable. We witness this happening because this
issue is not treated explicitly enough.
SUGGEST
a) In Present Text Annex 11 to
"compensation and other resettlement measures" be added "and
income restoration"
b) In Present Text 7 the words of OD
4.30 No.16 (as above) be included.
c) In the Present Text Annex a separate
paragraph containing the explicitation of income restoration strategies be
included in the way it was in Draft Annex 2 (k). Such strategies which should
be mentioned are:
* existing PAP skills, expressed
preferences of PAPs for IR options, a feasibility analysis of each IR option,
plans to set up effective training programmes, the number and eligibility
criteria of company jobs to be offered to PAPs, timetable and budget for
training and other IR activities, institutional responsibilities for design
and implementation, identification of suitable local training institutions,
assurance that for every displaced adult person there is a potential and
sustainable source of income restoration, benchmarks for monitoring the same.
2. TRAINING:
This has been given importance in
OD.4.30 no 18, now there is no reference to it. Our experience shows that
training for economic opportunities can do a lot to help displacees
"share in the benefits of a project", and this is a serious
omission (change of policy).
SUGGEST: In Annex, training must be
included as it was previously in OD 4.30 and Draft Texts.
3. SOCIO-ECONOMIC SURVEY AND
COMMON PROPERTY RESOURCES
TEXT: OD 4.30 no.11 says
Socio-economic surveys should contain "information on the full resource
base, including informal sector, non farm activities and from common
property." Draft Annex 2 c (ii) had "access to and use of common
property.." Now in Present Text Annex 6 b(i) it has become "common
property systems".
COMMENT:
a) This is a change of text - systems
are different from itemizing and valuating actual property.
b) The lens through which all is
seen is legal ownership, there is little recognition that these natural
resources are not "terra nullius" or greenfields, but actually are
often in the possession of communities apart from, and prior to, any legal
recognition. Yet with so many of our people, these natural resources which
are a major part of their survival base which are forcibly appropriated, and
replacement cost is not made. The basis of this is a narrow stress on formal
legal ownership. Their ownership is not recognized because it is not in
formal legal terms which are universally applied.
SUGGEST:
In Annex 6 (b) (i) the brief mention
of "including common property" be expanded to "including a
full inventory of common property natural resources (especially fuel and
water), from which people derive their livelihood and on which they survival
is based..."
b) Also add "interrelationship
of current land use patterns with the environment".
4. CUSTOMARY HELD LAND:
TEXT: Comment: OD 4.30 no 17 clearly
asserted "common property and non title based usufruct systems governed
by locally recognized land allocation mechanisms. The objective is to treat
customary and formal rights as equally as possible in devising rules and
procedures". Cf also OD 4.20 no 15 (c).
In Present Text 13 (b) and Annex 7
(c), these are now subordinate to "provided such claims are recognized
under the laws of the country".
COMMENT: This is a) a change of
text, b) it is precisely this fact that State law does not recognize tribal
land allocation mechanisms (they often existed before the present State
existed) and that they are genuine land rights, hence Bank Policy has to
recognize and uphold them.
SUGGEST: The above policy objective
statement from OD 4.30 be included in OP4.12 no 13.
5. HOST POPULATIONS
TEXT: OD 4.30 no 9 "the plan
should address and mitigate resettlement impact on host populations"
becomes in Draft OP 5 (d) "minimize adverse impacts". In the
Present Text this need to mitigate/minimize has been omitted.
SUGGEST: In Present Text this
sentence be included in OP 6 (a).
OTHER CHANGES:
6. TEXT: Present Text no 7 omits vulnerable groups
who "may not be protected through national land compensation
legislation" (WB OD 4.30 no 16).
COMMENT: It is precisely to address
this failure in legislation that has to be explicitated.
SUGGEST: This sentence be included
in Present Text no 7.
7. TEXT OD 4.30 no 6. "The responsibility for
resettlement...
COMMENT: In Bank sponsored projects,
there are 3 parties involved: the DPs, the borrower, and the Bank. If
responsibility is not mandatory on either the borrower or the Bank, who
precisely is to take responsible for the involuntary displacement of the DPs?
Submission: OD 6 should be included
in an appropriate place.
8. TEXT: OD 4.30 had "consulted... about their
options and rights" this should be included in Present Text 11 (a).
9. General Comment:
While the need for brevity and lack
of repetition is appreciated, we see a down-sizing and abbreviation that, if
not making changes, diminishes the force of statements. The changes seem to
come from computer cutting and pasting, not from understanding of needs on
the ground.
Example: OD4.30 paras 8 (with fn)
and 9 dealt with integration of resettlers and host communities. It went into
Draft GP para. 2, and now in O 16 c - it is a mere 13 words. It is an
important issue: resettlers moving into a host village is a source of
economic deprivation of already short natural resources and a source of
social conflict not easily resolved. Although in seminal form in 16 c, it
fails to effectively deal with the issue. ******
October 31, 1999
To: President James Wolfenson
The
World Bank Group
Washington, DC.
Submitted
via Resettlement_Help_Desk@worldbank.org
From: The Ritsumeikan
University Research Group on
Involuntary Resettlement (RURG)
Kyoto, Japan
56-1
Tohjiin-Kita-machi, Kitaku, Kyoto 604-8437 JAPAN
Tel: +81 (0)75-465-1111
Contact
to: Miss. JO, Phil Hwa, The graduate school of Policy Science
Mail
to: rurgir@anet.ne.jp
RURG Comments on The World Bank
Group Draft Involuntary Resettlement Policy 4.12
We are most pleased to have the
opportunity to comment on the World Bank pioneering efforts to clarify the
rights of people who are involuntarily displaced. We are grateful for the
opportunity to submit our comments on The World Bank's Draft Involuntary
Resettlement Policy 4.12. We are M.A. and Ph.D. graduate students at
Ritsumeikan University, Kyoto, Japan, majoring in Policy Science,
International Relations, and Socio-history who have been analyzing
involuntary resettlement. We are concerned about the socio-economic
assumptions underlying the policy; the need for better resolution, in the
policy, of potential conflicts of interests; resolution of conflicts between
stakeholders; some ambiguities and lack of definitions of key words in the
policy, and the need for more clearly defined disclosure process to
stakeholders.
1. Definitions and
Ambiguities
(1) We found considerable
ambiguity key words accompanying the value-judgment in the draft, such as
"appropriate" (para. 1, 12 and 17), "effective" (para.
6), and "sufficient" (para. 9). These words are used from the
viewpoint of the Bank in this policy. It may be true that such a Bank-based
policy was one of the factors leading some negative impacts on people and
social and natural environment, partly because the policy is one-sided. Moreover,
unless these key words can be clearly defined, we see the likelihood of
increased conflicts between the different stakeholders in an involuntary
resettlement. This struggle would be a product of an ambiguous policy and
standard.Therefore, the Bank needs to insert stronger language into the
policy to assure feedback from the bottom to avoid and reduce the conflicts
of interests (COI) among the actors related to the project. In this sense,
people's participation can be a possible solution for bottom-up feedback.
Although there is reference to participation (See para. 1 & 6) in this
draft, but it does not have clear meaning. The participation, in the draft,
explains only the stages in the project process, as in planning, implementing
and monitoring. However, virtually, it is not saying how participation is
carried out in each step. Therefore, when the Bank makes the policy, it
should offer the "table" that all actors can be seated and each
claim is at least heard.
(2) It is better to reflect
Project-Affected People's (PAP) opinions into the Bank Policy. The present
draft policy does recognize the severe economic, social and environmental
risks and damages on the resettled community due to the involuntary
resettlement. And the policy does not build on the extensive experience found
in its own reviews. In order to reduce and mitigate such damages, the Bank
proposed "appropriate" policy. However, in that policy,
"appropriate" only represents the position of the Bank and,
unfortunately, it does not seem to bring the PAP's ideas of appropriateness
into the policy. Because both the Bank and PAP will have different standard
of value-judgment, the Bank should identify this differences, and reflect
PAP's values into the policy.
2. Social Perspective
(3) We are concerned about the
lack of social perspective in the present draft, which is consistent with
resettlement research, the Bank reviews and the Bank experience. Possible
impoverishment risks of resettlement, identified by the Bank experience and
research and mentioned in footnote 1, have determined that "community*
institutions and social networks are weakened; kin groups are dispersed; and
cultural identity, traditional authority, and the potential for mutual help
are diminished or lost." Apart from the economic loss of assets, the
social and other risks are not addressed by the policy, even though they are
regularly observed to be a part of involuntary resettlement. These damages
are done to communities, not only simply individuals.
*When using the word
"community," the Bank should point out which community the Bank
supposes. In this comment, we note there are potentially several communities,
all of which may have different risks: host community, resettled community,
new community composed by host and resettled community, kin groups,
ex-neighboring community, and community which shared any interests.
(4) We propose the policy
include the following provisions.
a)
Risk Assessment and Evaluation (RAE): Risks mentioned in footnote 1 should be
assessed and evaluated not only quantitatively but also qualitatively to
reduce COI occurred by the economic compensation. Each PAP should have
opportunity to participate in the RAE and have full access to the information
of the risk assessment and evaluation by the Bank. Estimation of compensation
should include development actions, not simply replacement of assets or cash,
necessary to mitigate each risk that is identified. The PAP should
participate in the process to estimate their compensation for reducing COI.
b) Explicit steps to permit the
community to preserve their culture and identity, which are threatened by
resettlement: Culture is a dynamic method to meet the problems for the
community and if the culture of a group is damaged, their ability to cope
with future economic and social problems will be reduced. Preservation
of their culture and identity should not be limited to recording or
protecting the tradition such as the knowledge and the ceremony because the
culture of the community could be a dynamic method to meet the problems. The
focus should be on increasing the community's and individual capacity to
preserve and protect their way of life.
c) Community-based compensation
and development: We are concerned that financial and institutional
arrangements are not called for in the policy to protect community and social
organizations, which are disrupted by involuntary resettlement. Provisions
should be made in the policy to support self-reliance and autonomy of the
community, and compensation should not be limited to individual and/or
financial compensation. This is not simply a matter of paying, but should
address the development and action plans to avoid or mitigate social
disruption such as those identified in the research of Professors Downing (http://www.azstarnet.com/~downing/DIDI1/didi1frames.htm),
Professor Scudder, Mr. Cernea, and others. Organization arrangements should
be included not simply financial arrangements. In cases where the community
lacks the capacity to deal with the disruptions of involuntary resettlement,
we feel that financial arrangements should be made to provide them with a
professional, legal advisor who could play a major role in redistributing the
compensation to the community and mediating COI. Organization capacity
building, including the representatives of stakeholders, provision for and
financing of independent legal assistance, and professional resettlement
specialist advisors, play a major role in assisting the PAP interact with the
Bank and borrower, mediating COI, reducing conflict, and improving overall
project performance.
3.
Conflicts of Interests (COI)
(5) The struggle for power
should be mitigated in any project. The right and responsibility should be
defined clearly and the project framework should be constructed simply and
transparently. Since social, economic and environmental risk continue beyond
the construction phase of a project, the policy should make provisions for
financial and organizational activities, project activity, evaluation and
monitoring until an independent evaluator determines that all risks have been
mitigated and the policy objectives have been achieved.
(6) Where involuntary
resettlement is unavoidable, PAP should be well informed about the project,
the necessity and importance of the project, the reason why they have to be
resettled, detailed planning of resettlement, and compensation they could be
provided. And the draft should be revised to assure that PAP should have
access to policy-making process.
(7) The Bank mentioned
"minimize the scale and impacts of resettlement (footnote 3)" and
"Involuntary resettlement should be avoided where feasible, or
minimized, exploring all viable alternative project designs (para 1
(a))." We are concerned about legitimacy of the decision to resettle or
not, and the lack of definite plan of minimized involuntary resettlement. We
propose that the Bank policy should require disclosure of the information
about the feasibility study and planning of the project to be monitored by
the public before the project is carried out. This should not be a summary,
since PAP should be given the right to examine the scientific and engineering
work used to arrive at this decision.
4. Transparency and
Monitoring
(8) There is a huge information
gap between the implementation agency and PAP. On the ground, an information
gap translates into a power gap. We are concerned that the policy makes no
provision to provide the PAP with independent legal assistance and precisely
the time they need it the most. This may quickly lead to unacceptable
violations by the borrower and the Bank of the human rights of the PAP.
Transparency and disclosure are minimal steps to avoid this problem. This is
particularly true of the need for the PAP to not only understand the options,
but also the risks that the options address. Without this information, PAP's
opinion is difficult to reflect in the developing project plan. This problem
is so serious that we feel the need for a Neutral Mediator (NM) to
incorporate into the policy.
(9) Development is held under
NM that stands between PAP and implementing agency. NM should view the both
comments and take the responsibility. The Bank recognizes the responsible
person. The language, community society, information infrastructure of PAP is
in various ways. In the view of this fact, NM should choice the suitable
method of communication with PAP.
(10) Apart from the NM,
independent monitoring is needed to judge whether the project is progressing
under the objective of policy. However, in the present draft, the
implementing agency is supervising and independent monitor is only playing
supplementary role. Besides, there is no clear specification on the
structure, role and authority of independent monitor (See para. 21).
Accordingly, independent monitor must have an authority to control the
effectiveness of the project. Independent monitor must be autonomous
organization.
(11) A cut-off date established
by the borrower and it is acceptable to the Bank. The persons who encroach
the area after the above "cut-off" date are not entitled to
compensation or any other form of resettlement assistance (See para. 14).
When the progress of project delayed or the project changed the way
unexpectedly, cut-off date should be reexamined along with the project
situation.
(12) The budget of the Bank
will be shown in a public and checked by independent outer-organization.
5. Overall Recommendations
(13) Specifically, we note that
despite the strong participation of Japan in Bank financing, the policy was
not translated into Japanese. Furthermore, we do not feel the present draft
received the full range of comments and wisdom that might have been
available. We would like assurances, form Bank management, that in the future,
policies for public comment will be made available in more languages,
including those of the principal donors and PAP, to enable people living in
non-English-speaking areas to catch the information and to participate in the
process of improving the Involuntary Resettlement policy.
(14) In the policy, there
should be a statement on offering opportunities for all actors to
intercommunicate and create mutual relationship. The lack of mutual
understanding has risks to cause the delay of projects and weaken its
effectiveness. All actors, such as the Bank, PAP, and borrowers, have their
own values. Even among PAP, COI may exist since the community consists of
various people. In this case, the opinions of minority and the weak, like
women, children, the elderly and the poor, tend to be ignored. It is
important to resolve COI, but more weight should be put on avoiding COI
before projects start.
(15) It seemed that in this
draft the Bank did not sufficiently show a principle of policy making on
involuntary resettlement. Accordingly, we could not find the destination
where the Bank aimed by Involuntary Resettlement policy. Analyzing the draft,
we concluded that the Bank should have explicit policy for making policy.
Hopefully, we will contribute
to improve the draft.
Ritsumeikan University Research
Group on Involuntary Resettlement
GONDO, Chie
HARUYAMA, Takako
HIROTA, Bunpei
INOUE, Hirokatsu
IKUTA, Hiroyuki
JO, Phil Hwa
KAWAI, Masao
Nang Mya Kay Khaing
OGAWA, Yuji
SEKIDO, Akinori
SHIGENO, Hiroki
TAKAGI, Shigehiro
UEHATA, Naoki
YAGUCHI, Makoto
Pc. Ian Johnson, ESSP Vice
President, The World Bank
Policy Kiosk www.policykiosk.com
October 31, 1999
Alexandra Page
Indian Law Resource Center
Washington, DC
USA
Comments on the Draft OP/BP 4.12:
Involuntary Resettlement
In response to the World Bank's
request for input on OP/BP 4.12, the proposed conversion of OD 4.30,
"Involuntary Resettlement," the Indian Law Resource Center
respectfully submits the following comments. For more than 20 years, the
Center has helped indigenous peoples of the Americas to secure their rights
and protect their cultures. Our intention is to aid the Bank in crafting
policies and procedures that respect the rights of indigenous peoples and
ensure that Bank-supported projects will benefit rather than harm indigenous
communities.
The special relationship between
indigenous peoples and their traditional lands makes involuntary resettlement
particularly devastating to them. The Bank has recognized this relationship
in OD 4.20 ("Indigenous Peoples"), which states that indigenous
peoples often have "a close attachment to ancestral territories and to
the natural resources in the[] areas" they use and occupy. (OD 4.20
para. 5(a)). Just months ago, in a statement delivered at the United Nations,
a Bank spokesperson emphasized the Bank's recognition that "there is a
very sacred, spiritual and unique relationship between the land and
[indigenous] people" and that "addressing land access, use and
management must be done within the context and the fundamental dimensions of
the cosmovision that define the future of indigenous societies."
(Statement of Alfredo Sfeir-Younis, Special World Bank Representative to the
United Nations, ECOSOC, Geneva, July 28, 1999).
Given this unique relationship, the
Bank should guard against any changes in its policies, procedures, and
advocated practices that might indicate increased tolerance of or support for
involuntary resettlement, particularly where indigenous peoples are
concerned. For this reason, the strong language of OD 4.30 para. 2 outlining
the expected adverse impacts of resettlement should be restored. OP/BP 4.12
retains only a watered-down version of this text in the Notes, weakening
restraints on resettlement.
To adequately protect the lands of
indigenous peoples, OP/BP 4.12 must apply to the broad range of situations in
which project-affected people are effectively resettled. This includes
displacement from traditional lands not officially recognized by a borrower's
domestic legal regime and displacement from lands traditionally used and
occupied, whether or not permanent residences have not been established on
such lands. For example, the OP must recognize the importance of traditional
subsistence activities and sacred sites to indigenous communities.
OD 4.30 emphasized that
"[l]and, housing, infrastructure, and other compensation should be
provided to the adversely affected... indigenous groups... who may have
usufruct or customary rights to the land or other resources taken for the
project" and stated that "[resettlement] plans should contain
provisions for conducting land surveys and regularizing land tenure in the
earliest stages of project development." (OD 4.30 paras. 3, 17). OP/BP
4.12 contains no such protections against inadequate domestic land tenure
standards and expressly excludes from its protections those displaced persons
who have neither formal legal rights nor "a claim" to such rights
under domestic law. (OP/BP 4.12 para. 13). The domestic indigenous rights
laws of many countries fail to meet international legal standards in this
regard.
In addition, the OP creates a
separate and inferior set of protections for peoples displaced by the
creation of parks and protected areas. Many of the world's pristine
environments remain ecologically vibrant precisely because indigenous peoples
have occupied them, used them sustainably, and fought to keep national
governments, extractive industries, and others from despoiling them. For this
reason, the adverse effects of park and protected area projects will in many
instances fall upon indigenous peoples, who in many cases have both preserved
and relied on the land and resources sought to be "protected." The
OP should not allow borrowers to threaten the rights of such peoples merely
because the project at issue is a park or protected area.
Thus, for example, OP 4.12 para. 8
should be revised to provide the same degree of advance protection to persons
displaced by parks and protected area projects (i.e. those defined in para.
2(b)) as is provided to other project affected persons (i.e. those defined in
para. 2(a)). In addition, OP/BP 4.12 para. 9 should not release borrowers
from the responsibility of providing land-based resettlement options to
displaced persons with land-based livelihoods where "the provision of
land would adversely affect the sustainability of the park or protected
area."
Increasingly, international law
recognizes and affirms the right of indigenous peoples to the lands they
traditionally use and occupy. This law must be respected regardless of
whether domestic legal regimes properly protect such rights. (See ILO
Convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, 1989, Arts. 7, 13-19).
Instead of recognizing and embracing these international advances, OP/BP 4.12
diminishes the extent to which indigenous land rights will be recognized and
protected by the Bank when domestic legal regimes fail to do so. This must be
corrected to offer higher, not lower, standards of protection for indigenous
peoples' lands. Language to this effect from OD 4.30 should be strengthened
and added to OP/BP 4.12, and language expressly denying these rights should
be removed.
Similarly, the OP should carry
forward the Bank policy favoring land for land exchanges over cash
compensation for displaced persons. Land is a vital resource for indigenous
cultures, and cash, in most cases, cannot sufficiently compensate indigenous
peoples for the damage done when traditional lands are expropriated. Indeed,
in the United States and many other countries, confiscatory land
"purchases" have been undertaken as a mechanism to destroy
indigenous cultures and assimilate indigenous peoples. Moreover, few
countries have laws and legal mechanisms in place to guarantee that
compensation for takings of indigenous lands is truly fair and in keeping
with a non-discriminatory public purpose. For these reasons, OP/BP 4.12
should be revised to emphasize a preference for land-based compensation and
to require that cash compensation be offered as a substitute only in
exceptional cases.
Finally, the OP should be revised to
strengthen the Bank's role in monitoring and evaluating resettlement plans.
The Bank must be able to step in and provide practical remedies when
resettlement projects go awry. As numerous commentators have noted, reliance
on borrowers to monitor and evaluate resettlement planning and implementation
adversely impacts project-affected people.
We appreciate the opportunity to
comment on OP/BP 4.12 and urge the Bank to commit to further review of the OP
and consultation with indigenous peoples, NGOs and other stakeholders.
Alexandra Page
Indian Law Resource Center
November 1, 1999
Pierre Senecal
Conseiller Environment, Hydro-Quebec
Chair, EIA Technical Committee
Canadian Standards Association (CSA International)
IAIA Past-president 1996-97
Montreal, Quebec
Canada
Comments on Draft OP/BP 4.12
- Involuntary Resettlement
Based on my personal experience
in resettlement projects in North America, Asia and the Middle East, I have
found Draft OP 4.12 clear, in conformity with the results of recent
resettlement follow-ups, focused on the pitfalls which have turned out as the
most frequent factors of resettlement failures and forceful in its attempts
to address these issues. The draft has obviously involved a considerable amount
of work undertaken by many people. Although not perfect, it does represent a
very significant improvement in regard to OD 4.30.
The following remarks should be
viewed as constructive attempts to improve the current draft:
1) Paragraph 2 -- The definition
of "resettlement" and the scope of the policy seem far too
inclusive. According to the clauses of sub-paragraph (a), and as confirmed by
note 22, the policy would be applied even in situations where no relocation
occurs and only a marginal portion of the resource base is lost. I
personnally believe that these types of situations, which are quite frequent,
should be addressed by other OP.s. A resettlement policy should be restricted
to situations which either involve physical relocation or the loss of a
portion of the resource base large or significant enough to force residents
to relocate either on a short on long term basis. In other words, a line
should be drawn between actual resettlements and other types of social
impacts which do not involve resettlement but which can turn out nonetheless
as significant or severe. Another possible solution would be to rename the
policy (by adding "loss of the resource base" for example).
2) Paragraphs 12 (first
phrase), 15 (clause a) and 17 (first phrase) -- The draft OP seems to have
been primarily designed for the assessment of resettlement-related issues at
the full feasibility (or detailed EIA phase) when -- among other data
requirements -- a census of people who would be resettled has been carried
out, as spelled out in Paragraph 12, or is generally expected to have been
carried out. For this reason, the draft OP offers little guidance for the
growing number of prefeasibility or preliminary analyses which are being
conducted today. At that early stage, these census have often not been
carried out yet and other key information or data is often missing. How
should the assessment of a resettlement project should be done at that stage?
What kinds of information should be collected and for what purposes? And in
those contexts where data is much less abundant, what are the criteria which
should be used in order to assess whether resettlement is feasable according
to the policy, the project should go on and a much larger investment should
be made in a more detailed study?
3) More globally, the interface
with other social impacts which do not involve any resettlement but which are
often generated by the same projects -- and with the OPs requiring other
kinds of social assessments -- should be clarified (they are only mentioned
briefly in note 6). A common problem is the status which should be given to
resettlement issues and reports in regard to the other types of social isues
and assessments which should be analyzed or conducted.
I should also mention a larger
issue regarding World Bank Guidelines. They have de facto evolved in
international standards which are often used in contexts where the World Bank
is not involved in any way. The number of projects in which this situation is
being faced has recently grown and is likely to increase very much in the
coming years. In these contexts, among many other issues, the leeway or
bargaining power of those who are being asked to apply the WB guidelines is
obviously very different from contexts in which the Bank can implement its
policies and follow up on them. The statutory role of WB guidelines in
non-Bank financed or related projects opens all sorts of avenues which are
not addressed, for understandable reasons, in current drafts or OPs Should
the World Bank guidelines be "adapted" to these contexts and if so,
because they are so needed, how should they be adapted (and how could they
be)? Or should new guidelines be developed?
P.S. These views do not necessarily
reflect those of Hydro-Québec, CSA or IAIA
November 2, 1999
Jane H. Hill, Ph.D.
President
American Anthropological Association
Arlington, Virginia
USA
The American Anthropological Association
and its Committee for Human Rights thank you for the opportunity to review
and comment on proposed changes in the World Bank's policy on involuntary
resettlement (Draft OP 4.12: Involuntary Resettlement). We appreciate your
efforts to make this a participatory process, especially the translation of
the draft into many different languages (Bangla, Spanish, Portuguese, Hindi,
Urdu, Chinese, Vietnamese, Indonesian, Croatian, and Russian) and the
extension of the deadline by which to provide comments.
We encourage the Bank to further
develop this participatory process by developing and distributing a response
to all comments received, including illustration of Bank efforts to
adequately respond to the substantive nature of those comments.
World Bank guidelines on social and
environmental impact assessment are an essential component of the development
planning process, and have influenced the approach and shape of every
bank-funded development project for the past decade. World Bank guidelines,
policies, and procedures have been adopted or adapted for use by other
regional banks and aid agencies of host countries (OECD countries, the Asian
Development Bank, and others), and represent an example of customary practice
in assessing potential impacts, valuing losses, and devising socially and
culturally appropriate mechanisms to compensate for damages experienced by
indigenous and displaced peoples. Thus, changes in social and environmental
principles, policies and procedures have repercussions far outside of the
range of projects funded by the World Bank.
Our comments on the proposed
policies regarding involuntary resettlement include concerns over what may
prove to be a significant weakening of right-protective policies -- tossing
out language now framed a World Bank-mandated Directive, and presenting more
succinct, yet potentially less protective language as World Bank Policy.
In the preamble to Draft OP/BP 4.12,
the Bank notes that converting the Operational Directive on Involuntary
Resettlement to an Operational Policy does not involve a revision of current
Bank policy, merely a conversion to a new format. We are concerned that this
conversion, while clarifying certain ambiguities, also weakens both the
mandate and the guiding principles that determine what is relevant and what
is significant in a decision making process.
Policies are not legally binding
obligations, they are guidelines selectively employed within a political
context. In an increasingly privatized world, where more and more development
aide is funneled through public/private ventures (such as those funded by the
International Finance Corporation), obligations to clients and shareholders
may supersede, or even render irrelevant, the rights-protective social
policies contained in OP 4.12. Multinational corporations are not signatories
to international treaties and conventions, and while they do have the
obligation to comply with the laws of the countries where they do business,
it is that state's responsibility to insure compliance. Yet, the monitoring
and enforcement of state laws in a private/multilateral development process
is particularly difficult given the peripheral location of many development
projects, the lack of funds to allow regular and intensive scrutiny, and the
peripheral or nonexistent role in negotiating forums. Thus, culpability for
ensuing social and environmental crises is difficult to assign, and given the
availability of private investment capital, when the state or multilateral
funders attempt to apply leverage and renegotiation agreements or actions,
private corporations can simply refinance their loan (as illustrated in the
IFC/ENDESA Chilean hydroelectric dam partnership). When projects are funded
completely by private capital (investment banks, hedge funds, and so forth)
contractual relationships between the private funder and the private
corporation are confined to a specific set of obligations, and while
developer has the legal duty to meet the terms of those contracted
obligations, they are very rarely obligated to insure that goals are actually
met. Given the trends in global financing of large scale development
projects, especially those requiring involuntary relocation, it is all the
more critical to insure that adequate social impact analysis is conducted at
the earliest possible stage, that assessment and decision making processes
are equitable and transparent, and that projects development decisions are
made in ways that prioritize the human rights of affected peoples.
We are strongly concerned that
converting World Bank "Directive" to "Policy" weakens the
impact -- from a regulatory mandate to selectively employed guidance on
particular issues, and this action may prove counter-productive to the goals
of long-term sustainable development.
Our second major concern lies with
the rearticulation of compensatory principles. World Bank Operational
Directive 4.30 recognizes that "development projects that displace
people involuntarily generally give rise to severe economic, social and
environmental problems: production systems are dismantled; productive assets
and income sources are lost; people are relocated to environments where their
productive skills may be less applicable and competition for resources
greater; community structures and social networks are weakened; kin groups
are dispersed; and cultural identity, traditional authority, and the
potential for mutual help are diminished. Involuntary resettlement may cause
severe long-term hardship, impoverishment, and environmental damage unless
appropriate measures are carefully planned and carried out" (World Bank
OP 4.30.2). Thus, the major objectives of this directive are to insure that
the population displaced by a project receives benefits from it and that
involuntary resettlement is avoided or minimized when feasible.
Where displacement is unavoidable,
resettlement plans are to be developed with displaced persons compensated for
their losses at full replacement cost. The Operational Directive also notes
that "Land, housing, infrastructure and other compensation should be
provided to the adversely affected population, indigenous groups, ethnic
minorities, and pastoralists who may have usufruct or customary rights to the
land or other resources taken for the project. The absence of legal title to
land by such groups should not be a bar to compensation" (World Bank OP
4.30.3e). Valuation of lost assets are typically made at direct replacement
cost, and it is recognized that "some types of loss, such as access to
(a) public services; (b) customers and suppliers; and (c) fishing, grazing,
or forest areas, cannot be easily evaluated or compensated for in monetary
terms. Attempts should therefore be made to establish access to equivalent
and culturally acceptable resources and earning opportunities" (OD
4.30.15). In cases where the compensation policy of direct resource
replacement does not work, for example where access to natural resources
cannot be maintained because of the inability to acquire a similar designated
host area, compensation for the loss of access to natural resources is
provided based on an assessment of the value of natural resource use for each
homestead per annum. In short, the principles around which compensation plans
are based include a development strategy and package aimed at improving, or
at least, restoring the economic based for those relocated, and compensatory
policies stipulate the active awareness, engagement, and direct participation
of affected peoples in experiencing the benefits of development.
World Bank reviews of projects
developed under Operational Directive 4.30 clearly demonstrate the need for
stronger mandates insuring that compensatory actions that not only replace or
restore lost "assets," but significantly improve the ability of
people to lead meaningful, self-sufficient, sustainable lives.
Work by World Bank Senior Advisor
for Sociology and Social Policy Michael Cernea illustrates the considerable
damages incurred by local populations when resettlement projects are poorly
planned (1). The long-term socioeconomic and environmental consequences of an
inadequate development project can more than outweigh the benefits generated
by the development itself as clearly illustrated in Cernea's "Risks and
Reconstruction Model for Resettling Displaced Populations." This model examines
the relationships between forced displacement and poverty, with the specific
goal of identifying an analytical framework for recognizing, assessing, and
developing meaningful responses to adverse socioeconomic consequences. The
analytical framework recognizes eight socioeconomic consequences, including:
Landlessness -- expropriation of
land removes the main foundation upon which people's productive systems,
commercial activities, and livelihoods are constructed. Unless the land basis
of people's productive systems is reconstructed elsewhere, or replaced with
steady income-generating employment, landlessness sets in and the affected
families become impoverished.
Joblessness -- loss of wage
employment occurs both in urban and rural displacements. Those losing jobs
include landless laborers, enterprise or service workers, artisans, or small
businessmen. Creating new jobs is difficult and requires substantial
investments. Unemployment or underemployment among resettlers often endures
long after physical relocation has been completed. For several categories of
people whose livelihoods depend on jobs-including landless laborers - job
loss due to displacement causes lasting painful economic and psychological
effects. The previously employed may lose in three ways: in urban areas, they
lose jobs in industry and services, or other job opportunities; in rural
areas, they lose access to work on land owned by others (leased or
share-cropped) and the use of assets under common property regimes).
Homelessness -- loss of housing and
shelter is a severe drop in living standards. In a broader cultural sense,
loss of a family's individual home embodies also the loss of a group's
cultural space, resulting in alienation and deprivation.
Marginalization -- when families
lose economic power and go on a "downward mobility" path,
middle-income farm households do not become landless, they become small
landholders; small shopkeepers and craftsmen downsize and slip below poverty
thresholds, individuals cannot use their previously acquired skills at the
new location and human capital is lost or rendered inactive, useless. The
coerciveness of displacement tends to depreciate the image of self.
Marginalization materializes also in a drop in social status and in a
psychological downward slide of resettlers' confidence in society and self, a
sense of injustice, a premise of anomic behavior. Psychological
marginalization and behavioral impairments, anxiety and decline in
self-esteem, have been widely reported from many areas (2).
Governments and project agencies
also tacitly accept lasting marginalization of resettlers when they consider
it" a matter of course" that the displaced cannot regain their
prior social standard of living.
Increased morbidity and mortality --
serious declines in health result from displacement-caused social stress,
insecurity, psychological trauma, and the outbreak of relocation-related
illnesses, particularly parasitic and vector-born diseases such as malaria
and schistosomiasis. Unsafe water supply and poor sewerage systems increase
vulnerability to epidemics and chronic diarrhea, dysentery, etc. The weakest
segments of the demographic spectrum-infants, children, and the elderly-are
affected most strongly. People forced to relocate increase their exposure and
vulnerability to illness, and to comparatively more severe diseases, than
those who are not. Exposure to "social stress" has differential
consequences on mental health across age, gender, marital and occupational
status (3). Overall, direct and secondary effects of involuntary dislocation
in the absence of preventive health measures include psychosomatic
diseases, diseases of poor hygiene
(such as diarrhea and dysentery), and outbreaks of parasitic and vector-borne
diseases (such as malaria and schistosomiasis) caused by unsafe and
insufficient water supplies and inadequate sanitary waste systems.
Food insecurity -- forced uprooting
increases the risk that people will fall into chronic undernourishment,
defined as calorie-protein intake levels below the minimum necessary for
normal growth and work, and food insecurity. Undernourishment is both a
symptom and result of inadequate resettlement. Sudden drops in food crop
availability and/or incomes are predictable during physical relocation, and
hunger or undernourishment tend to become lingering long term effects. Forced
uprooting increases the risk that people will fall into chronic food
insecurity, as rebuilding regular food production capacity at the relocation
site may take years.
Loss of access to common property
and services -- for poor people, particularly for the landless and assetless,
loss of access to common (non-individual) property assets that belong to
relocated communities (forested lands, water bodies, grazing lands, burial
grounds, etc.) results in significant deterioration in income and livelihood.
After losing the use of natural resources under common property, displaced
people tend either to encroach on reserved forests or to increase the
pressure on common property resources of the host area population (4). This
is a source of both social tension and increased environmental deterioration.
Social disarticulation -- forced
displacement tears apart the existing social fabric and induces
powerlessness, it disperses and fragments communities, dismantles patterns of
social organization and interpersonal ties; kinship groups become scattered
as well. Life-sustaining informal networks of reciprocal help, local
voluntary associations, and self-organized mutual service arrangements are
dismantled. The destabilization of community life is apt to generate a
typical state of anomie, crisis-laden insecurity, and loss of sense of
cultural identity, tending to transform displacement zones into what has been
termed as "anomic regions" or "anomie-ridden areas" (5).
The unraveling of spatially-based patterns of self-organization, interaction
and reciprocity is a net loss of valuable "social capital," that
compounds the loss of natural and man-made capital. The social capital lost
through social disarticulation remains unperceived and uncompensated by
planners, and this real loss will reverberate long and detrimentally during
subsequent periods. "The people may physically persist, but the
community that was-is no more" because its spatial, temporal, and
cultural determinants are gone (6).
These eight basic impoverishment
risks affect various categories of vulnerable people differentially. Certain
population groups are hurt more than others. For instance, recent research
revealed that women suffer more severe impacts and there are cases of
clear-cut discrimination against women in compensation criteria (7). Tribal
groups are more vulnerable than the general population to the impoverishment
hazards discussed above. Children, as an age category, are subjected to
particularly perverse consequences.
Reconstructing and improving the
livelihood of those displaced requires understanding the socioeconomic
content of displacement, and designing equitable risk-reversal strategies
that are backed up by adequate financing. The underlying principle of this
model is recognition that meaningful resettlement plans require more than
statements to justify and "compensate" property losses, but plans
that pursue the actual restoration and enhancement of the income-generating
capacity and livelihoods of the displaced people. Application of the risks
and reconstruction model as a tool for planning resettlement with recovery
requires using the risks matrix to assess problems and develop an
action-matrix for reconstructing the livelihoods and incomes of those
displaced. This requires carrying out a risk assessment in the field,
tailored to the situation at hand; designing targeted responses for decision
makers/planners to reduce predicted risks; encouraging pro-active responses
and participation of the population directly at risk; establishing
transparent information and communication between decision makers/planners
and the populations at risk. The cost of reestablishing a family and a
community is generally bound to exceed the strict market value of the physical
losses imposed on that family or community.
Despite considerable evidence
accumulated by World Bank staff and others that involuntary resettlement
projects have typically led to significant socioeconomic disintegration,
affected peoples are commonly excluded from the benefits of the development
process, and issues of participation and transparency are key contributing
factors-- the proposed Operational Policy 4.12 places responsibility for
developing a resettlement plan is in the hands of the borrower, and
involvement of affected peoples occurs after development project approval has
occurred. Participatory involvement is recommended in choosing alternatives
or options, not in shaping those options, or even participating in the
development decision making process itself. Furthermore, compensatory
principles are limited to replacement for costs of assets directly
attributable to the project; replacement of comparable housing or housing
sites, or agricultural sites; short-term "transition" economic assistance;
and development assistance with the objective to "improve or at least
restore in real terms their livelihoods and standards of living to
pre-displacement levels or to levels prior to beginning of project
implementation, which ever is higher" (Draft OP 4.12.5g).
This language implies that life-ways
can be reduced to a system of valued assets, and adequate and meaningful
compensation can be achieved by replacing the list of lost goods, property,
and related income. Damages associated with the loss of communal space and
place involves much more than tangible assets defined and valued via market
interactions. Displaced communities lose natural and cultural resources,
human environmental experiences, and the social meanings of those
interactions. Market-based valuations, especially those based on pre-project
estimates- do not reflect actual resource replacement cost. Furthermore,
land-for-land replacement does not equate the total content of natural and
cultural resources, communal resources, or the social interactions with those
resources. Meaningful compensatory principles must reflect this broader range
of damages, so as to allow social reconstruction that not only replaces what
has been lost, but does so in ways that respect and reinvigorate the sociocultural
integrity of the community.
In preparing our comments, we
considered the proposed Operational Policy 4.12 within the broader context of
World Bank and the broader social science literature. Compensatory principles
contained in Operational Policy 4.12 do not strengthen meaningful
participation and transparency, and do not insure a commitment to social
reconstruction based on principles of long term self sufficiency and
sustainability. In our view, World Bank Operational Policy 4.12 does not
reflect the lessons learned from past resettlement project failures, and
ignores many of valuable social science recommendations of its' own staff.
To state the recommendations
generated from our review, we urge the World Bank to:
(1). Reconsider the decision to drop
the terminology of "Directive" from World Bank review procedures.
(2). Incorporate language that
mandates the consistent use of transparent, participatory processes in the
impact assessments and resettlement plans associated with in all Bank-funded
projects (including those funded through the International Finance
Corporation).
(3). lncorporate language that
requires meaningful involvement in the development planning and decision
making process by affected peoples at the earliest stages possible-- before
project funding approval is given.
(4). Incorporate language that
establishes internal World Bank AND external independent monitoring, review,
grievance, and response mechanisms in all project phases (planning,
implementation, and post-project). Bank staff, bank and development project
consultants, and project participants should all have the obligation, means,
and opportunity to assess the efficacy of their efforts to create sustainable
and rights-protective development projects.
(5). Incorporate language that
addresses obligations and meaningful responses when resettlement plans and
other mitigating measures fail to meet their stated objectives. When
mitigation measures fail to meet intended social and environmental
objectives, structural mechanisms should allow the identification of these
failures, the restructuring of development activities to address these
failures, and the opportunity for meaningful response by culpable parties--
including the project funders.
(6). Restore and strengthen the language
of OD 4.30, remove language endorsing cash compensation as the preferred mode
of compensation, and reframe compensatory principles and procedures in ways
that acknowledge impacted peoples as members of a broader community.
To conclude, we endorse compensatory
principles that reflect the goals of social reconstruction, reflect the needs
of displaced and host communities, and encourage compensatory action that not
only reflects a commitment to not only replace lost resources, but fosters
the development of self-sufficient, sustainable, and meaningful ways of life
for displaced communities.
NOTES
1. See World Bank (1994/1996)
Resettlement and Development: The Bankwide Review of Projects Involving
Involuntary Resettlement 1986-1993, The World Bank, Washington, DC. This
large scale study reviewed all 1986-93 World Bank-financed projects that
involved involuntary population displacement and was written by Michael
Cernea and Scott Guggenheim. See also, Michael M. Cernea (1986), Involuntary
Resettlement in Bank-Assisted Projects, A Review of the Application of Bank
Policies and Procedures in FY79-85 Projects, Agriculture and Rural
Development Department, World Bank, Washington, DC; Michael M. Cernea (1988)
Involuntary Resettlement in Development Projects: Policy Guidelines in World
Bank-Financed Projects, World Bank Technical Paper No. 80, The World Bank,
Washington, DC; and Michael M. Cernea (1995) Social integration and
population displacement: The contribution of social science, International
Social Science Journal, 143 (1), 91-112.
2. Appell, C. N. (1985) Resettlement
of people in Indonesian Borneo: The social anthropology of administered
peoples. Borneo Research Bulletin, 17(1). Also, see Appell, C. N. (1986) The
health consequences of social change: A set of postulates for developing
general adaptation theory. Sarawak Museum Journal, 36:43-74.
3. See for example, Turner, R. Jay,
Wheaton, B., Lloyd, D.A. (1995) The epidemiology of social stress. In
American Sociological Review. 60, 104-125.
4. deWet, Chris (1988) Stress and
environmental change in the analysis of community relocation, Human
Organization, 47 (2).
5. Atteslander, Peter (1995a) Social
Destabilization and the Development of Early Warning System, Special issue on
Anomie. International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy. 15 (8/9/10),
9-23; and, (1995b) Global development and the meaning of local
culture-reflections on structural anomie, International Journal of Sociology
and Social Policy. 15 (8/9/10), 221-242.
6. Downing, Theodore E. (1996a)
Mitigating social impoverishment when people are involuntarily displaced. In
Understanding Impoverishment: The Consequences of Development-Induced
Displacement, ed. C. McDowell, p. 203-215. Berghahn Books, Oxford and
Providence.
7. See for example, Patricia Feeney
(1995) Displacement and the Rights of Women. Oxfam, Policy Department,
Oxford; and Anita Agnihotri (1996) The Orissa resettlement and rehabilitation
of project-affected-persons policy 1994: An analysis of its robustness with
reference to the impoverishment risks Model. In Involuntary Resettlement in
Dam Projects, A.B. Ota and A. Agnihotri eds, p.19-42, Prachi Prakashan, New
Delhi.
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